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Policymaking in government ministries and agencies is the
inevitable result of the complex and technical nature of modern
policy issues. This reality creates a puzzle: How can policymaking
inside the executive remain true to democratic values? We
confront this question through an analysis of modern pressures on
French public law. We ask if the US. approach, which we call
"rulemaking accountability," has any lessons for French
reformers. The primary aim of this type of accountability is
facilitating public input to assure that democratic values extend
into administrative policymaking.
In France, the public administration traditionally has been
understood, not as a threat to democracy, but as an instrument for
achieving republican ideals. Statutes set out broad frameworks,
but their concrete implementation should be left to impartial,
expert bureaucrats. A specialized judiciary, also composed of civil
servants, oversees the administration. Developments are putting
pressure on French public law. These call for enhanced public
participation, the creation of independent agencies, and the use of
new forms of technocratic policy analysis. Can these new trends
produce a stronger, more democratically legitimate stihte, or are
they in such deep tension that France will either return to old
practices or experience a drastic realignment ofpublic power and
public law? The French system has begun to respond to these new
pressures, but they are still frequently resisted, and reforms have
not coalesced around a consensus view. However, recent decisions
of the French high courts suggest a move toward more oversight of
the democratic legitimacy of administrative processes.
Furthermore, efforts occurring inside and outside the government
are encouraging more open policymaking and the more systematic
study of government programs. Future developments are by no
means clear, but the elements are in place for reforms that
enhance public accountability and support systematic analysis of
policy impacts.
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INTRODUCTION
In all democracies policy is made, not just in the legislature, but also in the
executive. Yet, despite its prevalence, executive policymaking raises concerns of
popular legitimacy that have led some to question its justification. To examine this
controversy, we focus on the French case both because of its distinctive public law
traditions and because these traditions are facing a new and challenging set of
pressures. Because of the high quality of its civil service, France is a particularly
valuable lens through which to examine the impact of new developments. One
cannot simply dismiss the bureaucracy as corrupt, captured, or incompetent.' The
French model of administrative law stands in sharp contrast to the American case.
Hence, it can help illuminate features of American public law that might otherwise
seem unproblematic. Conversely, assessing the French case through the lens of
American law highlights the tensions facing French 0olicymaking institutions as new
developments confront entrenched legal doctrines and practices.
In both France and the United States, constitutional law acknowledges the
policymaking role of the executive branch. The administration is not simply a way to
implement detailed and clearly articulated statutory mandates; rather it plays a
creative rdle in designing and determining policy.2 Policymaking in government
ministries and agencies is the inevitable result of the complex and technical nature of
modem policy issues. Policymakers must also respond promptly to dynamic changes
in conditions. As a result, rules with legal force cannot be the sole responsibility of
the legislature. Either the legislature explicitly delegates policymaking power to the
executive, or the executive assumes this role by default or by constitutional design.4
This reality creates a puzzle: How can policymaking inside the executive remain
true to democratic values? The goal is not to assure that the executive follows the
"preferences" of the legislature, which ofien do not exist in any clear-cut way.
Rather, the administration should exercise its discretion in the broader public
interest, conditioned by statutory language and constitutional principles. France and
the U.S. differ sharply in their responses to this policymaking dilemma.
We ask if the U.S. approach, which we call "rulemaking accountability," could
be adapted to French conditions. Under that concept, if the executive or an
independent agency makes policy, it has an obligation to use procedures that are
'Timoth~e Paris, Is (French) Continental Law Efficient to Fight Conflicts ofInterests?, paper
presented at a symposium on "Corruption and Conflicts ofhfterest", Sciences Po, Paris September 2011.
(discussing the socialization ofcivil servants into the culture of integrity and impartiality).
2 PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION STATE 37
(2010) [hereinafter POWER AND LEGITIMACY], distinguishes between the "executive" at the political
summit ofthe government and the "administration." We consider policymaking at both levels and include
mixed cases where the background work is performed by civil servants and lower-level political actors,
but where the final decision is made by politically accountable individuals.
3 On the difficulty of distinguishing policymaking from administration, see generally James H.
Svara, The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementaritv of Politics and Administration in the Past and
Future of Public Administration, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 176 (2001 ).
4 See 1958CONST. arts. 34-38 (Fr.). Article 37 could be given a strong reading to permit a range
of autonomous executive regulatory powers; however, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council and
Council d' tat has narrowed its scope. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision
No. 81-132DC, Jan. 16, 1982, Rec. 18.
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democratically legitimate, not just technically competent. This does not imply that
they should copy the operation of a representative legislature. Rather it implies that
the executive must facilitate public input and operate in a transparent and
accountable manner so that citizens can understand the reasons for the policy. The
primary aim of this type of accountability is neither to protect individual rights nor to
assure more technically competent policy. Instead, it requires that those making
policy must facilitate public input to assure that democratic values extend into the
administrative policymaking process.
The American policymaking framework emphasizes open hearings, public
participation, the giving of reasons, and political accountability. The process
incorporates the interests of political appointees and of private individuals,
businesses and organized groups. Specialized, expert civil servants play an important
role in the US, but their characterizations of the public interest are not automatically
accorded respect, and the law requires broad opportunities for the public to comment
before agencies can make policy.
In France, by contrast, the public administration traditionally has been
understood not as a threat to democracy but as an instrument for achieving
republican ideals. The French have a very strong concept of the public interest, but
its connection to the laws produced by a representative democratic assembly is often
awkward. If one is wary of the ability of legislatures to produce laws in the public
interest, shifting policymaking power to the administration may seem to assure that
public-spirited officials make the key policy decisions. Statutes should set out broad
fiameworks, but their concrete implementation should be left to impartial, expert
bureaucrats committed to republican values. Career public officials are an elite,
meritocratic corps that checks narrow, partisan politics and are best-positioned to
further the public interest under constitutional and legislative constraints. Policy is
produced by the interplay of elected politicians and career civil servants imbued with
public interest values.5 A specialized judiciary, also composed of civil servants,
oversees the operation of administrative institutions.
As Pierre Rosanvallon explains, the modem French conception of democracy
was built up after a crisis between 1890 and 1920 during which "the idea that a
majoritarian electoral system could somehow express the interests of the whole
society lost all credibility." 6 Critics argued that Parliamentary processes were not
always clear reflections of popular will, but were influenced by lobbyists and other
well-organized interests.7 At the same time, all western democracies, including
The literature on this notion is vast. For a discussion in English, see Lkon Duguit, The Concept
of Public Service, 32 YALE L.J. 425 (1922-1923). For more contemporary analyses, see JACQUES
CHEVALLIER, LE SERVICE PUBLIC (9th ed. 2012); N. Foulquier, Service public, in 2 TRAITI DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 45 (Pascale Gonod et al. eds., 2011).
6 PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: IMPARTIALITY, REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY 3
(A. Goldhammer trans., 2011). See also Peter Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy:
Delegation, Democracy, and Citizenship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1.341,
1376-77 (2004) [hereinafter Paradox].
For a similar argument in the context ofthe United States, see generally Jerry Mashaw, Pro
Delegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). To
take just one example, the Center for Media and Democracy has recently exposed the role of the
American Legislative Exchange Council in supplying templates to states' legislators to implement pro-
gun "stand your ground" laws. In France, the work of lobbies has only recently been investigated in legal
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France, saw the emergence of an administrative power that profoundly changed the
machinery of government.8 These two developments led to a reformulation of
democratic principles. In France the bureaucracy was "a force of realization of the
general interest." The public service ethos of officials was described as "interested
in disinterestedness."'10 As a consequence, "the "Jacobin mandarins" of the high civil
service claimed to embody the Republic as fully as the people's elected
representatives."" Delegation seemed more responsive to republican virtues than
detailed statutes passed by the legislative majority. Parliament delegated
policymaking power to officials who legitimately embodied the general interest.
The role of the courts in France also reflects this confidence in the bureaucracy.
Public officials may fail to perform well in individual cases, and a system must be in
place to discipline those who fall short. However, in line with the fundamental
confidence in officialdom, the main check on the bureaucracy is a system of
specialized administrative tribunals that culminates in the Conseil d'tat, an elite
body that plays both an advisory and a judicial role. Its members are career civil
servants who frequently spend part of their careers as high government officials.
Even though the separation of the jurisdiction administrative and the administration
active is a long-established feature of French governance, in practice, civil servants
judge other civil servants to assure that they further public interest values and obey
the law.12
Contrast this situation with the United States. Generalist courts engaging in
administrative review are staffed by judges who are rarely drawn from the career
civil service. At most, some have experience as elected politicians or as high-level
political appointees. Just as in the case of policymaking inside the bureaucracy, the
contrast is between an elite career body, and one that is more linked to partisan
politics, at least at the time of appointment. Some say that French public law
tribunals are too inclined to side with public officials.' 3 However, American judges'
rulings may track their political history.
scholarship. See, e.g., JEAN LAPOUSTERLE, L'INFLUENCE DES GROUPES DE PRESSION SUR LILABORATION
DES NORMES (2009); GR9GORY HOUILLON, LE LOBBYING EN DROIT PUBLIC (2012).
' The United States is a partial exception. On the late development of its bureaucratic capacity,
see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982). However, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
first U.S. national independent regulatory agency, was established during this period in 1885. JERRY
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012), traces the origins of U.S. administrative law to the early
nineteenth century.
9 ROSANVALLON, supra note 6, at 54, argues that elections and concours (i.e., exams to enter the
public service) were both seen as serving the goal of furthering republican government.
1o Id.
1Id.
2 JACQUES CHEVALLIER, L'ILABORATION HISTORIQUE DU PRINCIPE DE SIPARATION DE LA
JURIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION ACTIVE (1970) [hereinafter PRINCIPE DE
SIRPARATION]. See also Peter Lindseth, "Always Embedded" Administration: The Historical Evolution of
Administrative Justice as an Aspect of Modern Governance, in ECONOMY AS A POLITY: THE POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 117 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter
Always Embedded].
'" ACHILLE MESTRE, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT, PROTECTEURS DES PREROGATIVES DE
L'ADMINISTRATION (1974), gives two arguments in favor of viewing the Council d'ltat as a protector of
2013]
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Before proceeding it is important to stress some similarities between France and
the US. First, neither democracy espouses a simple version of the separation of
powers in which the legislature, executive, and judiciary each stays securely in its
own realm and strictly limits its overlap with other branches. Under that simple
model, powers really are separated and elections are the primary source of public
input. Citizens vote for political parties or parliamentary representatives and perhaps
for a president, but between elections they sit on the sidelines. If the state violates an
individual's rights, he or she has access to the courts to gain redress, but the courts
are not a route to challenge government policies or procedures.' 4 Statutes resolve all
the important policy issues so that officials in the public administration do not need
additional public input when putting laws into effect. If they do look outside their
offices, it is only be to consult experts with scientific and technical knowledge.
Under this view, democratic legitimacy rests in the legislature alone. 15 The
legislature, because it represents the citizens, is the only legitimate venue for
policymaking. 16
Second, neither polity whole-heartedly endorses the neo-corporatist model.
17
Under neo-corporatism, the executive promulgates general rules to carry out
statutory mandates, but before doing so, it must consult predetermined bodies. These
bodies make or recommend policies on the basis of negotiations between a fixed
group of organized interests, such as business associations, labor unions, and civil
society organizations. The government does not engage in open-ended public
consultations.18 The democratic legitimacy of these bodies is questionable if their
membership is not a good reflection of the range of policy positions in the electorate
or if they reflect a balance of opinion that is tilted toward certain stakeholders. In
the administration's privileges: (I) its own self-restraint in limiting the intensity of review and (2) its
defense of some administrative privileges. His analysis has, of course, been criticized. See. e.g., M.
Barbet, Bibliographie, 28 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARI 192 (1976).
14 In France, the Constitutional Council has elaborated a theory of"negative incompetence."
Under this theory, Parliament is the only body responsible for the protection of fundamental rights. It
cannot delegate that power to the executive. In the abstract review ofdraft statutes, the Council can raise
this problem ex officio. See DOMINIQUE ROUSSEAU, DROIT DU CONTENTIEUX CONSTITUTIONNEL 139
(2006). The theory of negative incompetence is akin to the German Wesenlichkeitstheorie and the
Vorbehalt des Gesetzes. Lindseth, Paradox, supra note 6. at 1385-1411.
's This view of the relationship between statutory drafting and executive implementation is a
familiar feature of some German scholarship on democracy. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 7-13
(1995) [hereinafter CONTROLLING]; SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY:
BUILDING ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 15-16 (2005) [hereinafter FROM
ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY]; Werner Jann, State, Administration and Governance in Germany:
Competing Traditions and Dominant Narratives, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 95, 101 (2003).
14 he strongest statements of this view come from German defenders of the post-war German
"democratic political party state." See, e.g., Michaela .W. Richter, The German Party State: An
Assessment, in TRANSFORMATION OF THE GERMAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OR
DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL 62, 62 (Christopher S. Allen ed., 1999). In the French context, some
commentators worry about the consequences of weakening representative government with too much
direct input from citizens. See, e.g., DOMINIQUE SCHNAPPER, PROVIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY: AN ESSAY ON
CONTEMPORARY EQUALITY 189-96 (2006).
7 For a discussion comparing the French case with Germany in the post-war period, see Lindseth,
Paradox, supra note 6, at 1412-15.
18 Neo-corporatist bodies exist even in political systems that otherwise espouse strict separation;
for example, in Germany. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING, supra note 15, at 65.
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both countries, but especially in France, such neo-corporatist consultative bodies
exist, but they are concentrated in particular regulatory pockets, such as
labor\management relations or have purely advisory roles. Of course, one can
imagine corporatist bodies that are sufficiently representative, but the selection of
members and the mode of reaching consensus can easily diverge from democratic
ideals. The most fundamental problem in many corporatist bodies is the discretion
given to government officials and particular interest groups to select the
participants.' 9
France has a constitutionally mandated third chamber, the Economic, Social,
and Environmental Council ("CESE") organized on neo-corporatist lines, but it is
only advisory. It submits reports to the National Assembly and the Government on
draft bills, ordinances, decrees, and financial plans in its areas of concern.20
In the United States many advisory committees also exist, and administrative
agencies can voluntarily engage in regulatory negotiation under statutory guidelines,
but the groups represented around the table are reconstituted each time the process
takes place. The model of stakeholder negotiation does not have a strong hold on
American public law and is in any case a complement to, instead of a substitute for,
open-ended consultation.2
Given the importance of policymaking inside the government and the
inadequacy of neo-corporatism as a model of consultation, three distinct but
overlapping developments are putting pressure on the basic premises of French
public law: they involve process, institutions, and substance. More precisely, these
developments call for enhanced public participation, the creation of independent
agencies, and the use of new forms of technocratic policy analysis. Legal
imperatives arise at the European level, mostly in European Union ("EU't) directives
and policy initiatives. However, each development also has a vocal domestic
constituency both inside and outside the public sector that looks to European and
American models for inspiration.
A fourth pressure arises from the protection of individual rights, originating
primarily in the European Court of Human Rights. Others have noticed the impact of
the new rights jurisprudence on French law, and we recognize its importance.22
'9 For examples of these problems in post-socialist countries see ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM
ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 42.
20 The CESE includes representatives from different social groups, such as unions, business
associations, and experts. The CESE is mandated in articles 69-71 of the French Constitution. Articles 32
to 36 of the Constitutional law no. 2008-724, 23 July 2008 added the environment to this mandate, and
environmental representatives were added to the CESE social groups alieady represented. Article 71 states
that the CESE shall have no more than 233 members. Some recommend an expanded role for the CESE.
See, Interviews with Pierre Lascoumes, Senior Researcher, CNRS, CEE. Sciences, Po, in Paris, France
(November 7, 2011) [hereinafter Lascoumes Interview].and Ldic Blondiaux, Professor of Political
Science, University of Paris I Panthdon-Sorbonne in Paris, France (DEC. 6,201 I).[hereinafler, Blondiaux
Interview
21 Regulatory negotiation is purely voluntary but must be carried out under the provisions of the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Consensus Versus Incenties: A Skeptical Look at Regulatot' Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994);
Cary Coglianese & Laurie K. Allen, Does Consensus Make Common Sense? 46 ENV'T 10 (2004).
22 See MITCHELL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE (2009).
2013]
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However, our focus is on new developments that appear, at first, not to raise as direct
a challenge to French notions of the public interest and the proper role of the
administration. Yet each one forces French public law to face a new set of dilemmas
that occur at the intersection of substantive notions of the public interest and the
institutions of the modem democratic, regulatory state.
The debate over the legitimacy of government policymaking is especially heated
in France, because the country has traditionally relied on the administration not just
for technical competence but also as an expression of republican values. Yet, the
public does not view French bureaucrats as inherently benevolent.23 In recent years,
public choice theories and new public management doctrines have contributed to a
view of administrative action that leaves room for questioning the legitimacy of
administrative policymaking.24 French public law is confronting the contested roles
of civil servants, outside experts, interest groups, civil society advocacy
organizations, and politicians. It faces challenges to the very nature of the public
interest coming from advocates of analytical techniques such as Impact Assessment
(IA) and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).
We will first discuss the push for more .public participation and enhanced
transparency and accountability. Policymaking delegation is widespread in complex
and contested areas, such as the environment or the health and safety of products and
workplaces. However, citizens no longer routinely defer to official judgments of
what constitutes the public interest. Individuals and organized groups are pressing
for a greater role in executive policymaking. Yet, unlike the United States, France
does not have established, generic legal requirements for open-ended participation in
the promulgation of secondary legislation.25 Nevertheless, the French state is
beginning to face up to the need to combine administrative expertise with public
accountability when it promulgates secondary legislation.26 This requires not just
transparency and ex post justification, but also procedures that are open to public
input at an early stage in the policymaking process in ministries, in independent
agencies, and in lower-level governments. Nevertheless, as we will discuss below,
French government proposals have so far been rather modest.
French citizens and civil society groups are supported by European institutions
and treaties-the EU, the Aarhus Convention and the European Court of Human
Rights. 27 European Union bodies advocate for greater public participation in Member
23 For an early scholarly critique, see MICHEL CROZIER, LE PHtNOMINE BUREAUCRATIQUE
(1964). 24 The public choice or positive political economy literature often takes an overly simple view of
delegation in which the ideal is policy that reflects the preferences of the legislature that enacted the
statute, or perhaps the current legislative majority. This perspective sees the administrative process mainly
as a way to facilitate legislative oversight. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
We take a broader view of the democratic project, which leaves space for policy that balances legislative
will and input from the public.
2s See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§551-559, 701-706 (1946). The basic
requirements for informal rulemaking are contained in Section 553 of the Act.
26 With a few exceptions, so far the requirements are sector-specific, not comprehensive.
27 In France international law has precedence over parliamentary law. See CE Ass., Oct. 20, 1989,
Rec. Lebon 190 [hereafter Nicolo].
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State policymaking as part of the "Better" (or "Smarter") Regulation agenda.28 The
European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights includes a right to good
administration.29 In the environmental area, France added an Environmental Charter
to its constitution after ratifying the Aarhus Convention, an international treaty with
a European focus that deals with public participation in environmental matters.30
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), which interprets the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), has considered claims of
procedural injustice, but only insofar as they may violate individual rights. 31 They
seldom consider the procedures used to promulgate either statutes or secondary
legislation as a basis for violation. The right to good administration in the
Convention appears directed toward individual adjudications, but the Court's focus
could broaden over time if it extends its view of rights to include public rights to
participate in executive policymaking. In concert with domestic supporters, this web
of European norms has begun to increase the rights of French citizens to participate
in policy-making over and above the protection they already have against state
overreaching in individual cases.
32
Although rulemaking may require scientific and economic sophistication, that
fact does not negate the responsibility to consult. Policymakers are not simply
making purely expert judgments that citizens ought to respect.33 Rather, the
.29 The initiative was launched in 2001 after the G6teborg and Laeken European Councils. This led
to the publication of a Commission Communication entitled Action Plan: "Simplifying and Improving the
Regulatory Environment", COM (2002) 278 final (May 6,2002). It was the first step of what would
become a comprehensive policy to simplify and enhance the quality of European legislation. See Robert
Baldwin, Is Better Regulation Smarter Regulation?, PUB. L. 485 (2005).
2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 41, Dec. 12,2007, 2007 (C 303) 1.
30 See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, available at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Cnv/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
The Charter for the Environment was added to the Constitution in 2005. See Loi 2005-205 du I mars
2005 relative A la Charte de I'environnement [Law 2005-205 of March 1, 2005 on the Environnental
Charter], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIC FRANIAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAzETrE OF FRANCE], Mar. 2,
2005, p. 3697; Jean-Marc F6vrier, Les principes constitutionnels d'information et de participation, 35
ENVIRONNEMENT 31(2005).
3' The cases mainly deal with the failure of States to give sufficient information to their
inhabitants on the risks of pollution to their lives. See, e.g., Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30,2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/003-1204313-
1251361 ?TID=hhufznhydy (concerning industrial pollution).
32 In theory, the European Convention on Human Right and the EU treaties are separate legal
orders-with separate courts-i.e., the European Court of Human Rights [hereafter ECtHR] and the Court
of Justice of the European Union [hereafter ECJ]. However, the ECJ has increasingly relied on precedents
set by the ECtHR, and under Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has adhered to the European Convention on
Human Rights. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 6, § 2, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) I.
33 Both regulation and policy are difficult to translate into French for different reasons. Regulation
in English can either be translated as rtglementation or rigulation, the former meaning rules or rule-
making. Rigulation is a term that comes from physics and means "maintaining an equilibrium in a
complex" system. We use the English word "regulation" in its first sense. However, there is a debate in
French public law over the applicability of the second meaning. See generally, e.g., G6rard Marou, La
Notion Juridique de Rigulation, 62 L'ACTUALITI JURIDIQUE, DROrr ADMINISTRATIF 347 (2006). In legal
theory, some scholars use the term regulation to capture the "new normative approach" that we are
witnessing today because of clashing models of normativity-i.e., the State and the market. Regulation in
this sense is a "normative approach based on dialogue." See generally Gerard Timsit, Braibant Lecture
2007: Reinventing the State, 74 INT. REV. OF ADMIN. SC. 165 (2008); Gerard Timsit, Normativiti et
2013]
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policymaking process in the executive and in independent agencies is ultimately a
political one.34 Although the participants in policymaking processes in the executive
may not represent overall public opinion, that fact does not mean that their
contributions are irrelevant. Rather, the participants bring both information and their
own intensity of concern to the attention of public authorities. True, the authorities
should not let a weighted average of the comments determine their decision. 33 A
more open and well-justified process does not imply that officials give up their
mandate to further the public interest. Rather, it can produce a more informed choice
because decisions are not isolated from public input. Nevertheless, there may be
tradeoffs. We assess participation as a way to justify policy delegation in a
democracy by opening up space for citizen and group input. However, in practice, it
may simply delay and complicate public choices. This tension between more open
and democratically legitimate administrative policymaking and efficient, technically
competent choices presents real tradeoffs, but we argue that the French
policymaking process would gain popular legitimacy from a move in the direction of
requiring both more public input and more transparency.
We turn next to the challenges that independent agencies raise to traditional
French forms of bureaucratic centralization. The movement toward independent
agencies has been fueled by pressures from the EU and by global trends toward the
privatization of public utilities. Agency independence is more desirable in France
than in the US, not just to insulate the- agency from partisan political influence but
also to give it the freedom to regulate firms where the government still owns a
substantial share. In some cases, such as broadcasting, the government controls a
major firm. These independent agencies, although a familiar feature of the regulatory
landscape in the United States since the late nineteenth century, are newcomers in
France and fit awkwardly into the existing constitutional and regulatory structures.
They highlight the tensions between expertise, public accountability, and political
control in a particularly clear-cut way. On the one hand, the notion of a cadre of
independent, expert officials seems compatible with the French tradition of an elite,
meritocratic civil service. On the other hand, constitutional provisions that place
ultimate policymaking authority with the Prime Minster and the legislature seem to
limit the scope of permissible institutional innovation.
Rather than taking on the entire spectrum of independent agencies in France, we
concentrate on the two agencies that regulate telecommunications content and
infrastructure. We selected these agencies because telecdmmunications and media
are fields that combine strong public concern with the need to regulate complex and
fast-changing technologies. Our study of these two agencies also allows us to
Rigulation, 21 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 84 (2006). In contrast, English distinguishes
between "policy" and "politics," but French uses the word politique for both. In English, policymaking
implies the application of both specialized knowledge and political expediency to the design of public
programs, with some commentators criticizing the politicization of policymaking.
-4 For discussion of these issues in the United States, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, see
generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING, supra note 15; ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO
DEMOCRACY, supra note 15.
35 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulatio'n and Public Law in Comparative Perspective, 60 U.
TORONTO L.J. 519, 528 (20 10); see also generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. I (1998).
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compare an infrastructure agency ("ARCEP") that was created because of EU
requirements and that implements EU law with another agency, the Broadcasting
Commission ("CSA"), that is a domestic creation, although it too implements EU
law.
Finally, we consider the tensions between French traditions of expertise and new
forms of technocratic policy analysis. Both the European Commission and the
OECD have encouraged French legislative and regulatory processes to include
various forms of impact assessment ("IA"), risk assessment, and cost-benefit
analysis. These pressures are especially salient when the government makes policy
through general norms with legal force (rulemaking in U.S. parlance) or when it
presents draft statutes to the legislature. Arguments for IA also arise in planning
large projects at the municipal and regional levels that affect resource allocation,
economic development, and environmental or cultural values.3 6 Support for IA has
been expressed both by French social scientists with economic training and by
members of the career civil service who seek to constrain the politicians' enthusiasm
for lawmaking. IA is now legally required whenever the Government presents a draft
bill to the legislature, with the assessment posted on the website of the National
Assembly. Here the challenge is not so much procedural as substantive. Although
standard descriptions of IA include procedures to obtain public input, it is
fundamentally a substantive criterion for determining if policies are in the public
interest. Yet the technique does not necessarily fit with traditional French notions of
the public interest, and the expertise required to carry out a competent IA is not
necessarily the type that pervades the elite corps of French civil servants. To its
proponents it is a way of articulating public welfare criteria in a more systematic and
quantitative fashion. To its detractors it is a reductionist formula that ignores
essential values. However, because IA has no precise definition, it has been invoked
to justify tradeoffs in policymaking, on the one hand, and to require net-benefit
maximizing techniques, on the other. IA is ultimately a political tool, in that it
implies a commitment to certain values in determining the allocation of scarce social
resources. Hence, it needs to be legitimized consistent with principles of democracy
and the public interest.
Supporters of traditional French republican values are struggling to cope with
these new developments. Can they be resolved to produce a stronger, more
democratically legitimate state, or are they in such deep tension that France will
either return to old practices or experience a drastic realignment of public power and
public law? We identify trends indicating a shift in public policymaking towards the
integration of participatory methods and toward the use of new tools to evaluate the
merits of policies. We assess these developments in light of both the democratic
legitimacy and the technical competence of public policymaking in the French
executive and its independent agencies.
3' These developments are framed by the growing importance of the European Convention dn
Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights and the courts of the European
Union. The French courts directly enforce international law so long as the law reciprocally applies, but
individuals can utilize the ECtHR to seek damages when they have exhausted their domestic options, and
French courts can refer questions to the European Court of Justice. See 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.)
[hereinafter Article 55].
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Section I provides an overview of the basic institutional and legal building
blocks inside France and at the European level. We then move to the three aspects of
our study: efforts to engage the public, the role of independent regulatory agencies,
and finally, the use of Impact Assessment to evaluate policies. Section II shows how
public involvement in executive policymaking is evolving in the direction of broader
public consultation. It highlights some recent high court decisions that support
enhanced public participation. Section III focuses on the constitutional challenges
raised by policymaking in independent regulatory agencies, using CSA and ARCEP
as case studies. Section IV considers how Impact Assessment and related techniques
of policy analysis are beginning to influence French lawmaking. Finally, in Section
V we compare the U.S. and France and argue that a greater sensitivity to the public
legitimacy of the regulatory and legislative processes appears to be pushing French
public law in new directions.
I. PUBLIC LAW IN FRANCE AND THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS
This section introduces the institutions and docirines of French public law to
provide background for our analysis of contemporary trends.37 It begins with
constitutional provisions concerning the legislative competence of the parliament
and the regulatory power of the government, along with provisions on public
accountability. The next subsections introduce the most important institutions: the
Conseil d'ltat with its accompanying structure of administrative courts and the
Conseil Constitutionnel. France has no administrative code, but the doctrines of
French public law have built up over time and are most clearly expressed in the case
law of the Conseil dAttat. The Constitution also contains some explicit provisions
dealing with delegation and public accountability that have been interpreted by both
high courts.38
The three-fold challenges of public participation, independent agencies, and
impact assessment all arose from an ongoing dialogue between domestic French
reformers and European-level officials and legal texts. Domestic pressures for
change are essential to all three developments, but they have been complemented
37 For a comprehensive introduction to French administrative law in English, see L. NEVILLE
BROWN, JOHN S. BELL & J.-M. GALABERT, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1998); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD (1954). For a good
comparative introduction, see generally Lindseth, Paradox, supra, note 6, and Lindseth, Always
Embedded, supra note 12.
38 In addition, in some areas, administrative procedures have been codified--the Livre des
procedures fiscales [Book of Tax Procedures] covers tax law procedures, and the Code de l'urbanisme
[Planning Code] (for building permits, etc.) covers planning law procedures. In addition, legislation
covers some aspects ofthe administrative process. See Loi 78-753 du 17 juillet portant diverses mesures
d'am6lioration des relations entre 'administration et le public et diverses dispositions d'ordre administratif,
social et fiscal [Law 78-753 on Various Measures to Improve Relations Between the Administration and
the Public and Various Administrative Arrangements, Social and Fiscal], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.0.] [OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF FRANCE],I 8 July 1978, p. 2851; Loi 79-587 du
juillet 1979 relative A Ia motivation des actes administratifs et A r'amlioration des relations entre
r'administration et le public [Law 79-587 on the Motivation of Administrative Acts and to Improve
Relations Between the Administration and the Public], J.O., 12 July 1979, p. 1711; Loi 2000-321 du avril
2000 relative aux droits des citoyens dans leurs relations avecles admistrations (Law 2000-321 on the
Rights of Citizens in Their Relations with the Administration], J.O., 13 April 2000, p. 5646.
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and channeled by European developments. France, a founding member of the EU,
has struggled to implement EU policies and directives in our areas of concern.
Sometimes French understandings of a particular challenge are quite different from
those of European actors. This is most obvious in the case of Impact Assessment, but
it occurs elsewhere as well. Other times, the French public law tradition is at odds
with the reform agenda of those inside France and in Europe. This is particularly true
for moves toward public participation where respect for the elite, meritocratic civil
service may clash with demands for increased openness. But the expanded mandates
of independent agencies in response to EU policies also reveal tensions between
constitutional principles and EU law. Overall, European law has had a major impact
on all areas of French law in the last twenty to thirty years, and particularly in our
areas of focus dealing with the interaction between citizens, business firms, and the
state.39
A. The Constitution and the Separation of Powers
Under the French Constitution government ministries and the prime minister
have the authority to issue secondary legislation. 40 All such regulations are
deliberated upon in the Cabinet and must be signed by the President.4' According to
article 37: "Matters other than those coming under the scope of statute law shall be
matters for regulation." The Constitution in article 34 lists the subjects that must be
governed by statute, but these statutes can be implemented through secondary
legislation.4 Secondary legislation is an essential aspect of the French government
structure. However, the ability of independent agencies to issue degrees is
ambiguous under article 37, and the courts have interpreted the Constitution to limit
the agencies' authority.
The executive can issue ordinances under statutory delegations that are then
submitted to the legislature for a vote, which is usually pro forma.43 Article 38 states
that the Council of Ministers has the authority to issue ordinances, seemingly
preventing independent agencies from doing so on their own. Once approved by the
legislature, an ordinance has the status of ordinary law.
Because of the wide constitutional authority given to the Government to issue
secondary legislation, public consultation on their content is a particularly salient
39 International law, especially EU and ECHR law, has profoundly changed the French legal
landscape. France is a monist country, which means that, unlike most common law countries, all
international law norms produce a direct effect and can be enforced domestically without Parliament's
intervention. The struggle in France concerns the place of international law in the hierarchy of norms. The
Constitution clearly says that international law prevails over parliamentary statutes, subject to a
reciprocity requirement. See Article 55, supra note 36. However, the courts did not immediately
acknowledge this provision. The Conseil d'itat finally accepted the supremacy of international law in
1989 in the Nicolo case. See supra note 27.
40 1958 CoNST. arts. 37, 38.
4' Id. art. 13.
42 Most statutes cover topics included in article 34. In the tew cases where that is not so, the
government may "amend" such statutes by decree. However, the Constitutional Council determines
whether or not a statute was enacted under one of the clauses in article 34, and it has an expansive view of
the article's coverage. See id. art. 34.
4' Id. art. 38.
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issue. One cannot claim that all the important policy issues have, in principle, .been
resolved by the legislature.
B. French Public Law Institutions
France has both a system of ordinary courts and an administrative court
system." As A.V. Dicey described the situation in France over one hundred years
ago: "[A]ffairs or disputes in which the government or its servants are concerned are
beyond the sphere of the civil courts and must be dealt with by special and more or
less official bodies., 45 There are three layers: (1) forty-two first instance
administrative tribunals; (2) eight administrative courts of appeal; and (3) the
Conseil d'ittat at the apex of the system. 46 Appeal to the Conseil is generally only on
matters of law, although appeals from some important authorities-such as those of
the Broadcasting Commission-go directly to the Conseil d'Etat on matters of both
fact and law.47
1. The Conseil d'ltat: Tradition and Change
The Conseil d'tat is both the highest administrative court and an advisor to the
Government. 48 The successor to the Council of the King, it was created as an advisor
to the Government with no judicial function in 1799 after the French Revolution.
This advisory role gives its members the first rank among the grands corps de l'Etat.
In its advisory role it must both review ordinances and decrees, classified as Dcrets
en Conseil d'Etat, before they are issued and assess draft government bills before
they are presented to the legislature. 49 This review is routine, and the advice can be
44 The public-private split between the ordinary courts and the administrative courts is not always
clear-cut. If the administration acts in a "private" capacity, private law prevails. Recently, Parliament
extended the jurisdiction of private law courts to cover the individual decisions of certain independent
agencies. For example, it hears adjudications involving the oversight of business and financial markets. A
separate court, the Tribunal des Conflits, resolves disputes about the assignment of cases. It was created in
1848 and given full powers in 1872.
45 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 194
(5th ed. 1897)
46 The current system arose slowly over time as a response to the growing caseload. For an
overview by a retired member of the Conseil d'Ettat, see generally Jean Massot, The Powers and Duties of
the French Administrative Law Judge, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 415 (Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Peter Lindseth, eds., 2010) [hereinafter Powers and Duties].
17 The Conseil d'Ittat hears direct appeals dealing with ordinances and decrees of the President
and rules made by ministers, as well as appeals against the decisions of sixteen independent agencies-
including, inter alia, the Broadcasting Agency, the Financial Markets Authority, the Competition
Authority, the Communications and Postal Authority, the Railways Authority, and the Energy
Commission. See CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.], art. R31 1 -I.
" For English summaries on the Conseil d'Etat, see generally George Bermann & Etienne Picard.
Adminhistrative Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 57 (George Bermann & Etienne Picard eds.,
2008); James Charles Sholto Burehett, Administrative Law--The French Comparison, 69 AUSTL. L.J. 977
(1995); H. B. JACOBINI, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1991); Paul-Marie
Falcone, The Conseild'tat, in AN INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 97 (T. Ablard,
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
49 In 2010,.the Conseil d'Etat reviewed 156 draft laws and ordinances, 810 regulatory decrees,
and 223 other types of government actions, some of which dealt with individual cases, not general
policy-for example, denial of nationality. CONSEIL D'ETAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC: ACTIVITIt
JURISDICTIONNELLE ET CONSULTATIVE DES JURIDICTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES 263 (2011), available at
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics//I 14000263/0000.pdf [hereinafter
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kept secret at the option of the Government. The Conseil is consulted at the end of
the process inside the Government, which allows it to check that all necessary
formalities have been respected, and to be fully informed of all the consultations and
opinions on the drafts. For rules and bills that require the advice of the Conseil, the
Government has three choices: to wholly accept the advice of the Conseil, to reject it
and issue its previous text, or to abandon the proposal. This practice gives the
Conseil considerable leverage over the Government. 0 In a more informal way, the
Conseil also prepares studies and gives policy advice. In the 1870s the Conseil
developed into a true administrative court without giving up its advisory role.s
Organization and Personnel: The Conseil is an elite institution, drawing more
than half its membership from top graduates of the tcole Nationale d'Administration
or ENA. 2 Writing almost twenty years ago, one member of that select group argued
that the Conseil enjoys "considerable presti e" among the general public because it
is composed of the 'la cr6me de la cr6me.' s However, there do not seem to be any
public opinion polls that assess the body's standing with the public. Even though the
Conseil d'Etat is a "pillar of the State" it has a low profile, and citizens' knowledge
of all legal institutions is low. For example, more than half of the French confuse the
functions of prosecutor and judge (parquet and siege). It is, therefore, doubtful that
RAPPORT PUBLIC 201 1]. Article 37 of the French Constitution provides for the consultation of the Conseil
for draft decrees, Article 38 for ordinances, and Article 39 for government bills. Under Article 39, as
amended in 2008, bills prepared by members of Parliament [propositions dai foi] are now reviewable by
the Conseil d'ttat at the request of the president ofeither house. In 2010. the Parliament submitted two
drafts to the Conseil. Id. at 113-115. For advice given by the Conseil d'ttat on the way it and the
Assembly should carry out this process, see CONSEIL D'ETAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC: ACTIVITt
JURIDICTIONNELLE ET CONSULTATIVE DES JURIDICTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES 106-09 (2010), available at
http:llwww.conseiI-.tat.fr/media/document/rapporpublic 2010.pdf[hereinafter RAPPORT PUBLIC 2010].
' The steps in the process are presented in Jean Massot, Legislative Drafting in France: The Role
of the Conseil d'ttat, 22 STATUTE L. REV. 96 (2001).
5 During most of the nineteenth century, the system ofjustice reteine prevailed, meaning that the
ultimate say in administrative disputes belonged to the head of State. An 1872 law gave the Conseil d'ltat
final authority to resolve all administrative disputes. See Lindseth, Always Embedded, supra note 12;
CHEVALLIER, PRINCIPE DE StPARATION, supra note 12, at 109.
32 The ENA is the primary avenue of entry into the French high civil service. See generally
George Vemardakis, The National School ofAdininistration: Training.for the Higher Levels of the French
Civil Service, 12 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 563 (1989). ENA was established after the Second World War to
replace the previous elites, thought to be responsible for the defeat and the collapse of the country during
the war. A similar effort to replace previous elites occurred after France's 1870 defeat by Prussia and led
to the creation of Sciences Po in an effort to establish new elites faithful to the newly established Republic
after the collapse of the Second Empire (1852-1870). See generally Jean-Franqois Kesler, La 'premire'
kcole nationale d'administration, 108 REVUE FRAN(CAISE D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 543 (2004). To
enter the Conseil dtltat, two avenues are available: Ope must be either (I) a top graduate of the ENA or
(2) nominated at the tour ext rieur, which is a political nomination. It brings into the institution people
from the civil society or from other administrations. On the whole, 80 percent of the Conseil d'Etat is
made up of ENA graduates. See BRUNO LATOUR, LA FABRIQUE DU DROIT: UNE ETHNOGRAPHIE DU
CONSEIL D'ETAT 124 (2004). Only eighty French candidates are admitted to ENA each year. For the
statistics, see Combien de candidats an concours?, ECOLE NATIONALE D'ADMINISTRATION,
http:/www.ena.fr/index.php?/fr/institution/ena-chiffres/candidats-concours (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
53 Falcone, supra note 48, at 99.
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many know there is a dual court system, and even if they do, few may have an
opinion on the quality of administrative justice.5
The members of the Conseil d'ltat have careers distinct from most civil and
criminal judges. Of the approximately 300 members of the Conseil d'ttat, about
one-third are seconded outside the Palais Royal, the seat of the Conseil, at any
time. 55 Although its members are formally appointed by the Council of Ministers
under the Constitution, these are lifetime appointments that transcend political shifts
in government.56 They serve in ministries and other public positions, and many now
spend time in the private sector, reflecting the privatization of many formerly public
entities. In the course of a career as a Counselor of State, a member will have hands-
on government experience where he or she is likely to wield considerable influence,
even relative to political appointees. They are trained at ENA and in the Conseil to
draft documents in "legal language" (ligistique) that will withstand future scrutiny
by the Conseil and the administrative courts.
There is almost always at least one member serving on the Conseil
Constitutionnel, and since its creation, the General Reporter for the Conseil
Constitutionnel has been a member of the Conseil d'ltat with only one exception.
Bruno Latour estimates that on average members spend 40 percent of their time
outside the Conseil d'ttat.57 To the extent that members are associated with points
on the political spectrum, a counter-weight seems to be at work. When conservatives
come to power, they tend to bring in members of the Conseil from that end of the
spectrum into the government and vice versa for a left-of-center government.
58
Advice: Law and policy ought to interact most clearly when the Conseil gives
advice to the Government. Unfortunately, details on the nature and quality of
Conseil d'Itat advice are not generally available for public critique. Its advice has
traditionally remained secret unless the Government chooses to release it. However,
recent Governments have, in practice, permitted more of these documents to be
made public. They are published in the annual report of the Conseil d'itat, and the
most important are selected and commented on in the Grands Avis du Conseil
d 'Atat.59 Nevertheless, Government control over their release obviously produces a
biased sample of avis consistent with the Government's priorities.
5' See Katia Weidenfeld, La perception de ia justice administrative par les Franais: Le reflet
abstrait d'une rialiti ignor~e, 31 LETTRE DE LA MISSION DE RECHERCHE DROIT ET JUSTICE 12 (2009),
available at http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr/IMG/pdf/RDJ3 1-2.pdf.
"' Because of the prestige associated with being a member of the Conseil d'ttat, those who
qualify treat it as a life-long credential, whether or not they are serving in the Palais Royal, seat of the
Conseil, or working elsewhere. References to the Conseil d'ttat in this essay refer to the judicial
(contentieux) and consultative work of the Conseil. The percent of members of the CE working outside
the Court went from 24% in 1986 to 36% in 1996. See LATOUR, supra note 52, at 125.
56 French civil.service law provides this job security to members of the Conseil. See Massot,
Powers and Duties, supra note 46, at 416.
S7 See LATOUR, supra note 52, at 131.
See id. at 123-24.
9 There are two kinds of "advice" (avis). Some concern draft government measures; others are
given after a referral by an inferior court-e.g., a first instance administrative court. See generally LES
GRANDS AVIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT (Yves Gaudemet et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter LES GRANDS
AVis].
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Examination of some published avis reveals some features of Conseil d'ltat
review.60 The Conseil claims to be neutral on the substance of policy, and the
publicly available avis seldom represent in-depth policy arialyses. Their form is
strikingly similar to that of decided cases; they are usually quite short, two or three
pages, concentrate on formal legality, and include lists of legal sources and answers
to questions posed by the administration. Some of these questions deal with policy,
but the Conseil has neither the time nor the expertise to provide in-depth analyses.
They do not confront the functional efficacy of the proposed government actions.
However, the Conseil d'ltat does sometimes reach the merits of a proposal in
answering the government's questions. The Conseil pays particular attention to the
quality of drafting. Rules and statutes must be drafted in a clear and precise manner
and must avoid ambiguous terms. 61 The nature of the advice suggests that excesses
of both praise and blame are misdirected. It also suggests that making the avis public
would be unlikely to cause much of a political backlash and could help increase the
legitimacy both of the Conseil and of Government policymakers.
Dual Roles: The Conseil d'ltat originated inside the administration and the
government; yet it is currently both an advisor to the government and a court that
judges the legality of government actions. 62 These dual roles have caused tensions
with European institutions, especially the European Court of Human Rights. The
ECtHR has criticized conseils d'6tat in several European countries for their lack of
independence from governments. 63 It has interpreted article 6 of the European Code
of Human Rights under the common law "theory of appearances" ("Justice must not
only be done but be seen to be done") to condemn any appearance of bias." To
counter this criticism, two French rules govern cases that challenge the legality of a
60 See Assembl6e G6n6rale (Section des travaux publics), Avis no. 362.908, Sept. 16, 1999,
available at http://www.conseil-Itat.fr/media/document//avis/362908.pdf(Fr.); Transfert de March6s
Publics et D6l6gation du Service Public, Avis no. 364.803, Jun. 8, 2000 (Fr.), aiailable at
http://www.marche-public.fr/Marches-publics/Textes/Jurispmdence/CE-avis-364803-cession-marches-
dsp.pdf; Libert6 syndicale Conditions d'exercise du droit syndical, Avis no. 359.702, Sept. 26, 1996 (Fr.),
available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/media/document//avis/362908.pd.
" See LES GRANDS AVIS, supra note 59, at 39.
62 We only discuss judicial review here. The Conseil d'Etat also hears claims in tort (when the
government or a public body causes damages), and disputes over public contracts and public property. See
BRowN, BELL, & GALABERT, supra note 37.
63 The ECtHR ruled on the issue of the combination of functions inside the Conseil d'Etat of
Luxembourg and its compatibility with the right to a fair trial under ECHR art. 6 in Procola v.
Luxembourg, 326 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995). See also Kleyn v. The Netherlands, App. Nos. 39343/98,
39651/98, 43147/98 & 46664/99, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185 (2003) (indicating that the ECtHR objects to
judges adjudicating a case where they have previously given their opinion on a legal text on the sarme
issue). Since a 1996 reform, spurred by the ECtHR decision, the Luxembourg Conseil d'ttat has had a
purely advisory role. See M. Biever, Organisation et composition du Conseil d'Ettat
luxembourgeois, (Sp6cial) 4 LA REVUE ADMINISTRATIVE 22 (1999).
64 ECHR art. 6 has had further consequences on the Conseil dltat within its contentieux or
judicial mandate. The most important concerned the Commissaire du gouvernement (Government
Commissioner), who gave opinions on an independent basis on the legality of the law. The problem was
that this person also sat during the judging phase. See LASSER, supra note 22, at 90-93. Subsequently,
under pressure from Strasbourg, these officials no lpnger sit on judicial panels of the Conseil d'Etat, and
the name of the office was changed to Rapporteur public (Public Reporter) by the decree n* 2009-14 of 7
January 2009 [JORF N*6 OF 8 JANUARY 2009 P. 479]. This strengthened separation of roles only applies to
the Conseil d'Etat as the highest court of appeal; it does not apply at the lower level of the administrative
court system. See J.-C. BONICHOT ET AL., LES GRANDS ARR.TS DU CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 23 (3d
ed. 201 I).
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decree or law already reviewed by the Conseil in its advisory capacity. First, judges
who have previously studied and given their opinion on a norm must recuse
themselves. Second, in the past the prior advice given by the Conseil d'ttat was
confidential and was not available to the parties or the judges. A 2008 change now
provides the full opinion and the file to the parties, and they are discussed openly
before the judge.
In spite of these efforts, the Conseil d'ttat's fundamental structural ambiguity
has led some critics to claim that it is merely a guardian of executive power. A
traditional critique holds that the Conseil is too close to the apparatus of governing to
be an impartial judge." But others contest this, claiming that the Conseil is an
effective check on the executive by a body that understands how the administration
works. A 1963 reform requires all active members to be part of both the advisory
and the litigation section.
Judicial Function: The administrative court system receives a large number of
cases because it imposes few standing requirements beyond germaneness and
interest.68 In 2011 the Conseil d'tat rendered 10,827 decisions, and the entire
administrative court system made 232,840 decisions.69 So long as the plaintiff is able
to present a case competently, the administrative tribunals are not concerned with the
degree of individualized harm. Thus, simply in terms of access, the Conseil d'tat
could act as a stronger guardian of the democratic legitimacy of the state than could
US courts, where standing is tied claims of individual harm. 70 In addition, the
Conseil d'Etat's specialization on administrative and public law matters could also
make it a more effective check compared with the U.S. courts with their general
jurisdiction. Of course, if it did expand the grounds for review, caseload pressures
could persuade it to limit standing and jurisdiction. The solution of the U.S. courts is,
however, not a positive model. If one justifies judicial review as a check on the
democratic legitimacy and competence of the administration, the limits imposed by
65 See LES GRANDS AVIS, supra note 59, at 51. As a matter of practice, the Conseil d'tltat has
always sought to prevent a member of the Council from sitting on a case if she or he had been previously
involved in giving advice on the impugned rule. This rule is now written in the code of administrative
justice. See CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] art. R122-21. However, giving the parties access to the prior
advice proved to be more contentious.
6See MESTRE, supra note 13. For an inside look at the Conseil d'ttat and the impact of
members' ties on the day-to-day work of the Conseil, see the "ethnography of the Conseil d'ttat" by
LATOUR, supra note 52, at 38.
67 See DANItLE LOCHAK, LE R6LE POLITIQUE DU JUGE ADMINISTRATIF FRANCAIS 60 (1972).
"MASSOT, Powers and Duties, supra note 46, at 420-21. The law on standing dates back to the
early twentieth century and is tailored so as to vindicate legality (i.e., recours pour exces de pouvoir). See
also Burchett, supra note 48, at 981 (noting that the right of review under French administrative law
extends beyond the person affected so that an appeal is possible for every administrative decision in order
to test its legality).
6CONSEIL D'tTAT, I RAPPORT PUBLIC: ACTIVITt JURIDICTIONNELLE ET CONSULTATIVE DES
JURIDICTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES 21 (2012), available at
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/1 24000492/0000.pdf lhereinafter
RAPPORT PUBLIC 2012].
70 The American law of standing is complex and contested. For an overview, see generally PETER
L. STRAUS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d. ed. 2002). See also generally Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
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U.S. standing law do not sort cases in a principled fashion. Furthermore, they are not
linked to the nature of review once the courts have taken a case.7'
In practice, most cases in the administrative courts involve individual claims of
state overreaching and local government disputes. Many common French
administrative law disputes would never arise in federal courts in the United States
absent a constitutional law claim: for example, the taking of private property for
public use. 72 -The French courts' concern with local planning and infrastructure has
created a body of law has no direct parallel in the United States, where most such
disputes are the province of state and local judiciaries.
France has no administrative law code, but the case law of the Conseil d'ltat
provides an ongoing framework for public law. In this sense, French administrative
law is judge-made law. Some general principles of public law and judicial review
surface again and again in the case law.73 The basis of judicial review is legality: he
administrative judge has to decide only whether a decision is legal.74 The grounds of
review are numerous. They are usually classified into two groups: external legality,
which concerns the jurisdiction of the decision-maker, the form of the complaint,
and procedural violations; and internal legality, which concerns compliance with the
law. The administrative judge reviews questions of law and fact using inquisitorial
procedures. At first, the administrative judge enjoyed very blunt powers; he could
only quash or sustain the impugned decision. Now, administrative courts have the
power to issue injunctions that order the administration to implement the correct
decision. The judge can review all aspects of the decision and determine the degree
of discretion he or she will allow the administration in situations where statutes give
the administration broad power to regulate a sector. The Conseil d'tat never openly
defers to the legal interpretations of the administration; questions of interpretation
are always "under the review of the judge" (sous le contr6le dit juge). However,
depending upon the context and the degree of discretion Parliament has afforded the
administration, review can be minimal (university examinations for example),
normal, or maximal (for example, proportionality review when a freedom or a right
is at stake).
Applying these principles in particular cases produces written judicial decisions
that are usually quite concise. This economy of words is typical in civil law systems
where the reasoning of the judge follows the traditional syllogism: the major premise
(the legal rule) is confronted with the minor premise (the facts) in order to reach the
conclusion. The court lists the relevant legal authorities, states the legal issues, and
resolves them. If the Conseil quashes an administrative decision, it finds that is was
illegal but does not usually articulate the options that remain open to officials.
Sometimes when a decision is quashed, the legal alternative is clear, but frequently it
71 Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege; Is Germany a Model?, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (1994).72 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregiatoiy Takings, 86 VA. L. REV.
1435, 1491-92 (2000).
73 For a list ofthe grounds for review, see JACOBINI, supra note 48, at 108-12. See also Burchett,
supra note 48, at 980-82.
74 In this sense, the French administrative law system is very Kelsenien in its vindication of the
hierarchy of norms. Cf M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 310 (8th ed.
2008); see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS 257-65 (Michael Hartney trans., 1991).
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is not. However, now that administrative judges have the power to issue injunctions,
their practice may change. If they wish, they can go further to direct the
administration to act in a particular way.
French public law has no decision comparable to the U.S. case Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 5 In that case the United States Supreme
Court stated that it would defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress
had not directly spoken on the issue in question and if the agency's interpretation
was "reasonable." The case involved rulemaking that took place under the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act requiring notice, a
comment period, and reason-giving. A later case stated a less deferential standard for
a policy that was made without notice and comment.76 Although the exact import of
Chevron remains contested, it stands for the proposition that agencies have some
discretion to interpret the statutes under which they operate." The French courts do
not take this view, but one needs to notice a key difference. Chevron involved
rulemaking. In France the processes used to promulgate secondary legislation are not
generally subject to judicially reviewable requirements ex post. Presently, the
Conseil, in its judicial capacity, may be becoming more willing to review
policynaking processes. 8 Other than that, the only constitutional mandate is the
requirement that draft decrees and ordinances must be submitted to the Conseil
Etat before being issued.79 The Conseil reviews these rules for legality ex ante in
its advisory capacity, but it does not routinely publish its analyses. Furthermore,
compared with the US, procedural violations have not played much of a role in the
jurisprudence of the Conseil d'tat when it reviews the legality of large projects..
This may, paradoxically, be because there is so much law at the administrative level.
Because there are so many technical requirements that large projects must fulfill,
mistakes are likely. If some technical requirements are hard to rationalize on
functional grounds, they become merely symbolic with little practical effect.80 The
administrative courts take note of such mistakes but do not often halt public projects.
Rather the officials correct the mistakes ex post, and the project goes ahead.
However, the Conseil d'tat can intervene if it judges that the procedural lapses
could have affected the outcome. This is not merely an empty gesture. According to
one member of that body, its review of the process of project approval can be
summarized in a few simple principles: the Conseil checks to be sure that the
decision maker was impartial, respected the calendar (the process was neither too
long nor too short), provided information to the public, publicized the opinions
" 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
76 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
77 See generally Peter Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (1990); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An
Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. I (1998);
William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretationfran Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
71 See the discussion of CE, Ass., 23 d~cembre 2011, M.D. et autres, no. 335033, Recueil Lebon
p. 649, infra note 199.
7'The French Constitution states that the Conseil d' ttat must be consulted before the issuance of
both regulations and ordinances. 1958 CONST. arts. 37, 38.
go Interview with Laurent Mermet, Professor of Political Science, Icole Nationale du Gnie
Rural, des Eaux et des Forets, in Paris], France (October 28, 2011) [hereinafter Mermet Interview].
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expressed, and managed a "fair" debate that respected the principle of
proportionality. 8'
The definition of an "administrative act" subject to review includes secondary
legislation.82 However, when the Conseil reviews decrees and ordinances, the
decisions usually provide little guidance on what represents good practice. The
Conseil seldom reviews either the procedures used to promulgate decrees and
ordinances, or the nature of the underlying evidence.8 3 It does consider procedural
irregularities (vice de procdure), but the cases usually involve individual
adjudications and are decided in a highly formalistic manner. In the absence of a
general code of administrative procedure, the Conseil d'ttat has not set forth
procedural principles that apply to all secondary legislation.8' However, certain
statutes require particular procedures: for example, urban and regional planning,
licenses for medical equipment, environmental policymaking.85 The benefits for
democratic legitimacy of more open and inclusive procedures across the board have
not been a concern either in statutory and constitutional texts or in the case law of
the Conseil d'ttat.
An iconic case from 1962 explicitly deals with process, but the case concerns
criminal offenses tried in special military courts, not ordinary administrative
decisions made in government ministries.8 6 The Conseil d'itat found an ordinance to
be void on abuse of power grounds because the procedures violated the rights of the
81 Interview with Jacky Richard, Adjunct Head and General Reporter of the Section on Reports
and Studies, Conseil d'Etat], in Paris, France (December 14, 2011) [hereinafter Richard Interview]. The
definition of proportionality is open to debate, but the European Union seems to have settled on three
broad principles. A measure must be suitable to obtain the desired objective, and necessary to achieve the
objective in that no other measure is less restrictive of individual rights. Sometimes it is applied in the
strict sense, meaning that the burden on the individual must not be disproportionate. For a detailed
analysis, see PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 655-715 (2006).
32 Administrative acts subject to judicial review include all acts of public bodies. It is, therefore,
primarily an institutional criterion that determines the Conseil's jurisdiction. See PIERRE-LAURENT FRIER
& JACQUES PETIT, PRICIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 267 (2012).
13 The administrative courts have had the power to issue injunctions since 1995. C. Maugf6, Les
injonctions pour exhcution de la chosejuge, in MILANGES EN LIHONNEUR DE DANIEL LABETOULLE 593
(2007). A recent development may give the Conseil d'itat greater leeway to affect the administrative
process. Since 1995, the administrative courts have had the power to issue injunctions to reinforce the res
judicata effect of their decisions, and they can give clear directions to the administration. In the past,
without injunctive power, construction on a disputed project could continue. In one notorious case, the
administrative courts ruled negatively in November 1988 on plans to build the bridge to I'lle de R6 after
construction was completed, and the bridge opened in May 1988. The project's promoters obtained a
diclaration d'utilitipublique, which was challenged in court; however, when the trial that nullified the
permit was held, the works were so far advanced that the bridge was protected from destruction because
of its public utility. The bridge and the controversy are described at Pont de ile de Ri, WIKIPEDIA,
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pont-de1%27%C3%AEle-deRC3%A9 (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
Laurent Mermet provided further information on this case.
84 The Conseil d'itat has developed abundant jurisprudence on procedural rules that apply to
adjudications and especially to sanctions.
85 For planning procedures, see, e.g., CODE DE L'URBANISME, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXTOOOO06074075. For environmental
policy-making, see, e.g., CODE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006074220.
16 CE Ass., No 58502, 19 octobre 1962, Canal, Robin et Godot, Recueil Lebon p. 552.
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accused. The procedural violations did not relate to the democratic legitimacy of the
procedures, which in fact had been approved by a referendum.
8 7
Two other cases indicate that the Conseil d'tat will sometimes provide in-
depth review of government rules on substantive grounds. One case required the
state to act under an EU directive; it held that silence or inaction by the minister
could be an abuse of power just as much as action. Again, the opinion does not deal
with the administrative process.88 The second case was a quite aggressive review of
a substantive rule that set doctors' fees, but the Conseil did not examine the
process.89 The case turned on an interpretation of the principle of equality.9° The
decision takes on the substantive merit of a policy in a faiily functional way even if
the ground is the familiar one of abuse of power.
The Conseil, however, does take procedures into account if they have been
mandated in a statute. The cases, however, do not deal with public participation or
Impact Assessment. In one case from 2003 the Conseil held that a government body
that interferes with rights must give reasons based on actual cost calculations. 9 In a
second case, from 2006, the Conseil d'ttat accepts the privatization of highway
building companies, in part, because the executive sought and acted on advice from
impartial experts.92 The national Commission on Privatization evaluated the
privatization decree. The Conseil accepted its judgment even though the first advice
given by the Commission was not made public. 93 These cases, among others, imply
that the Conseil will require either fact-based reasoning or reliance on expert bodies
before it approves an executive policy choice, especially if rights are at stake.
94
"This case is conventionally presented as an example ofthe Conseil d'ttat's independence. The
Evian Treaty put an end to the Algerian war for independence. In the Treaty, ratified by a referendum, the
government was empowered to establish a Military Court of Justice to try the authors of offenses during
the war, who were mainly French Algerians. The ordinance was quashed because it did not give
defendants the right to a review of their cases. After that, General de Gaulle, then President, considered
abolishing the Conseil d'Etat.
' CE Ass., Feb. 3 1989, Rec. Lebon 44.
9 CE Ass., July 16, 2007, No. 293229. See also Marie-Christine de Montecler, Red4ijnition des
regles de calcul des redevances pour service rendu, 27 L'ACTUALITIt JURIDIQUE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
1439 (2007); Julien Boucher & Btatrice Bourgeois-Machureau, Redevances pour service rendu:
! 'assouplissement de la rigle du plafonnenent par le coflt, 33 L'ACTUALITIt JURIDIQUE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 1807 (2007); Laurent Richer, L 'hidonisme au Conseil d'Etat, 38 L'ACTUALITt
JURIDIQUE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 2057 (2007).
9 French judges use a number of"general principles of the law" to resolve cases. Besides
equality, others principles include, inter alia, liberty (freedom of trade), security (right to judicial review;
right to administrative appeal; natural justice; bias; non-retroactivity; obligation to revoke an illegal act;
right to live a normal life), respect for the dead (for a doctor's ethical obligations), and the continuity of
public services. See LASSER supra note 22, at 249; see also RENE CHAPUS, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF
GftNItRAL 94 (15th ed. 2001). The administration cannot ignore these binding principles. Parliament,
however, is free to override them.
9' CE, Mar. 21, 2003, No. 189191, Recueil Lebon p. 144 (concerning a 1997 decree ofthe Prime
Minister that set fees for firms laying cables or wires or building antennas and pylons along public rights-
of-way near roads and highways).
92 CE Sect., Sept. 27, 2006, No. 290716, Recueil Lebon p. 404 (dealing with challenges to decrees
that led to the privatization ofcompanies that constructed and operated highways).
93 The Commission is now called the Commission on Participations and Transfers.
94 For further examples, see cases in the field ofcompetition law dealing with industrial
competition. On the intensity of review in the competition field, see Marie Picard, Contentieux de la
concurrence, in ENCYCLOPIDIE DALLOZ: RItPERTOIRE DE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF (2012).
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Evidently, the Conseil sees no principled bar to considering administrative
procedures and could, as we urge, act to encourage more open and participatory
processes. At this point, its response to procedural challenges has been rather ad hoc,
but it could develop legal doctrine here. However, the most likely response of the
Conseil will be to support legislative or constitutional developments, but not reach
out on its own to establish procedural rights.
95
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, he Conseil d'tat has seen itself as
a guardian of legality and the public interest both at the policymaking stage and ex
post when the law is implemented. The landmark cases on judicial review, dating
back to the end of the nineteenth century, reviewed administrative actions ex post on
purely legal grounds.96 Judicial and advisory review on public interest grounds was
more contested. First of all, the Conseil's competence in this role is difficult to judge
because one can review only a subset of its advisory opinions and because it
explicitly rejects a policymaking role. Second, the Conseil claims not to defer to the
administration's interpretation of the law but rather to control for legality. Thus, its
definition of "legality" is an essential element of its decisions. How far will the
Conseil go in reviewing the quality of information, the credentials of expert bodies,
and the use that the Government makes of that advice? So far, decisions based on
procedure have not produced clear jurisprudence that could guide the administration.
The Conseil may uphold a decree because experts were consulted, but it has not
examined the nature of the expertise. It has also not ruled on the nature and role of
impact assessment or other forms of public policy analysis.
Recent developments suggest some change in focus. Outside the realm of case
law, the Conseil's 2010 Annual Report reflected the importance of public
participation, especially under the Charter of the Environment, a document with
constitutional status,97 and the 2011 Annual Report discusses of the value of public
participation and how it might be managed. 98 A 2012 decision voided a decree on
procedural grounds,9 and the Conseil d'ltat is debating the pros and cons .of a
codified Administrative Procedures Act, although the members apparently disagree
on whether their own broad principles should, in fact, be codified into statute. i'°
2. The Conseil Constitutionnel: The Beginning of Ex Post Rights Review
The French Conseil Constitutionnel has two distinct competences. In the United
States the Supreme Court can only review the constitutionality of a statute after its
passage and promulgation. In contrast, the Conseil Constitutionnel can review
95 For the Conseil d'ttat's own discussion of these issues, see generally CONSEIL D'ETAT,
RAPPORT PUBLIC: CONSULTER AUTREMENT, PARTICIPER EFFECTIVEMENT (2011) [hereinafter CONSULTER
AUTREMENT].
96 Edouard Laferri~re, the author of the first treatise on administrative litigation, defined judicial
review as the trial against an act, decision, or adjudication. tDOUARD LAFERRItRE, TRAITt DE LA
JURIDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE ET DES RECOURS CONTENTIEUX 561 (2d ed. 1896).
97 CONSEIL D'ETAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC 2010, supra note 49
CONSEIL D'ETAT, CONSULTER AUTREMENT, supra note 95.
See infra Part V.
1' Interviews with Olivier Schrameck, Head of the Section of Reports and Studies, Conseil
d'ttat, Paris, France (October 18, 2011), and Richard, supranote 81, Interview with Jean-Bernard Auby,
Professor of Public Law, Sciences Po, Paris, France (November 15, 2011)..
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statutes after passage but before promulgation. This type of review was created at the
beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958. It can only be instigated by a request from a
select group of political actors, a group that, after a 1974 amendment, now includes
elected opposition politicians. 1
The Conseil Constitutionnel recently obtained expanded powers. As a result of a
2008 constitutional amendment, both the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'tat
can now refer cases involving constitutional rights to the Conseil Constitutionnel.
Under these so-called QPCs [questions priorititaire de constitutionait6],0 2 certain
constitutional issues that arise in the other high courts can now be passed on to the
Conseil Constitutionnel at the discretion of those courts.1
0 3
In the past, once a law had been promulgated, the Conseil Constitutionnel
played no further role, and no one could challenge a law on the books under
domestic law. Statutory interpretation was left to the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de
Cassation. These courts might take the constitution into account in interpreting legal
texts, but they could not declare a law void on constitutional grounds. 14 The lack of
ex post review contributed to scuriti juridique: once a law was passed it was
impossible to question its legality. Under this doctrine, Parliament ought not to enact
provisions that change the established legal order unless it could articulate a
sufficient and legitimate public interest.10 5 Courts similarly were not to reach out to
overturn or reinterpret statutes.'06 If the Constitution was changed or amended, all
existing laws would remain in force unless explicitly repealed by statute or by the
unambiguous wording of the constitutional text. Obviously, the downside of sicuritg
juridique is that laws that are arguably incompatible with the current constitutional
text remain in force unless they are explicitly repealed. This is true both for old laws
and for newer mandates that were not subject to ex ante, abstract review.
The introduction of QPCs addressed the persistence of potentially
unconstitutional statutes by permitting both the Conseil d'ttat and the Cour de
Cassation to refer questions dealing with the violation of constitutional rights to the
Conseil Constitutionnel if it had not already judged the text constitutional during the
I0 Some acts and rules must be reviewed before promulgation. 1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.). The
1974 amendments gave the right to refer a bill to 60 Deputies or 60 Senators thus giving the opposition a
route to challenge laws before they went into effect. Id.
102 The phrase is translated as "Priority Preliminary Ruling on the Issue of Constitutionality," but
this seems odd given that a ruling by the CC is definitive, not preliminary. It is not clear why the more
natural English translation: "A Question of the Priority of the Constitution" (over ordinary law) was not
adopted. See generally La question prioritaire de constitutionnaliti (QPC), CONSEIL CONSITIUTIONNEL,
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francaisAla-question-prioritaire-de-
constitutionnaliteila-question-prioritaire-de-constitutionnalite-qpc.47106.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
103 1958 Constitution, art. 61.
104 See, e.g., CE [Ass.], Oct. 3, 2008, No. 297931, Recueil Lebon p. 322 (holding that
environmental affairs had to be governed by statutory law setting out the regulatory framework). See the
"Commentaire aux cahiers" supra. See Conseil d'Ittat, 12 janvier 2009, Association France Nature
Environnement, n*. 289080.
'05 This is a doctrine of good practice, not an enforceable legal obligation.
'04 The problem arose during the French Revolution. In an attempt to curtail the power ofjudges
who were hostile to the Revolution, a mechanism called rif~ri legislatifwas created, where, if a question
of statutory interpretation was raised during a trial, the question had to be referred to Parliament. This
system did not last, and before long statutory interpretation was left to the two supreme courts.
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legislative process.'0 7 It was, in part, a response to the aggressive review of rights
provided by the ECtHR, whose decisions posed challenges to French law.
A framework statute implemented these amendments, and on March 1, 2010 the
Conseil Constitutionnel began to accept QPCs. Referrals are discretionary; each high
court can have the last word by stating that no constitutional controversy exists.'08 In
practice, both courts have made numerous referrals, increasing the caseload of the
Conseil and its importance to French law. The Conseil d'ttat and the lower
administrative tribunals received 2077 QPCs from March 2010 to September 2012.
Of these, 655 came before the Conseil d'ltat. by the end of October 2012, and it
referred 146 to the Conseil Constitutionnel or 22.3% of the total. The Conseil
Constitutionnel had decided 251 QPC cases by the middle of January 2013. Of the
cases referred by the Conseil d'Itat, the Conseil Constitutionnel found about 25
percent at least partially unconstitutional. Other laws were held in conformity with
the constitution but with reservations. These figures suggest that the administrative
courts have been doing a relatively good job of filtering out trivial cases. 19
The introduction of the QPC is likely to affect the role of the French courts in
reviewing the administrative process, including public participation. The Conseil
only reviews legislation under a QPC if the act affects rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution; it does not consider purely procedural violations of
the legislative or administrative process." 10 Recent case law suggests that the Council
may be willing to give a fairly expansive interpretation to its constitutional mandate.
107 Before the introduction of QPCs, the Constitutional Council reviewed proposed statutes for
violations of rights. In a famous case dealing with the freedom of association (liberti d'association), the
Council took an expansive view of constitutional rights that went beyond the text of the 1958 Constitution
to include the text of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution.
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 71-44DC, July 16, 1971, Rec. 29. It read
the open-ended language of the Preamble to include a right to freedom of association. Id. The case is
discussed in Sophie Boyron, Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAw 145, 162 (J.S. Bell et al.
eds., 2008).
'0 Under law 2009-1523 the issue must be important, and the Conseil Constitutionnel must not
have already ruled on the issue. Loi 2009-1523 du 10 d66embre 2009 relative i I'application de I'article
61-1 de la Constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009 on the application of Article 61-1 of the
Constitution], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE FRANqAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
Dec. 10, 2009, p. 21379.
09MThe material cited here is available from the websites of the three courts: Le Conseil d'Etat et
la Juridiction Administrative, CONSEIL D'ITAT (Feb 12, 2013), http://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/dossiers-
thematiques/question-prioritaire-de-constitutionnaite-un-nouveau-droit-pour-eskn2.htmi; Le Decisions
QPC, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionneVfrancais/les-decisions/acces-par-typ/qles-decisions-qpc.48300.htm; Questions prioritaires
de constitutionnaliti, COUR DE CASSATION (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurispnidence -2/questions-prioritaires-constitutionnaite3396. See also
Jean-Marc Sauve, Vice President, Conseil d'lttat, Bilan de la question prioraire de constitutionalid
[Review of the issue of constitutionality], Presentation to the Commission des lois de I'Assembl6e
nationale (Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/media/document/DISCOURS%20ET%/o20INTERVENTIONS/bilan-de-la-qp.pdf.
"0 See 1958 CONST. 6 I-I; CE, QPC, July 9, 2010, No. 337320, (recommending referral to the
CC under a QPC). See also Bertrand du Marais, Etablissements Publics: La Ligaliti de la charte de
nommage internet remise anen question, 274-275 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 45-47 (2010); Conseil
Constitutionnel [CC] decision No. 2010-5QPC, Jun. 18, 2010, Rec. [1 14] (Fr.), available at
http://www.conseiI-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank-mm/anglais/en2OlO5qpc.pdf ("La
m6connaissance par le Igislateur de sa propre compitence ne peut 6tre invoqu6e i l'appui d'une QPC que
dans le cas o6 est affect6 un droit ou une libert6 que Ia Constitution garantit.").
2013]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
Nevertheless, its opportunity to review administrative rulemaking procedures, as
opposed to individual decisions, is likely to remain fairly limited.
The final set of institutional pressures on French public law comes from
European institutions and legal developments. In practice, it is difficult to know how
much of the impetus for change originates from internal as compared to external
influences. However, it is clear that the European Union and the European Court of
Human Rights ire both key actors in the French public law landscape.
C. European Law and Institutions: Challenges to French Legal Sovereignty
European law is of particular importance to developments in French
administrative law, not only because it has become very extensive, but also because
domestic courts are its primary enforcers."' After a period of reluctance, the Conseil
d'ttat has become pro-European." 12 Both the Conseil d'tat" 3 and the Cour de
Cassation 14 have held that EU and ECHR law are superior to French statutory
law." 5 They enforce EU law in the French courts. French public law, in spite of its
long history and deep involvement with French republican traditions, has been
deeply affected by these external influences." 6 What makes modem developments
especially interesting is the extent to which public law developments are a response
to the activities of French civil society and other interest groups, rather than just a
reaction to EU and ECtHR mandates. The jurisprudence of the European bodies,
however, provides another layer of protection to the citizen. Those who challenge
the legality of an administrative decision, decree, or ordinance can claim that it is
contrary to statute, violates the Constitution, or is inconsistent with EU law or the
ECHR.
EU law is framed by a paradox. On the one hand, the doctrine of subsidiarity
implies that Member States should be responsible for the implementation of EU law,
but on the other hand, harmonization of EU law across Europe requires the
Commission and the ECJ to curtail Member States' discretion. EU law requires
national regulatory agencies to be independent if the State is a player in the market.
".As the ECJ put it: "The EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which... became an
integral part of the legal systems of the Member-States." Case I 1/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
mbH v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1134; Opinion of Advocate
General Reischl, Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, 15
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 479,480-81 (1978). See also PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW:
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 344 (2008).
We use the term European Union (EU) to refer to both the present day EU, established by the Treaty
of Lisbon and to its predecessors called first the European Economic Community (EEC) and then the
European Community (EC). These institutions are distinct from the European Court of Human Rights that
was created by the Council of Europe and has a membership larger than the EU.
11 LASSER, supra note 22, at 64.
"' See Analysis of Ocober 20, 1989-Nicolo, Conseil d 'Etat decision: Superiorite des traites stir
les lois [Superiority of treaties over laws], CONSEIL DETAT, http://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/presentation-
des-grands-arrets/20-.octobre-1989-nicolo.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). As is often the case with the
Conseil d'ttat, departures from previous case law are not easy to spot.
"4 See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] ch. mixte, May 24, 1975,
Bull. civ. 4, p.6 , No. 73-13.556.
"' See also 1958 CONST. art. 88-1 (giving constitutional status to EU law).
116 See LASSER, supra note 22, for a study of the extent of this influence across all areas of French
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The ECJ has held that a government body that owns and. operates a public utility
ought not to have the power to make rules that govern the industry where the utility
operates. Otherwise it could be guilty of an abuse of its dominant position.7 As a
result, Member States have created many independent agencies to implement EU
liberalization directives. This is the case for example, for public utilities, such as
energy, electronic communications, mail, and rail. The principle of subsidiarity
conflicts with the policy of increasing the competitiveness of markets, and in these
cases market competition trumps other values.
These agencies are beginning to establish networks for coherent implementation
of EU law in the new European administrative space." 8 In implementing EU
directives, agencies refer both to EU law and to the principles of "better regulation"
espoused by the OECD and the European Commission. 119 Often, EU directives
contain provisions inspired by "better regulation" ?rinciples, requiring transparency
and the participation of stakeholders, for example. - Agencies are at the -forefront of
better regulation practices in the Member States. They often have more freedom to
innovate than do cabinet departments.
The pressures for regulatory reform in environmental policymaking come from
a different direction. International law has' supported the push towards more
participation in environmental regulation: Principle 19 of the Stockholm Declaration
(1972), the World Charter for Nature of 1982, and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development of 1992 all proclaimed a right to education and
participation in the field of the environment. But these instruments had no legal
force. The Aarhus Convention, however, is a treaty that links the right to
environmental quality with procedural rights. Its provisions are designed to enhance
public input in environmental policymaking processes at the national level, but the
legislative process is not covered by its provisions. Its enforcement body is the
Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, but it only issues recommendations, not
binding decisions. France must file reports with the treaty's secretariat at the UN
Commission for Europe. Environmental groups can then file critiques, which may
embarrass the government. 12  European Directives are pushing towards more
"' See Case 41/83, Italy v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 880. See also Case C-202/88, France v.
Comm'n, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 964-72 (1991).
" On networks agencies in the EU, see generally, e.g., Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, The
Development ofAgencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 23
Y.B. EUR. L. 137-97 (2004); Giandomenico Majone, The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and
Regulatory Institutions in the European Union, 3 EIPASCOPE 9 (1997); Edoardo Chiti, The Emergence of
a Community Administration: The Case of European Agencies, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 309 (2000).
'9 The European Commission has developed a strong and established practice of consultation and
participation. See Participation wad Policy, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 34 (Helen S.
Wallace et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010).
120 In the electronic communications sector, see, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 2002/2 1,
On a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, art. 6,
2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 (EC) ("Consultation and transparency mechanism....") [hereinafter Framework
Directive].
121 In cases against France, the Compliance Committee has been rather reticent. See, e.g., Julien
B6taille, La contribution dA droit aux effets de la participation diu public: De la prise en considiration des
risultats de la participation, 2 REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 200 (2010) (discussing the case
concerning the construction by the Marseille Provence M~tropole Urban Community (CUMPM) of a
center for processing waste by incineration at Fos-sur-Mer).
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participation in environmental policymaking. 22 In order to implement the Aarhus
Convention, the European Union has made participation a priority, and it has been an
important source of new administrative practice in the environmental field. The
Sixth Community Environment Action Program states that: "Full consideration shall
be given to ensuring that the Community's environmental policy-making is
undertaken ... with an emphasis on... extensive dialogue with stakeholders, raising
environmental awareness and public participation."' 
23
Outside of the specific areas of regulated industries and environmental
protection, both the EU courts and the ECtHR might in the future increase their
oversight of Member State regulatory processes. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty includes the right to good administration in article 41, but
its focus in on the due process rights of individuals.124 However, some interpret this
new right as calling for more transparency in policy-making and more participation
by stakeholders.' 25 In addition, the EU courts' case law already supports a broader
view of "good administration" that encompasses policymaking processes and that
applies to Member States as well as EU institutions.'
26
The ECHR is also relevant. Article 6 of the Convention gives a right to a fair
trial to European citizens if their civil rights are affected or if they are subject to a
criminal charge. On the surface, this seems to have nothing to do the procedures for
promulgating general norms and rules. However, the ECtHR has defined civil rights
and criminal charges quite broadly. It may view an administrative penalty as a
criminal charge for the purpose of the Convention, and the withdrawal of a license
(to drive a cab, for example) can be linked to a civil right. Thus, in such cases,
agencies have to give the person the rights of a fair trial. In France, these rulings
have fostered a functional separation inside agencies between those who decide and
those who review decisions for their legality. The result is a structure similar to the
U.S. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) system that separates adjudication from other
agency tasks. However, in the United States the agency head or the governing
commission has the last word if it chooses to exercise its authority. In many
French agencies the power to adjudicate disputes and to inflict sanctions is separate
from the power to regulate, and the head of the agency does not have the power to
change the adjudicator's decision.
123 See Parliament and Council Decision 1600/2002/EC, Laying down the Sixth Community
Environment Action Programme, at § 3. OJEC, 10.9.2002, L 242/I.
'24 ECHR art. 41.
'
2 See GEORGES DUPUIS ET AL., DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 26-27 (2010).
'
26 
See RITHA BOUSTA, LA NOTION DE BONNE ADMINISTRATION (2010); see also Joana Mendes,
Good Administration in EU Law and the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (Eur. Univ.
Inst., Working Paper No. 2009/09,2009), available at
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/I2 101/LAW_2009 09.pdfsequence-3.
127 However, if the decision is appealed to the courts, they may require the agency to give weight
to the AU's decision. The iconic case here is University Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (195 1).
However, for disputes that arise in mass benefit programs the agency head only sets the parameters for
individual decisions-a practice that has been heavily criticized. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458
(1983) (permitting the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue guidelines to govern eligibility
for disability benefits).
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With this introduction to the institutional structure and basic concepts of French
and European administrative law, we turn to consider current challenges to
traditional ways of mediating the state\society interface in France, including
pressures for more public involvement, the operation of independent regulatory
agencies, and those urging more systematic policy analysis. These pressures occur,
to some extent, outside the formal structures of administrative and constitutional
law, but they have implications for the very meaning of public law in a republican
democracy.
II. POLICYMAKING PROCEDURES: PARTICIPATION AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Agitation for enhanced public participation and public accountability in France
has come from civil society groups, many with an environmental focus. Mass
demonstrations and other forms of direct action have a long history- it is even said
to be a "national sport128 - and some of them have had a strong influence on
policy. However, organized efforts to manage public debate are more recent. Public
participation occurs during the process of statutory drafting and when policy is made
inside the national executive, in the independent agencies, and at the regional and
local levels. As with any procedural innovation, some question the real impact of the
process, and others worry that more participation might be counter-productive. Are
the processes simply symbolic charades with no real effect, or are they so effective
that they slow down policymaking, undermine its coherence, and favor narrow
interests? Without settling on a definitive answer to these difficult questions, we
consider the tradeoffs through examination of the recent French experience, and we
urge a more explicit debate over the value of more open and participatory
policymaking in the executive and the agencies.
We begin at the local level with the venerable procedure of the public inquest,
and then move up one step to large regional projects where participation is managed
by the National Commission on Public Debate. Next we consider national
consultations that have provided advice in a number of areas, most notably the
environment. We contrast those efforts with grassroots procedures at the local level
and finish by showing that consultation for secondary legislation has had limited
impact so far although new initiatives may change the outlook.
128 See FRANK LEE WILSON, INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS IN FRANCE 174 (1987). A recent example
of a national policy debate, not involving the CNDP that spurred such protests, is the controversy over a
bill amending the civil code to legalize the marriage of same-sex couples. Between October 2012 and
January 2013 the streets of Paris were constantly occupied by protests for or against "marriage for all." On
January 13, 2013, 340,000 persons-according to the police, I million according to the organizers-
marched in Paris to protest against the proposal, arguing, among other things, that they were not heard by
the government and that their opinions were not taken into account. After the protest, President Hollande
met with the organizers to hear their views but also to reiterate the government's determination to press
for passage of the law. Two weeks later a counter-march, estimated at 125,000 people, supported the law.
The bill has been accepted at the National Assembly and is currently being examined by the Senate. See
Steven Erlanger, Thousands Rally in Paris for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, at A7.
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A. The Public Inquest
Traditional French law limited public input to the public inquest. 29 The prefer,
who is the representative of the national government in each d~partement, organizes
the procedures:130 The inquest's task is to inform the population about local and
regional projects, both public and private, and to assist the pr~fet in making the final
decision to approve or cancel a project. An inquest is compulsory for projects that
will involve the taking of private property by eminent domain, 131 and it was
expanded in 2011 to include projects that have an impact on the environment.' 32 The
process originated 150 to 200 years ago, but recently it has become more open and
transparent. The recent changes are partly the result of EU pressure and due to
environmental protests against big projects, such as nuclear plants or, more recently,
the extraction of shale gas in undeveloped natural areas. 1
33
The inquest occurs at the very end of the project planning cycle after a particular
plan has been fully developed. The pr~fet appoints a single Commissaire or a small
committee, selecting evaluators on the basis of recommendations from the President
of the Regional Administrative Court. Those nominated are primarily high national
civil servants, often with engineering backgrounds. A committee usually has two or
three generalists and two or three specialists knowledgeable about the type of project
at issue. Even if committee members are high civil servants, the selection process
can be politicized because the ultimate selection is in the hands of the pr~fet, a
political official.
The inquest evaluates whether or not the project is in the public interest. It is not
a forum for balancing and debating multiple alternatives. The developer-whether
the government, a local authority, or a private firm-prepares a dossier describing
the project in detail and presents it to the pr6fect. Domestic law, reinforced by EU
pressure for more transparency, requires environmental and social impact
assessments.'34 As a result of recent reforms, the project must be presented in a
nontechnical way that includes both an impact assessment (IA) financed by the
developer and the opinion of the Ministry for Environment. The Ministry's opinion
'2 The first law on public inquests dates from March 8, 1810, and simply allowed landowners to
comment on proposed projects that involved the taking of land. See Xavier Dupr6 de Boulois, Les actes
adminristratifs unilatiraux, in TRAIT DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 196 (Pascale Gonod et al. eds., 2011).
'" C6cile Blatrix, La dinocratie participative en representation, in 74 SOCItTtS
CONTEMPORAINES 97-119 (2009).
"' See CODE DE L'EXPROPRIATION [C. EXPROP.] art. RI 1-4-14.
132 See CODE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT [C. ENV'T] art. L123-1. The provision was introduced by Loi
2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour 'environnement [Law 2010-788 of 12 July
2010 on National Commitment to the Environment], J.O., Mar. 24, 2012, p. [12905]
13 See Yves Jigouzo, Principe et idologie de la participation, in POR UN DROIT COMMUN DE
L'ENVIRONNEMENT: MtLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE MICHEL PRIEUR 577-78 (2007).
'-4 Loi 76-629 du 10 juillet 1976 relative Ala protection de la nature [Law 76-629 of 10 July
1976 on the Protection of the Environment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZE'rE OF FRANCE], Nov. 28, 1976, p. 4203 (providing for environmental impact
assessments with a concern for private property rights); Loi 83-630 du 12 juillet 1983 relative A la
democratisation de l'enquete publique [Law 83-630 of 12 July 1983 on the Democratization of Public
Inquiries and Environmental Protection], J.O., Jan. 1, 2001, p. 2 156 (marking a significant step toward
democratizing the process of public participation); Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement
national pour renvironnement [Law 2010-788 of 12 July 2010 on National Commitment to the
Environment], J.O., Mar. 24, 2012, p. 12905.
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balances the influence of the IA, which may be biased because it is financed by the
developer. The dossier is available for a fixed period of time in town halls and other
places (and now sometimes on the Internet). Anyone who asks can obtain the whole
dossier and can make comments, which must be submitted on paper at agreed
locations so they can be "properly" recorded and added to the dossier. The
Commissaire can also request the opinion of anyone with relevant information or
expertise. The public's observations are given more weight than before the 2011
reforms. First, the report of the inquest must mention how the public's comments
were taken into account; second, the Commissaire must communicate the public's
observations to the developer.' 35 However, the public is only invited to comment on
a particular proposal, not to engage in a debate on alternatives. 36 There are no
formal provisions for debate and discussion.
Once comments are recorded and opinions heard, the inquest has three choices;
to recommend that the project be approved, that it be abandoned, or that approval be
conditioned on certain reservations. Its opinion must contain a statement of reasons
to inform the pr6fet and the developer, but it need not respond to the public
comments. In cancelling a project, the opinion cannot propose an entirely new
project. This document is not automatically made public, but if there is litigation
challenging the final decision, the opinion will become part of the public file. The
inquest usually recommends approval of the project, and the pr~fet generally follows
its recommendation, but it is not a rubber stamp. Project planners are likely to take
account of the objections raised by the civil servants who typically serve on inquests.
In recent years a number of projects have been rejected that would have had adverse
environmental or social effects:' 37 If such negative decisions begin to pose a
significant risk to developers, planners can be expected to incorporate these values
up-front.
After a favorable decision, a project can go ahead. However, opponents can
bring a case before the administrative courts to have it quashed, and, at present, the
courts can issue an injunction to put the project on hold while the court
deliberates. 38 Such court-cases provide another route for public input, but once
.. Dcret no 2011-2018 du 29 d6cembre 2011 portant r~forme de 1'enqudte publique relative aux
operations susceptibles d'affecter renvironnement (JORF n°0302 du 30 d6cembre 2011 page 22692, texte
no 12); and Dc6ret no 2011-2021 du 29 d6cembre 2011 determinant la liste des projets, plans et
programmes devant faire lobjet d'une communication au public par voie 6lectronique dans le cadre de
rexp~rimentation prevue au II de 'article L. 123-10 du code de I'environnement (JORF n°0302 du 30
d6cembre 2011 p. 22718, texte no 15).36 Julien B~taille, La proc&lure de I tude d "impact apris la loi portant engagement national
pour I'environnement : des insuffisances xcurrentes, (Sp6cial) REVUE JURIDIQUE DE
LENVIRONNEMENT 241-51 (2010).
137 Michel Prieur argues that the introduction in the 1970s of compulsory environmental impact
assessments in the law-shortly after introduction of similar measures in the United States-has had a
tremendous impact on administrative law and administrative decision-making in France. See MICHEL
PRIEUR, DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 91 (6th ed. 201 I); see also Loi 76-629 du 10juillet 1976 relativeA
[a protection de la nature [Law 76-629 of 10 July 1976 on the Protection of the Environment], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 28, 1976, p. 4203.
13 See Blatix supra note 130, at § 30. After an inquest has approved a given project,
environmental associations frequently appeal to the administrative courts to prevent the commencement of
the project. Once domestic procedures are exhausted, a disappointed property owner may be able to bring
a case before the ECtHR, but the remedy there is limited to compensation for lost property rights. As a
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again the decision will be whether or not a particular project ought to go forward.
Judicial processes are not the place for a broad functional analysis of the available
alternatives.
In short, the inquest includes a form of public consultation which, since a 1983
reform,1 39 has been open to all, but which does not include a public debate. The
process is essentially a way for the national government to exert some control over
spending priorities and economic development at the local and regional levels.
In recent years, many have criticized the public inquest as being too closed, too
ineffective, and for coming too late in the policymaking process.140 In response,
French law and practice have not only expanded the factors considered by the
inquest, but also moved toward increasing public participation through initiatives
outside of the traditional inquest, which are occurring at all levels of government.
B. Consultations and Concertations: Legal Requirements, New Experiments 4,
In recent decades, French law has supplemented the inquest with additional
routes for public input. However, it does not routinely require broad-based
consultation for executive policymaking along the lines of the U.S. Administrative
Procedures Act. A few statutes mandate some form of consultation, but there are no
consistent legal requirements. "Public" input into the policymaking process includes
consultation either with expert bodies established by the State or with labor unions.
Only in the 1960s did participation become a major aspect of public administration
reform. It was proposed as a way to regenerate the bureaucracy and also to foster
social and political links. Thus, participation by those outside the bureaucracy is not
a new concern for French policymakers, but its meaning and implementation have
dramatically changed over the years toward more transparency and, recently, toward
more direct participation.
The French distinguish between consultation and concertation. The former term
refers to consultations with bodies representing various interests; it corresponds to
the "consultative administration" (administration consultative). 42 The bodies
established by the State have a closed membership and usually have no final
decision-making power despite the strong impact of their views on public choices.
The law frequently requires consultation with .one or another body at some point in
the policymaking process. In addition, government ministries and agencies create ad
hoc commissions to aid their decisionmaking. The Conseil d'ttat criticized the
general rule the ECtHR cannot quash a legislative or an administrative decision breaching the ECHR; the
Court can only award compensation for the breach.
"9 Loi 83-630 du 12 juillet 1983 relative & la democratisation de l'enqu~te publique [Law 83-630
of 12 July 1983 on the Democratization of Public Inquiries and Environmental Protection], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAzETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. I, 2001, p. 2156.
1" MICHEL PRIEUR, DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 110 (2011) (contendng that the provisions for
publicity in the law are "disappointing").
141 Interview with Charlotte Halpern Professor, University of Grenoble, Paris, France, November
14, 201 land Phillippe Deslandes, Director General, CNDP (December 13, 2011)..
4 See CONSEIL D'9TAT, CONSULTER AUTREMENT, supra note 95, at 19.
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proliferation of these bodies, especially the permanent commissions, in its 2011
report.
43
An example of an expert group with considerable impact is the National
Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences (NCECHLS). The
government consults with it on any public issue involving ethics--for example, organ
harvesting, donations for transplanting, research on human embryos, euthanasia, the
treatment of personal medical records and problems associated with the
computerization of health-related data, and the commercialization of human stem
cells. The NCEDHLS, often called the "wise men committee," is made up of experts
from various scientific and philosophical backgrounds, such as representatives
belonging to the "main philosophical and spiritual families" (Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish, and Muslim), those chosen for their "qualifications and interest in ethical
problems" (prominent philosophers and intellectuals), and experts from the field of
research.' 4 This elite group is supposed to tell the government what is "moral." Its
opinions on surrogate mothers or assisted suicide, for example, are thought to
represent what can be agreed based on present knowledge. The decision is also
meant to be socially acceptable, but it is not subject to an electoral or public opinion
test.
The government also organizes consultations where it both learns from
participants and gives them information to prepare the way for reform. Ministries
consult groups with a stake in the outcome such as unions, professional
organizations, and councils representing various groups. Even if many of these
consultations serve the valuable function of providing expertise and advice to
decision-makers, they are not equivalent to processes that involve the broader public.
On the contrary, these bodies act as intermediaries between the broader public and
the government.
In contrast, the term concertation refers to open-ended consultations in which
there is give and take that permits a real discussion with concerned citizens and
organized groups. Although the concept dates from the times of French economic
planning, the 70s and 80s extended the practice as a way of involving the public in
environmental policy making. 45 Since passage of the 1995 "Bainier" law,
concertation is becoming more frequent, especially for local and regional projects.
46
The Barnier law sets up early-stage concertation procedures for large projects with
environmental impacts. 47 The motivation was a fifteen-year controversy over the
143Id.
I4 Id. at21.
4 See CMCILE BLATRIX ET AL., RESEARCH ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISION-MAKING: APPROACHES, CONTEXT, STAKES AND PERSPECTIVES ACROSS BORDER 12 (2011),
available at http://concertation-environnement fr/documents/seminaires/CDEOxford_2011 .pdf
(comparing French and British perspectives on the issue and the history of the development of
concertation).
' See Programme Concertation, Dcision, Environnement, available at http://concertation-
environnement.fr/ (provides overview of current developments); see also http://www.concertation-
environnement. fr/documents/regards croises/sencej 2.pdf (study on the results of 30 years of research
on concertation).
'47 Loi 95-4 01 du 2 f~vrier 1995 relative au renforeement de la protection de l'environnement
[Law 95-101 of 2 Feb. 1995 on Reinforcement of the Protection of the Environment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. I, 2001, p. 1840.
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high speed train (the TGV) from Paris to Marseilles between 1978 and 1992 that
involved many public protests that delayed the project for years.148 The law created
an independent National Commission on Public Debate (CNDP), established in
1997, to organize debates on environmental impacts. 149 In 2002 its mandate was
broadened to include socio-economic and development impacts as well as
environmental effects. 150 Thus, it covers most major infrastructure projects. Requests
to the CNDP to organize a debate can be compulsory or discretionary depending on
the nature and importance of the project. For compulsory debates, the private
developer and the public body responsible for the project have to ask the CNDP to
organize a debate. For other projects the request is not compulsory but can come
from a local government, ten MPs, environmental associations of "national
importance", the private developer, the public body in charge, or the Minister for
Environment. About two-thirds of requests come from a ministry. At the initiative of
the national government, the CNDP can also organize public concertations on
national issues, but this is uncommon. It has organized only three so far.15
The debates occur at an early stage before the developer has prepared a final
plan. The CNDP seeks to apply the principles of inclusion, argument, and openness.
The aim is a process that permits a broad range of public concerns to be vetted and
discussed before the government settles on a particular plan. The ministries request
debates for two different reasons: 52 they may hope to get broad public support for a
project, or conversely, they may want to highlight opposition to a local plan that
national politicians or officials oppose or want modified. 
53
14 See B6n6dicte Delaunay, De l'enquite publique all dbat public, La consultation des
personnes intiressies, 8 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ADMINISTRATIONS ET COLLECTIVITIS TERRITORIALES 35
(2011 ) [hereinafter De lenqudte publique].
'49 It began to operate in 1997, headed by a member of the Conseil d'ttat, and in 2002 it was
given the status of an "independent administrative authority."
"0 Loi 2002-276 du 27 f6vrier 2002 relative i la d~mocratie de proximit6 [Law 2002-276 of 27
Feb. 2002 on Local Democracy] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 1, 2010, p. 3808; COMMISSION NATIONALE DU DtBAT PUBLIC,
http://www.debatpublic.fr/ (providing background information on the CNDP); Blatrix, supra note 130, at
106-07; Cecile Blatrix, Genise et consolidation d'une institution: Le dibat public en France, in LE DtBAT
PUBLIC: UNE EXPtRIENCE FRANCAISE DE DtMOCRATIE PARTICIPATIVE 43, 56 (C~cile Blatrix et al. eds.,
2007).
' 5 Ren6 Dosi&e & Christian Vanneste, Conitg d 'vahation et de contrdle des politiques
publiques, ASSEMBLIE NATIONALE (Dec. 1, 2011), Rapport d'information sur les autorit~s administratives
independantes, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/l 3/rap-info/i4020.asp. These involved
nanotechnologies, nuclear waste disposal, and a national highway in the Rhone Valley. The nuclear waste
debate operated in a satisfactory way. The nanotechnology debate was disrupted by strong opponents of
the technology, so it was not really a debate with give and take but rather a series of events that put the
issue in the media. According to one observer, the end result was that the organizations who participated
have taken refuge in a sort of bunker ("se ri uigier dans uie sorte de bunker'). See also Blatrix. supra
note 130, at 113; Interview with Blondiaux, supra note 20.
152 Interview with Charlotte Halpem, Professor, University of Grenoble,, in Paris, France
(November 14, 2011) [hereinafter Halpem Interview].
" Interview with Florence Denier-Pasquier, Administrator, French Nature Environment and
representative of FNE on the Economic, Social, and Economic Council, in Paris, France (Dec. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter Denier-Pasquier Interview].
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The CNDP has 25 members drawn from a range of interest groups and political
bodies, 5 4 but the selection of members is largely controlled by government ministers
or other official bodies. Even those representing environmental groups, consumers
and users, and experts are nominated by various ministries. 55 The'consultations that
the CNDP organizes are routine for large projects so that the project planners must
open their decision-making activities to generalized input from outside. Any
document produced by the public debate takes the form of advice to the relevant
authorities. Even an excellent concertation may not produce a unified
recommendation, and even if it does, the advice has no binding force. 56 However, if
a proposal obtains strong support in the debate and is then completely ignored,
government unresponsiveness could spur street protests or lead to lawsuits down the
line.
The quality of the debates varies. Some provide excellent input to subsequent
stages, but others are just talking shops; still others provoke little interest beyond the
firms and the government.1s Most participants in the debates are existing
associations and groups, not the broader public. For example, one interviewee
mentioned the failure of a debate over a third airport near Paris. According to her,
the debate was poorly prepared and managed and was overly rushed. 5 8 Officials at
the CNDP acknowledge the variability in debate quality, pointing especially to the
lack of participation in some processes.' 59 The CNDP does not try to mobilize the
general public, although the process is nominally open to their input. 16° The CNDP
154 The "grands corps" are very well represented. The current President is a pr6fet (which can be
explained by the importance ofprifets in the process of eminent domain at the local level), and.there are
two MPs (one from the National Assembly and one from the Senate); six local government
representatives; one member of the Conseil d'ttat; another from the inferior administrative courts; one
member of the Cour de Cassation; and one member from the Cour des Comptes. Other members represent
civil society-e.g., environmental and consumer groups, etc.
'55See Hislorique de la Commission: Composition 2007-2012, COMMISSION NATIONAE DU DIBAT
PUBLIC, http://www.debatpublic.fr/cndp/composition.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (the size of the
CNDP was increased from 21 to 25 under Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national
pour l'environnement [Law 2010-788 of 12 July 2010 on National Commitment to the Environment],
J.O., Mar. 24, 2012, p. 12905[ch. IV, art. 246, Il1], to add two labor union representatives and two from
business (including one from an agricultural enterprise). They are to be nominated by the Prime Minister
on the advice of respective labor and business associations. The environmental representatives do not
have the same ability to select their representatives).
156 See Denier-Pasquier Interview, supra note 153. Denier-Pasquier criticized this aspect ofthe
process in her interview.
157 COMMISSION NATIONALE DU DtBAT PUBLIC, CNDP 2009-2010: RAPPORT D'ACTIVITI 5
(2011) (stating that the CNDP is troubled that sometimes the debates attract little interest from the public
beyond those who are directly concerned) [hereinafter CNDP 2009-2010].
'5' See Charlotte Halpem, Les ressorts politiques de /a decision publique en matire de
planification a~roportuaire: Les mobilisations autour de l'agroport Paris-Charles de Gaulle (Centre de
Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po ("CEVIPOF") Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 19,2006).
159 Interview with Philippe Deslandes, Director General, CNDP, in Paris, France (December 13,
2011).
160 Interview with C6cile Blatrix, Professor of Political Science, Itcole Nationale du G6nie Rural,
des Eaux et des Forets, in Paris, France (November 29, 2011) [hereinafter Blatrix Interview]; Blatrix,
supra, note 130, at 106.
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organizes relatively few debates (around ten per year), and the Process is quite
expensive (although not when compared to the cost of the project). 6
The legal rights created by the existence of the CNDP are limited. The Conseil
d'tat reviews the CNDP's decision whether or not to require a public debate.
62
However, once the CNDP has decided to go ahead, the Conseil will not evaluate the
adequacy of the process. 163 The Conseil has not explained why it is inappropriate for
it to review the organization of the debate.
The relationship between consultation and concertation is integral to the Conseil
d'ttat's 2011 report on participation. The report advocates a process where the
government frames the issues in general terms, followed by an open-ended
concertation, a stage of impact assessment inside the government, and a more formal
consultation at the end. The authors of the report argue for the application of this
general model to all kinds of government actions, not just "big projects" in the
municipalities and regions. '64
C. La Grenelle: Symbolic Politics or Genuine Involvement?
At the local level, the national government has a clear interest in monitoring the
development of large projects that require the expenditure of government funds and
need regional coordination. It may want to use participatory processes as a check on
local governments that are captured by narrow interests. However, high-level
government officials will be less interested in checks on their own policymaking
freedom. In France's unitary state, participation was first legally mandated at the
regional and local levels under CNDP oversight. Although the CNDP can organize
national debates, the government has seldom requested its help.
Despite this, the global push toward more public participation has been felt at
the national level. The Government responded with a series of large public
consultations, of which the most important was the 2007 Environmental Grenelle.
These consultations are advisory processes organized at the Government's initiative
outside the constraints of the CNDP. They do not give anyone legal rights either to
challenge the invitation list or the policy recommendations, and the Government is
under no obligation to organize them. However, these processes differ from
traditional French experiences of participation in that they are not binary interactions
with the government at the center (e.g., unions-government or associations-
161 CNDP 2009-2010, supra note 157, at 96 (the cost of the public debate for developers in 2008-
2009 totaled 550,000 to 3 million euros); see also Delaunay, De l'enqu~tepublique, supra note 148, at 37
(analysis of shortcomings).
162 CNDP 2009-2010, supra note 157, at 113.
,63 B6ndicte Delaunay, Les Limites aux recours contre les dicisions de la Commission nationale
du dibatpublic, 60 ACTUALITI JURIDIQUE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 2100, (2004) [hereinafter Les Limites
aux recours].
16 See generally CONSEIL D'TAT, CONSULTER AUTREMENT, supra note 95; see also Richard
Interview, supra note 81.
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government). 65 In general they have been organized to help develop legislative
proposals, not to assist in the promulgation of decrees or the drafting of ordinances.
The history of the Grenelle, named after the Rue de Grenelle, where many
government ministries are located, dates to the late 1960s. The government
organized the first such gathering in June 1968, bringing labor union leaders and
rank and file members together with government and business representatives and
produced an agreement that ended massive and disruptive strikes.'6 The term has
been appropriated by more recent governments to refer to any large-scale
government-organized concertation process with an agenda and a time limit that
focuses on a particular issue area. They generally involve stakeholders other than
political parties. The recent Grenelle processes have provided advice to the
government; they did not make binding decisions. Recent iterations have dealt with:
health (2001), the environment (2007),167 minimum wages for the poor (le Grenelle
de rinsertion, 2007), advertising on public television, job training throughout life (le
Grenelle de la formation, 2007), access to the high speed internet (2008), the use of
the sea (2009), radio waves from mobile phones (le Grenelle des ondes, 2009), and
urban security (20 10).16
The 2007 environmental Grenelle provides an example, although the label has
no formal legal definition and is used rather indiscriminately. Soon after Nicolas
Sarkozy was elected president, the Grenelle took place over several months in the
summer and fall of 2007. The consultations involved almost 2000 people and drew
from a wide spectrum of interests. It involved six working groups, each including
representatives from five types of participants: local authorities, the French State,
environmental organizations, employers, and employees. The working group
proposals were then discussed in public meetings throughout the country followed
by four round tables that included representatives of the same five groups.' 69
The idea seems to have originated with the environmental advocacy group
Ecologie sans frontiere and was then adopted by Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, an
influential member of President Sarkozy's cabinet. 170 The government saw the
process as a way to enhance its rather shaky environmental credentials.' 17 Some also
'63 See generally Pierre Lascoumes, Des acteurs aux prises avec le "Grenelle Environnement":
Ni innovation politique, ni simulation ddmocratique une approche pragmatique des travaux du Groupe V,
I REVUE PARTICIPATIONS 277 (2011).
'6 Mermet Interview, supra note 80.
167 LE GRENELLE ENVIRONMENT, http://www.legrenelle-environnement.fr (last visited Apr. 13,
2013) (reporting ongoing activities related to the environmental Grenelle).
'" See Philippe Durance, De la dcision politique 6 la dicision publique: Participation des
citoyens et innovation sociale, in CONSEIL D'ANALYSE ICONOMIQUE, CR9ATIVITI ET INNOVATION DANS
LES TERRITOIRES 225 (2010); see also Jacques Chevallier, De I'administration dimocratique h la
dimocratie administrative, 137-38 REVUE FRANrAISE D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 217 (2011); Jean-
Michel Fourniau, Information, Access to Decision-making and Public Debate in France: The Growing
Demand for Deliberative Democracy, 28 SCI. & PUB. POL'v 441 (2001).
i See Lascoumes, supra note 165, at 2. See also Kerry Whiteside et al., France's "Grenelle de
I 'environnement": Openings and Closures in Ecological Democracy, 19 ENVTL. POL. 449 (2010); see
also LE GRENELLE ENVIRONMENT, http://www.legrenelle-environnement.fr (last visited Apr. 13,2013).
'7 She was Secretary of State for Ecology in 2007 and Minister for Ecology, Sustainable
Development, Transport, and Housing from November 2010 until Febnuary 2012.
171 Akhlasse Hamdan, M6dias et environnement : le processus et les protagonistes du v Grenelle
de l'environnement (2011) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Paris X), available at
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claim that the process was designed to marginalize Les Verts (the Green Party).
Whether or not that was an intention, the process was explicitly non-partisan and
excluded official political parties.
The process did not involve open-ended public hearings, but there were no
explicit quotas on who could participate. The large environmental umbrella groups
supplied many of the participants, as did some specialized groups that had a history
of working with the state (for example, groups concerned with wild birds). However,
some groups were not certified to participate either because they worked on issues
that the government organizers excluded from the agenda, such as nuclear power, or
because the organizers judged that they were not environmental groups.172. Some
agonized over whether to be part of the process or to stand outside and maintain a
critical stance. One group withdrew after initially agreeing to participate because of
the government organizers' failure to include nuclear power on the agenda.
However, that group remained a member of one of the umbrella organizations that
was a key environmental participant.' 73A few groups established a counter-Grenelle,
arguing that the environmental participants had sold out and labeling the Grenelle a
"Munich of ecology."'
174
Nevertheless, the Grenelle was an apparently serious effort to seek input from a
wide range of opinions and interests, although its broad effort to reach consensus
assured that the final recommendations would be moderate compromises. The
Grenelle helped to launch a dynamic of policy change, although, the process only
produced non-binding recommendations. As Jean-Louis Borloo, Minister of the
Environment (Ministdre de 1'tcologie, du Dgveloppement et de l'Amnagement
Durable et de l'lAnergie), said "the Grenelle is not an end point, it is a starting
point."'175 Thirty-three follow-up committees (of 800 people) were set up in order to
implement the program of the Grenelle. 176 Two recent laws dealing with
environmental matters, Grenelle 1 (2009) and Grenelle II (July 2010), built on some
of the policies proposed at the original meeting. 177 The government did not always
follow the lead of the Grenelle is its legislative proposals, and consequently the new
statutes were not greeted with enthusiasm by all of the participants.
http://www.theses.fr/201 lIPAI00145; Interview, Akhlasse Hamdan, Doctor of Political Science, Paris X,
in Paris, France (Nov. 7, 2011 ) [hereinafter Hamdan Interview]; Pierre Lascoumes, supra note 165, at 2.
172 See ANIMALCONCERNS, http://www.animalconcerns.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). For
example, the Brigitte Bardot Foundation's group Animal Concern was not allowed to participate on that
ground).
173 Hamdan Interview, supra note 171.
174 Lascoumes, supra note 165, at 285.
175 The sentence, part of Minister Borloo's remarks in October 2007 as the end of the process, is
frequently quoted. See, e.g., Anne-Christine Beard & Marina Biadi, Grenelle de 'environnemtent: Un
autre modile economique, TOURAINE Eco LE MAG, http://www.touraine-eco.com/article.php?art=7 (last
visited Apr. 13, 2013).
17?6 Lascoumes, supra note 165, at 2.
7Loi 2009-967 du 3 aofit 2009 de programmation relative i Ia mise en euvre du Grenelle de
l'environnement [Law 2009-967 of August 3, 2009 on the Implementation of the Grenelle de
I'environment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANI;AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], 5 aofit 2009, p. 13031; Loi 2010-788 du 12 Juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour
l'environnement [Law 2010-788 of July 12, 2010 on National Commitment to the Environment],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 13 Juillet
2010, p. 12905.
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The government did not move immediately to draft a bill based on the
Grenelle's recommendations. Rather, reverting to standard practice, Minister Borloo
appointed a twenty-four-member commission to recommend legal changes. Headed
by Corinne Lepage, a former minister of the environment under Prime Minister
Alain Jupp6 and a long-time moderate environmental activist and politician,
17
8
Mission Lepage produced a report with 88 proposed legal changes in the areas of
access to information, use of expertise, and legal responsibility (criminal, civil, and
administrative). The reporter, St6phane Hoynck, was a member of the Conseil
d'ttat, and members had a wide range of expertise and political associations.
179
Thus, the familiar pattern of government consultation with an elite commission
persisted even after the completion of the more open Grenelle.1
8 0
One of the most contentious issues involved a carbon tax, a policy
recommended by the Grenelle but modified by the government to exclude many
large emitters. The original proposal was not contentious and was endorsed by all the
presidential candidates as part of an "ecological pact" even before the Grenelle
began. After the Grenelle, the government set up an expert group to implement the
proposal, headed by former socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard. In its report, the
group recommended the adoption of a tax of C 32 per ton of CO2. The government
instead chose to reduce the amount of the tax to E 17. The proposed law, unlike the
recommendations of the Grenelle, would have entirely exempted large emitters
because they were subject to an EU program of tradable quotas. The Conseil
Constitutionnel held the resulting bill unconstitutional on the grounds of unequal
treatment.18 But it is not clear whether the Grenelle played an-independent role in
the legislative drafting process. The proposal for a carbon tax was the consensus
view before the process started. President Sarkozy convened an expert commission
after the Grenelle, even though experts were part of the Grenelle. The ultimate
legislative proposal was quite different from the recommendations of both the
Grenelle and the expert body.
Beyond controversies over the Grenelle's impact on concrete pieces of
legislation, the process was the first formal effort by the national government to
include environmental groups explicitly in the legislative drafting process even if
this insider role was sometimes an awkward fit.'1 2 It put business, labor, and
environmental groups together around a single negotiating table. This created some
tensions, but led some large firms voluntarily to adopt environment-friendly policies,
perhaps to stave off more restrictive laws. Most of these voluntary agreements have
now been codified into law. 8 3 For example, the working group on construction and
171 Lepage is a very well-known attorney who specializes in environmental law. She recently
defended the parties in the Erika tragedy, a toxic fuel spill that washed ashore following the sinking of the
tanker Erika in 1999.
179 See CORRINE LEPAGE, MINISATRE DE L'9COLOGIE, DU DtVELOPPEMENT ET DE
L'AMINAGEMENT DURABLES, MISSION LEPAGE RAPPORT FINAL: PREMItRE PHASE, available at
http:llesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/084000490/0000.pdf [hereinafter LEPAGE MISSION
FINAL REPORT].
"0 Id., at 108-09.
181 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-599 DC, Dec. 29,
2009, Rec. 218 (reviewing the budget law and discussing the decision on the carbon tax in §77).
112 Hamdan Interview, supra note 171; Lascoumes Interview. supra note 20.
113 Law 2010-788 of July 12. 2010, supra note 134.
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energy efficient buildings produced a negotiated agreement under which the industry
promised to take certain voluntary steps with respect to building insulation.
8 4
Jacques Chevallier points out shortcomings that arise whether the public debate
is called a Grenelle or an bats gdndraux.183 The problems he raises can occur even
though the number of participants is very impressive (200,000 for the Health ltats
G~n6raux and more than 1 million for the debate on the future of education). In
practice, the participants are mainly professionals from the sector concerned (doctors
for health, teachers for education) and users (patients, parents). The main innovation
is that the public debate is more inclusive than traditional organized institutions such
as professional unions and associations. Chevallier shows, however, that the two
principles guiding public debates-the principle of equivalence (each participant
should be treated equally) and the existence of an independent organizing third
party-are not sufficient. The traditional hierarchy of actors often reappears in the
debate because some actors are more experienced than others. 18
The dynamics of the Grenelle process and its impact on policy will differ across
policy areas depending upon the decree of antagonism between the groups and their
relative bargaining power. Furthermore, because it is not a legally institutionalized
process and because the government bears the organizational costs, such processes
will only be initiated if they are useful to those in power. However, as these methods
of participation have been increasingly used, they have set a precedent. The
initiatives of the government of Frangois Hollande show that this kind of public
input is continuing so that, even where public participation is not legally required,
any government that wants to make an important policy uses these labels (Grenelle,
ltats g6n~raux) and organizes public participation events to ensure a high level of
publicity and popularity. The Hollande Government organized a "social conference"
to consult the social partners on several issues. Roundtables were organized, dealing
with employment, the reform of public services, vocational training, salaries and
purchasing power, the recovery of industry, equality between men and women at
work, the quality of work life, and pension reform. Each roundtable was chaired by a
minister and an expert. The process involved consultations with labor unions,
business associations, and other representative organizations. Although most only
aim to produce "road maps" that will be a prelude to further dialogue,"'8 the effort to
reform the labor market produced a consensus policy on January 11, 2013 that
balanced more flexible labor rules with more rights for workers. The proposed
reforms in the labor law were signed by the three most important labor unions, the
'"'Halpern Interview, supra note 152; Lascoumes Interview, supra note 20; see also generally
DANIEL Boy ET AL., LE GRENELLE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT: ACTEURS, DISCOURS, EFFETS (2012).
'0 See generally Jacques Chevallier, Le dibat public en question, in POR UN DROIT COMMUN DE
L'ENVIRONNEMENT: MILANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE MICHEL PRIEUR 489 (2007). Under the ancient
tradition of Etats giniraux, public participation is linked with the idea of revolution. The Etats giniraux
met during the Ancien R6gime and were appointed by the King. They were the gathering of the three
"estates" in France-i.e., the nobility, the clergy and the third estate. Thus, the term refers to a gathering
of all the people. Because the last real one led to the Revolution, its connotation is particularly symbolic.
It is used politically to show the will of the government to gather everyone together to debate and solve a
specific problem.
'RId. at 503-44.
" See LES tCHOS, 9 July 2012, pp. 2-4.
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employer association, and the Government, and the Government is drafting a statute
consistent with this agreement.1
88
D. Other Experiments with Public Participation
In response to criticisms of both local-level processes and national Grenelle
meetings and Etats Gtntraux, other participatory procedures are taking place at the
national and the local levels. It remains to be seen if they will influence the actions
of the Hollande government. These efforts are legal so long as rights are not
obviously violated. If they are legally required, as for urban planning, the Conseil
d'tat reviews the ultimate decision but does not take on the more difficult task of
assuring procedural adequacy. 8 9 This leaves a broad opening for experimentation at
all levels of government.
Some recent initiatives need more study. For example, at the local level, the
Municipal Council for Children and Youth (CMEJ) organizes conversational
consultations for young people in order to build participatory capacity.19" Similarly,
the government has organized debates over an education reform that would shorten
the individual school day and lengthen the number of days per school year. The
debate involved not just parents, teachers, and educational and health experts, but
also the tourism industry, which favored long vacations, and employers, who favored
long school days. 191
Failures may be as instructive as successes. The 1995 pension reform is a classic
case where pro forma, hastily organized consultations took place, but where the
government feared that it had a good deal to lose from an open debate. Opponents
sharply criticized the lack of open concertation, and organized massive strikes. Prime
Minister Jupp6 had to resign, and President Jacques Chirac decided to call for new
legislative elections, which his center-right coalition lost. 192 This episode showed
future ministers the risks of attempting closed-door pension reform. However, in
spite of that experience, the 2010 reform of the retirement/pension system was also
proposed with little effective consultation.
193
Local examples come from the Poitou-Charentes region, which has
experimented with a range of participatory activities. 9 4 These experiments were.
os Liz Alderman, Unions Back Revisions of Labor Law in France, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, at
BI.
189 Delaunay, Les Limites aux recours, supra note 163, at 2100 (dealing with the review of CNDP
decisions). The CE reviews the decision whether or not to organize a public debate but not the procedural
form of the debate.
190 Blatrix, supra note 130, at 107-08.
19' See Luc Chatel, La reflexion sur les rythmes scolarirs, MINISTtRE -DUCATION NATIONALE
(June 7, 2011), http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid56729/a-reflexion-sur-les-rythmes-scolaires.htm. A
steering committee was set up and consulted all the stakeholders. Debates were also organized inside
schools all over the country and on the intemet.
192 See Bruno Palier, Dhbat public: L'exemple des Retraites, 284 PROJET 74 (2005).
193 Initially the reform was set for 2012, but the financial crisis and subsequent economic
downturn accelerated the difficulties of the social security system. See BRUNO PALIER, LA R9FORME DES
RETRAITES ch. 5 (4th ed. 2012).
194 For an overview of these efforts, see Alice Mazeaud, L 'instrumentation Participative de
L'action Publique: Logiques et Effets. Une Approche Comparie des Dispositifs Participatifs Conduits Par
la Rigion Poitou-Charentes, 2 REVUE PARTICIPATIONS 53 (2012).
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spearheaded by S6gol6ne Royal, the former socialist candidate for President of the
Republic who was President of the region and a strong supporter of citizens'
involvement in public decision-making. One activity involved the financing of high
schools, an important budgetary item. Royal helped organize a participatory
budgeting process involving ten percent of the regional budget for such schools. In
addition, she developed citizen forums that discussed important policy issues and
recommended solutions to the regional government. The Poitou-Charentes
experiences contain important lessons.
According to Sophie Bouchet, who was deeply involved in organizing these
experiments, participatory processes will only work if people believe that the time
and trouble of participating will make a difference and if the process is organized so
that the debate is productive and well-informed. The participatory budgeting process
determined how funds would be spent and consequently attracted students, teachers,
and other employees. Parents were less involved. The schools also generally made
participation easy by setting aside time for the debate. Participants aired and
discussed options but were spared the need to reach a consensus, which is always a
difficult requirement in the zero-sum game of allocating funds. Rather, those
organizing the process distilled options into a finite set of possibilities with costs
attached, and the participants then voted for those they preferred using a point voting
system.
The citizens' forums, in contrast, included a stratified random sample of 20-30
individuals from the community, representing all major social groups. The group
then debated policy options based on written and oral presentations under the
guidance of trained mediators who sought to include everyone in the debate. The
resulting recommendations were presented to elected officials and civil servants at a
press conference with active media coverage. 15
Some French proponents of deliberative democracy, however, are skeptical.
Loic Blondiaux, for example, is a critic of what he calls the use of "mini-publics"
such as the citizen juries in Poitou. 96 He argues that it is problematic to see the
process as a reflection of the popular will because most people 'do not participate. He
worries that the person or group that organizes the process will have power to set the
agenda and influence the process. In the worst case, the citizens involved can be
used by the organizers for their own ends. Hence such processes need a neutral
monitor, which is not usually possible. One response to this critique, reflected in the
Poitou forums, is that the proposals that come from the citizen forums are just that-
193 See Interview with Sophie Bouchet-Peterson, Former Advisor to S6golene Royale on Public
Participation, and Marion Ben-Hammo, Assistant to Bouchet-Peterson, in Paris, France (Jan. 6, 2012).
Bouchet-Peterson and Ben-Hammo also supplied English-language documents. See Marion Ben-Hammo,
High School Participatory Budget (Poitou-Charentes France), PARTICIPEDIA BETA (Feb. 5, 2012, 2:11
PM), http://participedia.net/cases/high-school-participatory-budget-poitou-charentes-france; MARION
BEN-HAMMO, LA DEMOCRATIE PARTICIPATIVE, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN REGION POITOU-
CHARENTES (2008), available at www.oecd.org/gov/public-innovation/41095800.pdf.
'
96 See Loc Blondiaux & Yves Sintomer, L'impiratifD6libiratif, 63 RUE DESCARTES 28, 28-38
(2009); Loic Blondiaux, D~nocratie Dlibrative vs. D~mocratie Agonistique?, 30 RAISONS POLITIQUES
131, 131-47 (2008); Loic Blondiaux, La Dilib~ration, Norme de Laction Publique Contemporaine?, 268
PROJET 81, 81-90 (2001).
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proposals. The government will not enact them into law if they fly in the face of
broad conceptions of popular opinion.
The Poitou region's experience and that of similar efforts in other countries
provides lessons about combining direct citizen input with both technical expertise
concerning substantive issues and expertise about how to achieve meaningful public
involvement that does not demand more from ordinary citizens than they are able
and willing to supply. One of the most interesting aspects of these procedures is the
way that the participatory budget process combined public debate with a voting
process that ultimately set the priorities. It will be important, however, to study the
actual results. Because the process began in 2005, one can ask if the spending
priorities were actually followed. Apparently, some of the proposed capital
improvements in the high schools have been held up by lengthy bureaucratic
approval processes. For the citizen forums, one could see if they affected the
political priorities of elected politicians.
E. Public Input for Government Secondary Legislation
Public, open-ended consultations are not a routine or legally necessary part of
the process of issuing secondary legislation. The National Commission on Public
Debate can organize concertations on national policy issues, but only if requested to
by the Government. Interest groups and civil society bodies cannot make such a
request, and the Government has only asked for CNDP help three times. However,
recently, the high courts have reviewed some policymaking processes for
inclusiveness and adequacy. The Government has also made some moves toward
more open-ended consultation both in the environmental area, following France's
ratification of the Aarhus Convention, 197 and, in general, as it implements a 2011 law
that calls for more transparency and public input. This does not imply that France
has established notice and comment rulemaking on the U.S. model, but it does
represent some movement in that direction. That is not to say that France should
copy the U. S. model, but only to urge reformers to focus on the democratic values
that inform and justify those procedures.198
1. Judicial Responses'
Both the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel have examined
policymaking procedures and found them insufficiently deliberative and
participatory. These are important new developments, but it remains to be seen how
far these courts will go.
The Conseil db'Atat: Recently, the Grand Chamber of the Conseil d'ttat signaled
a willingness to review the efficacy of participatory processes that do not involve
!97 The Aarhus Convention, supra note 30, governs environmental policymaking processes.
Forty-six countries had rati fied it by September 26, 2012. See also Dominique Custqs, Le Statut du
Responsable Public et la Rception de la Notion d'Accountability, il JEAN-BERNARD AUBY,
L'INFLUENCE DU DROIT EUROPtEN SUR LES CATEGORIES JURIDIQUES DU DROIT PUBLIC FRANCAIS 275,
?79 (2010).
19 For a fuller discussion of these issues in other comparative contexts, see generally ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING, supra note 16; ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY, slupra
note 15.
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experts or established commissions. In a December 23, 2011, decision it upheld a
procedural challenge to a government decree on excess of power grounds. The
decree, issued by the Minister of Higher Education and Research, would have
merged two high schools in Lyon.' 99 The Conseil found that the procedural
violations were serious enough to have possibly affected the final decision. The first
flaw was a failure to consult the joint committees of employees at each school who
were not part of the teaching staff. The second was the inadequacy of a meeting to
discuss the proposal. The opinion holds that the meeting was not truly deliberative
and suggests that the head of one of the schools dominated the discussion and
limited debate. The decree approving the merger was voided, but the holding only
took effect in June 2012.
The decision is particularly important because the Conseil d'tat acted under the
Warsmann Law III of May 17, 2011, article 70, which states that procedural
violations should not lead the courts to void an administrative act unless they are
serious enough to have possibly affected the outcome.2°° The decision suggests that
henceforth the Conseil d'ttat will evaluate the efficacy of participatory rocesses
when they are challenged by opponents who claim to have been sidelined.2e' It sends
a signal to those who issue decrees that they should organize genuine consultations
or concertations up-front to avoid being frustrated ex post.2°2 The case does not
touch on substantive criteria. One can see the merger of two schools as an essentially
political decision with both cost savings and losses of institutional identity and jobs.
It is not an issue that implicates the broader public interest as would be the case for
decisions about, for example, the use of genetically modified organisms in French
agriculture or the overall levels of power plant pollutants. It remains to be seen if the
Conseil will apply the same standards to a challenge to a government decree
promulgating a broad policy initiative. How will it resolve disputes between those
who see participation as a right that furthers democratic values and those who see it
only as instrumental to better substantive decisions? These values need not conflict
in every case, but if they do, the Conseil's response will indicate the direction of its
members' thinking.
The Conseil Constitutionnel: In 2011 and 2012, the Conseil Constitutionnel
dealt directly with challenges to the lack of participation in the administrative
process in four closely linked QPCs. The decisions suggest that the Conseil is
'9 CE, Ass., 23 dbcembre 2011, M.D. et autres, no. 335033, Recueil Lebon p. 649, available at
http://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/selection-de-decisions-du-conseil-d-etat/ce-23-d-k0k.htmi.
"a Loi 2011-515 du 17 mai 2011 de simplification et d'am6ioration de Ia qualit6 du droit [Law
2011-515 of May 17, 2011 on Simplifying and Improving the Quality of the Right], available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024021430&categorieLien=id.
201 Furthermore, Denier-Pasquier reported that the Conseil d'ttat now sometimes requests
documents from the government's consultation processes, suggesting a greater interest in reviewing
participatory procedures. However, the Conseil d'Etat has not gone further to require public consultation.
"2 This jurisprudence draws on very old case law about "substantive irregularities." If the
consultation is compulsory by law, the decree will be quashed. By contrast, if a procedural omission did
not breach a right protected by the rule, the decree will not be quashed. See Pierre-Laurent Frier, Vice de
procedure, in IV R9PERTOIRE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATtF §168-173 at 17-18 (Erwan Royer eds.,
2013). Frier's article dates from 2004 and has been reprinted in the above volume with updates added at
the beginning of the volume that do not apply to the relevant sections. The page numbers refer to Frier's
article.
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willing to consider the constitutionality of policymaking processes, at least in the
environmental area. These cases were brought under the Charter for the
Environment, which was promulgated in 2005 and incorporated into the
Constitution. 20 3 The Conseil Constitutionnel affirmed its status as enforceable
constitutional law in 2008.204 Article 7 of the Charter states:
Each person has the right, in the conditions and to the extent provided by law, to have
access to any information pertaining to the environment in the possession of public
bodies and to participate in the public decision-making process likely to affect the
environment.
This text has the potential to constitutionalize environmental policymaking
processes. In April 2011, the Conseil held that the substantive rights and duties
included in articles 1-4 of the Environmental Charter were appropriate for review
under a QPC.205 It was a relatively small step to hold that the procedural
requirements in article 7 were also reviewable in a QPC. The Conseil did this in
Association France Nature Environnement (AFNE).206 The case involved the list of
facilities that are subject to various licensing criteria under the environmental laws
[rggime des installations classies]. °7 The classification of facilities is of great
interest both to the owners of the installations and to the public concerned with
environmental harms. The Association argued that the process of promulgating the
list violated article 7 because there was insufficient consultation, particularly with
environmental organizations. The Conseil Constitutionnel confirmed that article 7
created a constitutional right to consultation, the key to exercising its jurisdiction in a
QPC. It then held that this right had been violated by the text of the statute passed by
Parliament, and it set January 1, 2013 as a deadline for the passage of a new
statute.208
203 The preamble was amended to include a mention of the rights and duties included in the
Charter. The Charter itself is published at the end of the constitutional text. Article 34 lists the
environment as an area that must be covered by statutes thai lay down basic principles. See Dominique
Bourg & Kerry H. Whiteside, France's Charter for the Environment: Of Presidents, Principles and
Environmental Protection, 15 MOD. & CONTEMP. FR. 117, 117-133 (2007).
204 20 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2008-564DC 19, June 19,
2008, Rec. 313, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-
law/case-law.25743.html.
5 Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2011-I 16QPC, Apr. 8, 2011,
J.O. 89.
206 Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2011-183/184QPC, Oct. 14,
2011, J.O. 78. The legal and factual background is summarized in the Commentaire aux cahiers, available
on the CC website along with the decision. See http://www.conscil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionneF/english/priority-preliminary-rlings-on-the-issue-of.constitutionality/decisions-of-the.
constitutional-council-qpc/20! I/decision-no-201 1-183-184-qpc-of-14-october-2011.103823.html. See
CONSEIL D'ETAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC 2010, supra note 49 (dealing with the same substantive issue).
207 For a German-French comparison on this aspect of environmental law, see generally LE
MODiLE DES AUTORITIS DE RIOULATION INDIPENDANTES EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEGMAGNE (G6rard
Marcou & Johannes Masing eds., 2011); UNABHANGIGE REGULIERUNGSBEHORDEN:
ORGANISATIONSRECHTLICHE HERAUSFORDERUNGEN IN FRANKREICH UND DEUTSCHLAND (Johannes
Masing & G6rard Marcou eds., 2010).
208 Under the doctrine of negative ultra vires, or incompetence, Parliament cannot leave
constitutional rights and liberties unprotected. See supra note 16. In this case, consultations with Conseil
d'[tat and with the Conseil Sup6rieur des Installations Class6es (now the Conseil Supkrieur des Risques
Technologiques) were not sufficient to protect rights.
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The statute was unconstitutional under the doctrine of "negative ultra vires."
Parliament cannot leave constitutional rights and liberties unprotected, it has to give
statutory protection to these rights and not leave the executive free to decide the
,content of a procedural right. Under that broad rubric, the Conseil Constitutionnel
decided three more closely related cases in favor of the plaintiffs in June and July
2012.209 These decisions raise important challenges to administrative procedures that
go beyond the treatment of aggrieved individuals and, as in these cases, extend to
broad-based policies affecting the rights of many citizens.
In these cases, the relevant minister issued a decree after hearing the advice of
the Conseil d'Itat and of an expert body that must be consulted on changes in the
list.210 The Conseil Constitutionnel held that this was not sufficient; the Charter
requires a balance between legal and environmental expertise, on the one hand,and
public consultation, on the other. Hence, the decisions imply that whenever
Parliament takes measures that affect the environment, it must incorporate public
participation into executive regulatory procedures. However, in its opinions, the
Conseil contents itself with finding an existing statutory provision unconstitutional
and setting a time limit for it to be amended. It provides no guidance on what would
satisfy the constitutional provisions. Can the demand for process be satisfied by a
more detailed substantive statute? That hardly seems a realistic response given the
technical nature of the list. Assuming that the process remains an administrative one,
what kind of hearing or consultation regime would satisfy the Conseil? How do
process and substance relate to each other? What is the relationship between the
other provisions of the Charter and article 7's participatory provision? Given the
Conseil's limited experience with such cases, these are open questions.
211
2. Government Actions
In addition to high court cases dealing with policymaking processes, there are
some developments inside the executive, some taken in response to the Conseil
Constitutionnel's holdings. As a first step, the Grenelle II statute provides for public
209 The 2012 case is Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-
262QPC, July 13, 2012, J.O. 83. See also Interviewwith Florence Denier-Pasquier, Bd. Member &
Lawyer, French Nature Environment ("FNE"), and Rep. of FNE on the Economic, Social, and Economic
Council, in Paris, France (Dec. 7, 2011 ); Interview with Schramecksupra note 100. This case has since
been followed in the following cases: Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No.
2012-269QPC, July 27, 2012,.Journal officiel, 28 juillet 2012, p. 12356; Conseil constitutionnel
[CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-270QPC, July 27,2012, J.O. 72; Conseil constitutionnel
[CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-283QPC, Nov. 23, 2012, Journal officiel du 24 novembre
2012, p. 18547; Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-282QPC, Nov. 23,
2012, J.O. 90. All of these decisions found CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. L. 120-1 unconstitutional. The
provision struck down by the Council required neither a general consultation provision nor a special
consultation with stakeholders. Hence, the Constitutional Council quashed the provisions.
210 The body now called the Conseil Suprieur de la Prevention des Risques Technologiques was
formerly the Conseil Supgrieur des Installations Classies.
211 The Conseil d'1ttat considered some of these questions in its adice to the government in 2010,
before the case was decided. See the summary in RAPPORT PUBLIC 2010, supra note 49, at 93-97. The
decisions also raise the question ofwhether the procedural protections of article 7 could apply to a statute.
A recent ECJ decision distinguishes between legislation and administrative decisions, but refuses to treat
everything passed by a Member State legislature as outside the scope of Aarhus. See generally Case C-
182/10, Solvay v. R6gion Wallonne, 2012 ECJ EUR-LEX LEXIS 59 (Feb. 16,2012).
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comment on draft decrees from the environmental ministry or by state autonomous
bodies that have a "direct and significant impact on the environment" (but not
ordinances or decrees from other ministries). 2 The minimum period for comments
is very short - two weeks - and the ministry does not give public prior warning
that a draft regulation is about to be opened for comments.213 The final decree is
usually not accompanied by a statement of reasons incorporating responses to the
comments. Formal consultation involves clicking a rather obscure box on the
ministry website.214
This practice now extends to all administrative authorities that have consultation
obligations under the Warsmann law of May 17, 2011.215 The law permits
administrative authorities to organize internet-based consultations that echo the
practices of the Environmental Ministry. Authorities that otherwise would have had
to consult with established commissions can substitute a public consultation over the
Internet. The official commissions can still submit comments by that route if they
wish, but the burden is on them to monitor the rulemaking activities of the respective
authorities. The decree has important weaknesses: comments are not always publicly
available and may only be summarized ex post; the comment period can be as short
as two weeks. 2 6
The Grenelle 1I procedures have now been strengthened in response to the
Conseil Constitutionnel decisions discussed above. Soon after coming to office, the
Hollande Government proposed amending the Environmental Code, and parliament
enacted a law on December 27, 2012. A proposed environmental rule must now be
made available to the public along with its context and objectives. The public can
give their observations within a minimum of 21 days, up from 15 days in the original
draft. During that period, the comments are not available to other members of the
public. After the close of the comment period, the government must wait at least four
days (up from two days in the original draft) before issuing the final rule. Along with
the final rule, it must provide a statement of reasons, a response to the comments,
and a synopsis of the comments. The comments must then be put on the ministry
212 See CODE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT [C. ENV'T] art. L. 120-2 1.
213 This development was discussed in the Mermet Interview, supra note 80; Blatrix Interview,
supra note 160; and Denier-Pasquier Interview, supra note 153, Denier-Pasquier mentioned the lack of
notice. The procedure in the 2011 case discussed above occurred before the Grenelle provision went into
effect.
214 MINISTtRE DE L'tCOLOGIE, DU DtVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET DE L'NERGIE,
http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ (last visited Feb. 2012). A check of the website in February
2012 revealed three open dockets and little activity.
213 Loi n 2011-525 du 17 mai 2011 de simplification et d'am~lioration de la qualit6 du droit [Law
2011-525 of May 17, 2011 to simplify and improve the quality of the law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RIPUBLIQUE FRANCAI5 [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], n0 0115 of May 18, 2011 p. 8537, article
16. The Prime Minister issued an implementing decree on December 8, 2011, which took effect January I,
2012. 216 See Loi 2011-1832 du 8 dcembre 2011 de relatifaux consultations ouvertes sur I'intemet
[Law 2011-1832 of December 8, 2011 on Open Consultations on the Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRAN(AIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 9, 2011 (issued under Law 2011-
515 of May 17, 2011, supra note 200, art. 16). For a discussion, see Akis Psygkas, [Legislation] The
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website for three months but can then be removed.1 7 This formulation represents a
bare minimum. The time periods for comments and for government review of the
comments are very short, and the government can decide how it wishes to
summarize the comments.218 The law does contain an experimental procedure for
appointing a neutral person to summarize the comments. 219 After 18 months the
Government must assess this experimental procedure and issue a report.
3. United States Practice
The rather grudging moves in France toward more open-ended public
participation in rulemaking contrast sharply with American experience. The 1946
U.S. Administrative Procedures Act mandates that when the government or an
independent agency carries out a rulemaking it must place a notice in the Federal
Register, engage in an open-ended hearing process that accepts comments in written
or oral form, and issue a statement of reasons along with the final rule. That rule can
be reviewed by the courts on limited procedural. and substantive grounds. The courts
will check to be sure the proper procedures were followed, will check for the rule's
consistency with the underlying substantive.statute, and ask if the policy is "arbitrary
and capricious" or sometimes if it is based on "substantial evidence." These concise
legal provisions have spawned a large body of case law around the basic principles.
Rulemaking needs to go through a final stage that is transparent and open to all
interested participants. The administration needs publicly to justify the policies it
makes under delegated authority, and those decisions can be reviewed by the courts.
Although the courts are not always explicit about the goals of judicial review, one
strand of jurisprudence emphasizes that judicial review can be a way to verify that
rulemaking procedures are consistent with representative democratic values. 220 Other
cases review administrative decisions for consistency with individual rights, but the
courts frequently rule on the consistency of delegated rulemaking with democratic
values. This aspect of U.S. administrative law is much less prominent in France.
There has been a movement to supplement review based on rights with scrutiny of
legality and abuse of power. However, most of the French efforts to open up the
processes for producing secondary legislation and draft statutes have no legal force.
The main legal innovations that we canvassed above concern large local and regional
projects, not national decrees and ordinances. Until the passage of the December
2012 law, efforts to involve a broad range of organized groups were purely
voluntary, motivated by the Government's own political incentives. They did not
give any enforceable rights to citizens to demand such procedures. The 2012 statute
dealing with environmental policymaking is a new departure, and it will important to
217 The draft is available at MINISTtRE DE L'ICOLOGIE, DU D9VELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET DE
L'tNERGIE, CONSULTATIONS PUBLIQUES, http://www.consultations-publiques.developpement-
dumble.gouv.ft/projet-de-loi-relatif-a-la-mise-en-oeuvre-du-principe-de-participation-du-public (last
visited Feb. 6, 2013).
2'8 No referral was made to the Conseil Constitutionnel, so it is unclear whether the statute will
meet constitutional standards.
219 The proposal for a neutral referee or "guardian" is an innovative aspect of the experimental
process. Under U.S. administrative law, the federal courts serve some of that function by reviewing the
adequacy of the rulemaking process and the reasons expressed by an agency when it promulgates a rule.
220 For the seminal discussion, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
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monitor the role of the Conseil d'tat and the Conseil Constitutionnel in reviewing
its provisions for legally mandated public participation. The statute itself contains
some language that is not completely clear, and it makes no mention of judicial
review. Thus, much will depend upon how the French courts interpret their mandate
given this new departure.
The recent high court cases suggest that courts are now willing to pressure the
administration to provide for more effective participation and consultation, but these
developments are most extensive in the area of environmental law because of
participation rights embedded in the Environmental Charter. The Conseil d'tat
cases, although striking in their willingness to consider the extent and quality of
participation and deliberation, deal with rather self-contained decisions, not broad-
based policy initiatives. Furthermore, if the Conseil Constitutionnel accepts as
sufficient the very limited participation processes in the new law amending the
Environmental Code, that action could set back efforts to develop more extensive
participation rights.
III. INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: SECONDARY LEGISLATION AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
A second challenge to traditional French public law, especially constitutional
law, is the existence of independent regulatory agencies.22' Some of these agencies
are relatively recent creations that regulate newly privatized industries under the
heavy influence of EU law. Others have a longer history. Most implement the law in
particular cases and have limited authority to issue secondary legislation. They raise
important separation of powers issues for the French courts as they confront claims
from private groups and newly privatized firms that demand stronger roles in agency
policy-making.
A. Constitutional Issues and Public Welfare
The fumdamental background issue is the problematic legality of delegating
policy making outside the conventional structure of government. As discussed
above, both the legislature and the Government have lawmaking authority, but, as in
the United States, the Constitution does not explicitly mention independent
authorities. 222 There are three linked constitutional issues. First, does the
Constitution permit the creation of independent regulatory authorities? Second, if
such authorities are permitted, how much detail must be included in the statute that
establishes the regulatory body? Third, how much independence can the agencies
have from the rest of government? In particular, does the Constitution permit them to
issue decrees on their own authority without the participation of the President or the
Cabinet?
The Conseil Constitutionnel answered the first question in the affirmative. The
French Constitution in articles 20 and 21 provides that the government is under the
22 The agencies differ in whether or not they have "moral personality," Le., whether they can,
like private firms, enter into contracts, be sued in tort, etc.
2f2 The only exception is a 2008 constitutional amendment that created a new independent
agency, the Defender of Rights, an Ombudsman. See 1958 CONST. art. 71-1.
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control of the Prime Minister. This language, read narrowly, could limit the ability of
the legislature to create independent regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, the Conseil
Constitutionnel has accepted the constitutionality of independent regulatory agencies
subject to some caveats.
The second question was raised in a 2010 QPC involving the assignment of the
Internet domain name ".fr". 224 The plaintiff challenged an individual decision of
l'Association franvaise pour le nommage internet en coopiration (AFNIC), a state-
created, nonprofit body that assigns the domain name ".fr" but also argued that the
law was an unconstitutional delegation because it was too imprecise.2 The statute
permits the Minister in charge of electronic communications to determine which
bodies have the task of assigning and managing domain addresses "corresponding to
the national territory." The assignment must be carried out "in the general interest,
under publicized nondiscriminatory rules designed to ensure compliance by the
applicant with intellectual property rights. 226 The Ministry delegated the assignment
to ARNIC, whose status as a quasi-private entity with public responsibilities may
have influenced the Conseil. In that sense the Conseil's decision echoes the U.S.
Supreme Court's conclusion in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, old U.S.
cases that found a constitutional violation in vague, open-ended delegations to
privately controlled bodies during the Great Depression.
227
The Conseil Constitutionnel faulted the statutory language saying that:
although Parliament has thus protected intellectual property rights, it has
entirely delegated the power to supervise the conditions in which domain
names are assigned, refused or withdrawn. No other statutory provision
offers guarantees ensuring the absence of any infringement of freedom of
enterprise and Article I 1 of the Declaration of 1789 [free communication
of ideas and opinions]. Parliament thus failed fully to exercise its powers.
The Conseil then declared this article of the act unconstitutional and gave the
legislature time to amend the law.228 The Conseil, saying that it did not have the
power to strike the appropriate balance, left it up to Parliament to fill in the details. It
did not mention public participation or any other features of the administrative
223 The Conseil Constitutionnel has not objected to the creation of independent bodies outside the
core administration, unlike in Germany, where this is only possible in a few limited areas. However, the
Conseil has tried to limit the regulatory power of agencies and award protections to citizens and
businesses when Parliament has granted sanctioning powers to these bodies. See Conseil sup6rieur de
I'audiovisuel, 17 janvier 1989, n' 88-248DC, Recueil p. 18; Commission des op6rations de bourse, 28
juillet 1989, no 89-260 DC, Recueil p. 71.
224 Decision n* 2010-45 QPC of October 6th 2010 (Mr. Mathieu P.) Interet domain names,
Recueil, p. 270.
223 AFNIC appears to be analogous to an independent agency but-perhaps because of its quasi-
private status-it not listed in http://www.vie-publique.fr. Its own site is at http://www.afnic.fr/.
226 POSTAL & ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS CODE art. L-45 (Fr.).
227 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22s The translation is from the official website of the CC. The new law correcting the
unconstitutional provision is Loi no 2011-302 of 22 March 2011, portant diverses dispositions
d'adaptation de la 16gislation au droit de I'Union europ6enne en matiere de sant6, de travail et de
communications 6lectroniques [introducing various provisions to bring French law into line with
European Union law in the fields of health, labour and electronic communications], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RtPUnLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 23,2011, p. 5186, art. 19.
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process. It just found the delegation to be too vague and broad, and the case itself
only involved an individual decision, not a decree or ordinance. The decision implies
that France has a non-delegation doctrine that could have more teeth than .the
U.S.equivalent, but it is concerned with the violation of rights, not government
policymaking. 29
The third question is of most interest to us because it concerns the policymaking
role of agencies and the way independence is intimately tied up. with the agencies'
insulation from the rest of government. Independent regulatory agencies implement
broad policy mandates affecting the industries that they oversee. They are not simply
engaged in case-by-case adjudication or the licensing of individual firms. Thus, even
if independent agencies are constitutionally acceptable and the statute is sufficiently
precise, the constitutional text may limit agencies' policymaking activities even
though the French Constitution, unlike the American one, does mention secondary
legislation, both decrees and ordinances.
2 30
The list of the policy areas that must be governed by statute in article 34
includes "the freedom, diversity, and independence of the media.",2 31 Statutes must
govern the establishment of public legal entities and the nationalization and
privatization of firms. However, there are no details on the acceptable institutional
options to preserve media independence or to regulate privatized firms in network
industries. Article 38 clearly states that the Council of Ministers must issue
ordinances, a provision that seems to prevent independent agencies from doing so on
their own authority. Their ability to issue degrees seems more ambiguous under
article 37, but th*e courts have interpreted articles 20 and 21 to limit independent
agencies' authority to issue decrees.
This restriction on rulemaking contrasts with the US, where independent
agencies have the same authority to issue legally binding rules as cabinet
departments. The policymaking reach of U.S. agencies is often quite broad under
open-ended statutory grants of regulatory authority. This was not always the case. At
first, the Interstate Commerce Commission established in 1887 had to obtain court
orders to take legally binding actions, but this requirement was soon overturned by
statute with Supreme Court approval.2 32 In the post-World War II period, the
independent agencies followed the rest of government in moving toward greater
reliance on rulemaking and met with no resistance from the courts.23
In France, the perceived limitations imposed by the text of the Constitution and
the venerable concept of service public clash with concepts of public welfare
emanating from the EU. Under EU efforts to promote competition, it is important to
229 In the domain of liberties, the Conseil d'Etat has ruled that the administration cannot restrict
liberties through normative acts that would breach them; only Parliament can restrict liberties through
statutes. See, e.g., CE, [5 May], 1944, Rec. Lebon [133]. [[Dame veuve Trompier-Gravier]]. Ass./Sect.
distinction did not exist at that time
230 1958 CONST. arts. 13, 37, 38.
231 1958 CONST. art. 34. The Conseil Constitutionnel had held that although the Constitution
reserves an inherent jurisdiction to the executive in article 37, Parliament can always legislate in these
matters.
232 Thomas W. Merrill, The Origin ofAnerican Style Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 46, at 389.
233 See generally, e.g., Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F. 2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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distinguish the roles of the public operator and the government regulator and to
demand independence on the part of the latter to help ensure that regulation furthers
the public welfare. 234 The public-welfare argument in favor of independent
regulatory bodies has several pragmatic and functional components.235
First, familiar arguments support the use of regulations that give specific content
to general laws. These arguments stress the legislature's lack of expertise and time to
draft fully detailed statutes, combined with the fluidity of the regulatory environment
over time. The French Constitution is fully consistent with these reasons for
delegation. In fact, it goes further than the U.S. Constitution by permitting the
government to regulate in certain areas even without a statutory basis.
Second, delegating power to independent agencies is based on the benefits of
depoliticizing the regulatory environment so that decisions can be made by
technocratic experts free from partisan pressures. Even if, as in France, appointments
to agency governing boards are made by politicians, staggered terms and security of
members' tenure give them protection from day-to-day partisan influence. In
general, they cannot be removed even for "good cause" as appointees can in the
U.S.
236
Third, if the regulated industry was formerly in state hands, and especially if it
maintains a "golden share" or owns some providers, then independence helps avoid
conflicts of interest between public officials who wish to exploit any remaining
monopoly power and regulation in the interest of the broader public.237 This has been
a major reason why EU law requires Member States to establish independent
agencies when they privatize firms in network industries. The ECJ upheld this
justification, finding that the same entity cannot be both a market player and a
regulator.238 This last justification is particularly salient in France and in the rest of
the EU, as opposed to the U.S. where state ownership of firms in network industries
has been uncommon.
However, in political terms, proposals to create independent agencies can
produce inter-branch conflicts. Thus, if the Parliament seeks to make existing
agencies more independent or to create new agencies, the Government may object.
Especially if these agencies have a monitoring function, the Government will insist
that they are actually creatures of the Government that cannot be separated from it
by a mere statute. The Government may also seek to limit Parliament's role in
2m Dominique Custos, Independent Administrative Authorities in France: Structural and
Procedural Change at the Intersection of Americanization, Europeanization and Gallicization, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra, note 46, at 278-79 [hereinafter Custos, Independent
Administrative Authorities].
23 1958 CONsT. arts. 20, 21.
236 In France, security of tenure is guaranteed by the agencies' statutes, and the Conseil
Constitutionnel has accepted those provisions as constitutionally permissible. However, the Conseil
Constitutionnel did permit the substitution of one broadcasting agency for another in Dcision 86-217
DC, Sept. 18, 1986, Rec. 141.
237 The ECJ ruled on this issue in Case 41/83, Italy v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 873 (holding it to be
an abuse of a dominant position for a company both to operate in a market and to have regulatory powers
over the same).
2 8 See Case 41/83, Italy v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 873; Case C-18/ 88, R6gie des t6l6graphes et
des t6l6phones v. GB-Inno-BM SA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5941; Case C-92/91, Neny, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5398.
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agency oversight and appointments.239 Once such agencies exist, they may seek to
increase their independent authority at the same time, seeking more control. In
France, if these three actors conflict over the role and behavior of an agency, a fourth
actor, the Conseil d'Itat, referees conflicts over the agencies' legal powers. The
Conseil has occasionally reviewed the procedures used to make policy in
agencies. 24° The Conseil Constitutionnel might also referee these conflicts both at
the time of statutory drafting and ex post as the agency carries out its mandate. At
present, the EU also is a major player whose legal mandates and court decisions
constrain French legal institutions.
To further explore the tensions between functional arguments for independence
and constitutional strictures, we consider the two French agencies involved in the
regulation of the media and telecommunications: the Conseil Supirieur de
I'Audiovisuel (CSA) and the AutoritM de R~gulation des Communications
Electroniques et des Postes (ARCEP). The former grants licenses and regulates
content, including political speech. The latter regulates physical infrastructure and
economic conditions. The CSA regulates TV and radio, as well as the Internet and
mobile phones to the extent that these two platforms carry professional content. Both
agencies operate in an industry where public firms compete directly with private
entities under the authority of these bodies.24' We selected this industry for study
because it raises important policy issues that cannot effectively be resolved through
case-by-case adjudication alone. The regulatory mandates include many issues that
combine high levels of technical expertise and strong public concern. They highlight
the tensions between independence and political accountability.
B. Le Conseil Supirieur de I'Audiovisuel
For radio and TV, CSA regulates and monitors content, grants licenses, and can
revoke them. It must decide how far to extend its reach into on-line content as these
fora are becoming professionalized (e.g. the French version of You-Tube
calledDailyMotion and Smartphones). It has managed the French transfer to digital
TV (TNT in French) and overseen the development of cable and satellite channels.
At present, CSA and ARCEP share competences in allocating new frequencies,
particularly for digital terrestrial television and in broadband development.
239 In 2011, a parliamentary committee heard reports from a study of independent agencies. See
Comit6 d'6valuation et de contr6le des politiques publiques, December 1, 2011 at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.ft/13/cri/2010-2011/20110180.asp#P441 98358
240 Some agencies' actions are reviewed either by the Conseil d'ltat or by the Paris Court of
Appeal, a civil court, depending upon the nature of the challenge. Most decisions reviewed by the civil
courts are not within the scope of our study as they involve adjudications not general norms.
241 For background consult RAPPORT ANNUAL 2010, CONSEIL SUPIRIEUR DE L'AUDIOVISUEL
("CSA"), http://www.csa.fr/var/ezflow site/storage/csa/rapport201 0/rapport/conseil.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2013) [hereinafter CSA RAPPORT ANNUAL 2010]. An English-language summary is available on the
website. Much of the material in this section is derived from the annual report and from an interview with
Olivier Japiot, Director General, and Elisabith Mauboussin, Directrice Juridique, CSA, in Paris, France
(December 5, 2011) [hereinafter Japiot and Mauboussin interview]. In addition, the Haute autorit6 pour le
diffusion des oeuvres et ia protection des droits sur internet, has responsibility for regulating file-sharing
on the internet and protecting copyright. See generally Christophe Geiger, Honourable Attempt but
(Ultimately) Disproportionately Offensive Against Peer-to-Peer on the Internet (HADOPI)-A Critical
Analysis of the Recent Anti-File-Sharing Legislation in France, 42 INT'L REV. INTELL PROP. & COMP. L.
457 (2011).
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Furthermore, both have a claim to regulate technical digital broadcasting between
providers.
We make no attempt to sort out these jurisdictional issues, but instead discuss
CSA and ARCEP separately. 242 The CSA must make decisions that mix technical
and value choices. Many of its decisions are both politically and economically
salient and are also of great interest to ordinary citizens. Its activities cannot be
cabined in a technocratic box even if some of its decisions demand technical
expertise. In that sense the issue area is similar to the environmental problems
discussed above. Although the institutional solutions are quite different,
policymakers in both areas face pressure for more accountable decision-making that
may clash with traditional ways of acting. Both cases raise the question of how an
independent agency can be both independent of politics and responsive to public
concerns.
The CSA was founded in 1989 as an independent authority to enforce a 1986
statute guaranteeing freedom of expression in audiovisual communications. It
replaced a 1982 body with a more limited mandate. 243 The complex interactions
between the government, CSA, and the public broadcaster illustrate some of the
challenges of maintaining an independent authority in an industry with prominent
publicly owned firms.
Currently, the CSA has nine members, of which three are appointed by the
president, three by the president of the Assembly, and three by the president of the
Senate.244 Each member serves for one non-renewable term of six years, staggered
with one-third (one from each group) appointed every two years. This system means
242 In August 2012, the French government set up a working group to consider the merger of CSA
and ARCEP. In December 2011 , a National Assembly committee heard from two reporters who had
prepared an assessment of independent administrative authorities. The report recommended merging the
three agencies with primary responsibility for the media-i.e., CSA, ARCEP, and HADOPI. See Christian
Vanneste, Reporter, MP, Statement to the Comit6 d'6valuation et de contr6le des politiques publiques
(Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/l3/cr-cecl0-l/clOl 1010.asp.
243 The CSA replaced the Commission nationale de Ia communication et des libertbs ("CNCL").
The CNCL itself replaced the Haute autorit6 de Ia communication audiovisuelle ("HACA"). The original
1982 body was created mainly so that appointments of the presidents of the public media companies
would be independent of the sitting government. In 2009, a constitutional amendment made the
appointment process somewhat less independent. See Loi du 5 mars 2009 relative , Ia communication
audiovisuelle et au nouveau service public de Ia television [Law of Mar. 5, 2009 on audiovisual
communication and the new public television service], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 7, 2009, p. 4 32 1 . The new process has been used three times
so far and, according to Director General Japiot, has not generated controversy. See CSA RAPPORT
ANNUAL 2010, supra note 241; Japiot and Mauboussin Interview, supra note 241; E-mail from Olivier
Japiot, Director General, Conseil sup~rieur de l'audiovisuel, to author (Sept. 20, 2012, 10:1 0 AM) (on file
with author).
244 This is a common method of appointment in France. For example, this is how the Conseil
Constitutionnel is appointed. A National Assembly report recommends changing the method of
appointment for the chairs of all authorities to assure bi-partisan support for the candidates (or gridlock).
They propose that chairs be appointed by a vote of three-fifths of the members ofthe relevant committees
in the two houses. The government set aside this proposal on conflict of interest grounds, stating that the
committee might in the future seek the commission's advice on some legislative matter. The proposal was
also opposed by an Assembly committee on the law See Vanneste, supra note 242. The agencies
themselves have "gone to the mat" [monties au crineau] to defend their independent existence. Ren6
Dosi~re, Reporter, [MP, Statement to the Comit6 d'6valuation et de contr6le des politiques publiques
(Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/Cr-cec/l0-1/clO1 1010.asp.
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that in 2011 all the members had been appointed by politicians associated with right
wing parties. An amendment to the agency's statute proposed a new method of
appointment to assure party balance, as is the practice in the US, but the proposal has
not been enacted. During periods of divided government, more diversity can be
expected. After the 2012 elections, however, a single party controlled all three
institutions. Unlike the US, where the Senate must confirm Presidential nominees
and the threat of a filibuster looms large, the majority of each body can appoint its
own preferred candidate without worrying about the approval of another
body. However, since the 2008 amendments to the Constitution, it is possible for the
relevant committees to veto those nominated by the President (or other appointing
authority) if they can muster a three-fifths majority. This reverses the practice in the
United States where two-fifths of the Senate can veto a presidential appointment if
the opponents choose to filibuster the nominee.
As in other independent regulatory agencies, serving on the CSA is a full-time
job.245 Members cannot be employed in the industry for one year after leaving the
board.246 The background of members varies, but journalists have always been well
represented. Retired politicians are common. Others are senior civil servants who
will return to government ministries after service on the CSA. The chairman in 2011
was Michel Boyon, a graduate of ENA with a long career in government and French• , " 147
public companies as well as in the Conseil d Etat."
The board and especially the Chairman of the CSA are supposed to be above
politics, but given the sensitive nature of their responsibilities, this mandate is a
source of ongoing debate and critique. The problem is not just the result of
personalities, but relates to the structure of the agency, its links to the government,
and the career paths of its staff and some of its board. Given the strength of France's
civil service tradition, some worry that no real independent thinking is possible in
regulatory agencies heavily staffed at the top by career civil servants. The CSA has a
staff of 293 full-time-equivalents of which seventeen percent are civil servants
seconded from the rest of the government. Many of these are in top positions in the
agency.
The CSA mostly issues individual decisions (e.g., it awards and renews licenses,
sanctions stations for violations). Limited by the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'ltat
and the Conseil Constitutionnel, it lacks open-ended authority to issue secondary
legislation. However, it has decree authority in particular areas set by statute.2 48 The
245 Loi 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative i la libert6 de communication [Law 86-1067 of
September 30, 1986 on the Freedom of Communication], J.O., Oct. I. 1986, p. 11755 [hereinafter CSA
Act], art. 5.. In contrast, service on some advisory boards and commissions is a part-time responsibility.
246 Id. According to our joint interview with Japiot and Mauboussin, supra note 241, the actual
practice appears to be somewhat more restrictive.
247 See Michael Boyon, WIKIPEDIA, http://fr.wikipedia.orgtwiki/M ichelBoyon (last visited Apr.
13, 2013). President Hollande appointed.Olivier Schrameck, a member of the Conseil d'Etat and one of
our interviewees, to replace Japiot in January 2013. Pascale Paoli-Lebailly, Olivier Schrameck Appointed
Head of CSA, RAPID TV NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.rapidtvnews.com/index.php/2013011025770/olivier-schrameck-appointed-head-of-csa.html
24 The Conseil Constitutionnel, Conseil sup6rieur de laudiovisuel, n*. 88-248 DC of 17 January
1989, upheld the creation of CSA but restricted the permissible level of delegation. "17 janvier 1989:
Conseil sup6rieur de I'audiovisuel (248 DC),"in Louis Favoreu, Patrick GaTia, Richard Ghevontian,
Ferdinand M61in-Soucramanien, Andr6 Roux, Loic Philip, Les Grades Dicisions du Conseil
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most important are: child and youth protection (both programming and protection
from harmful microwave emissions); advertising (a government decree gave CSA
authority here), access of parties and candidates to radio and TV during electoral
campaigns, on-line gambling,2 49 and the ethical and honest use of information.
Statutes set very general requirements for CSA processes, but these
requirements do not create legally enforceable procedural rights when the CSA
issues rules. The 2010 Annual Report discusses a requirement of "public
consultation, 250 but this involves individual licensing decisions and seems designed
to hear would-be applicants for a license and other firms, not the "public" in general.
However, the statute refers to a decision's impact on the market, a criterion that
would seem to invite potential competitors and consumers to take part.25 '
The CSA in its own interest carries out "hearings" with the companies and
associations interested in its policies, but these are not open-ended consultations.5 2
It often also has a formal public consultation. It accepts comments, but these are not
made public and are only summarized ex post without attribution. This is justified to
protect privacy and encourage frankness, but, of course, it limits debate because
participants cannot respond to others' arguments. According to Director Japiot, the
CSA is interested in increasing public consultation, and its top officials have met
with people from OFCOM (the UK agency in this area) to discuss its experience
with citizen panels. However, such an exercise in public outreach is not the same
thing as a process that seeks public input on particular policy decisions.
The administrative and constitutional tribunals have not struck down CSA
decisions on procedural grounds. In the absence of statutory provisions, the Conseil
d'ttat is reluctant to require consultation, and has been mostly supportive of CSA
practices and choices. 253 However, the recent Conseil Constitutionnel case dealing
Constitutionnel, n* 21, p. 229 (Dalloz, 16' ed., 2011). The delegation must cover only measures of limited
scope in terms ofboth application and content. See also Emmanuel Guillaume and Charlotte Beaugonin,
"Contentieux de I'audiovisuel" in Rdpertoire de contentieux administratif(2007), IN 135-139. The case is
summarized in English at 570-57 1).
2 9 A dilibgration sets out conditions on broadcasters that permitted such games. This appears not
to be a formal decree but a guideline that announces enforcement priorities. See Dliboration 2011-09 du
27 avril 2011 relative aux conditions de diffusion, par les services de t6l6vision et de radio, des
communications commerciales en faveur d'un op6rateur de jeux d'argent et de hasard I6galement autoris6
[Deliberation of Apr. 27, 2011 on the Conditions of Dissemination of Legally Authorized Gambling by a
Commercial Operator of Television and Radio Services], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RPPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF FRANCE], Apr. 30, 2011, text n* 77.250 CSA act supra note 245, art. 3 1.
25! See id. arts. 29, 30-1, 30-5, 30-6.
22 These consultations are not legally required and create no legally enforceable rights. The CSA
has no legal obligation to take comments into account and has no published guidelines on the way it
carries out consultations. The agency uses its website to manage the consultation process subject to
precise time limits for comments. It either poses particular questions concerning a future decision or puts
a draft decision on the web and awaits comments. Afterwards, the CSA writes a synthesis of the
comments and is free to decide whether or not to take them into account before issuing its decision. E-
mail from Elisabeth Mauboussin, Legal Director, Conseil sup6rieur de l'audiovisuel, to authors (Jun. 15,
2012, 07:06) (on file with authors).
253 Fifty cases went to the Conseil dEtat in 2010; there were three proposed referrals to the
Constitutional Council, but none was sent on. Of the 50 cases, 18 upheld the CSA decision, four annulled
the CSA decision, seven were ruled out of order by the judge or were nonsuits, and 21 were withdrawn.
Of the proposed referrals to the Constitutional Council, one involved procedures but only with respect to
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with the assignment of Internet domain names raises some questions. The case did
not involve the CSA, but the underlying logic would seem to apply.
Recently, the Conseil d'tat held against the CSA in a case of non-decision that
dealt with substance. The issue revolved around the question of how to count the
speeches of the President in determining the air time allotted to different political
viewpoints.254 In France it had not been the practice for Presidents to give speeches
in Parliament. President Sarkozy instituted that practice, raising the issue of how to
count them. The CSA omitted them, and the Conseil d'ttat disagreed. In 2005 the
Conseil d'tat held that the exclusion of his speeches was generally proper but did
not apply in extraordinary circumstances: here a referendum on the European
constitution. Subsequently, in 2009 the CSA did not include the president's speeches
in Parliament in the total allotted to the government. The Conseil d'tat held, in
contrast, that the CSA needed to include the "political" parts of the president's
speeches in the total.255 This seems like a highly charged mandate, but the CSA
apparently managed its task without much controversy during the 2012 electoral
season.
However, the allocation of TV time remains a contested issue that intersects
with new political institutions over and above presidential speeches. The Socialist
Party held its first ever primary in 2011, and the media covered it extensively,
though not always in a manner favorable to the Socialists. The other parties objected
that the media devoted too much time to the Socialists. The stations were given a
formal warning by the CSA, the first stage in sanctioning. If they were to repeat the
contested behavior, they could be fined, advertising could be suspended, or in
extreme cases licenses might be modified or revoked. This reaction from the CSA
suggests a need to rethink the underlying policy in the light of the newly instituted
primary process.
Thus, the Conseil d'tat acts as a watchdog over the CSA while giving it
considerable leeway in its day-to-day operations. But there is another important
check on the independence of the CSA: the Government. The CSA is a statutorily
independent body; the Government cannot dismiss board members even "for cause"
and cannot interfere with individual decisions, for example, granting licenses and
sanctioning firms that violate the rules. However, as noted above, the CSA has only
limited decree authority. Outside those areas, they issue advice (avis) to the relevant
government ministry on draft decrees (as well as on draft laws).256 The CSA
deliberations over the grant of an individual license. See Conseil d'ttat, Oct. 4, 2010, 336918 (where the
Conseil d'ttat refused to send the constitutional challenges to art. 29-3 of Law 86-1067); Loi du 5 mars
2009 relative i la communication audiovisuelle et au nouveau service public de Ia television [Law of Mar.
5, 2009 on audiovisual communication and the new public television service], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 7,2009, p. 432 1, art. 77, which
required deliberation as part of the process of applying for a license, to the Constitutional Council on the
ground that the question was neitherserious nor new). The Report cites a number of important Conseil
d'Etat decisions upholding CSA decisions. Of these, only one involved the administrative process and that
decision was an individual licensing decision. CSA ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 241.
25 Conseil d'tat, Ass., Apr. 8, 2009, 311136, Recueil Lebon p. 140.
255 id.
256 The CSA has frequently given advice to the government on draft decrees, but this practice has
only been formally required by statute since the Law 2009-258 of March 5, 2009 on Audiovisual
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submitted nineteen evaluations in 2010. It also submitted seven evaluations to the
competition authority and ARCEP. 257 The key point is not the number of
evaluations, but the fact that most of the government decrees dealing with the media
will be implemented, but not created, by the CSA.
The CSA offers advice at an early stage while the decree is being formulated in
order to have an impact on the final result. As a result of the CSA's involvement
early in the drafting of ministry decrees, it usually finds the results acceptable.
However, the obvious concern is that the agency is not really independent of the
government with respect to major policy initiatives.258 This can be a plus if one
worries that the agency is too independent of democratic imperatives, but it can be a
minus if one wants an agency able to act independently of political pressures to
provide a background for free flowing political debate and a free media. The latter
concern is particularly salient because the government owns or partly owns major
providers and has an interest in their financial health and in thb content of their
programs.
Although the CSA usually approves government decrees, the possibility of
going public with a negative finding gives it bargaining power. For example, in 2007
it publicly disapproved the Government's draft decree dealing with on-demand TV
services. The Government was obviously unhappy with the CSA's public stance,
which was a way of signaling the agency's independence. The Government
eventually buckled and took account of the CSA's stated objections.
259
In other words, rulemaking is a shared competence.26 Such a back and forth
between an independent regulatory agency and a government ministry might seem
strange to an American observer. If a government ministry can promulgate a rule
that is then carried out by an agency, it would seem to violate the agency's
independence. It is one thing to include such agencies in Government task forces that
consider overlapping policy issues and to ask it for advice with respect to ministry
policymaking. It is quite another for a cabinet ministry to be able to issue rules that
the independent agency must enforce.
Communication and'New Public Television. The CSA Annual Report 2010 lists 19 instances where the
CSA gave advice to the government. CSA RAPPORT ANNUAL 2010, supra note 241, at II.
257 Id. at 11.
25' Limited decree authority is a general feature of French independent agencies. See Custos,
Independent Administrative Authorities, supra note 234, at 281-82.
259 CSA RAPPORT ANNUAL 2010, supra note 24 1, at 9.
260 For a defense of this way of organizing the relationship between agencies and governments,
see generally GtRARD MARCOU & FRANCK MODERNE, DROIT DE LA RIGULATION, SERVICE PUBLIC ET
INTtGRATION RIGIONALE (2005). See also SOCItTt DE LIGISLATION COMPARIE, LE MODtLE DES
AUTORITtS DE R9GULATION INDIPENDANTES EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE (G6rard Marcou & Johannes
Masing eds., 2011). This shared competence is a common feature of European regulatory agencies.
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C. ARCEp
61
The Autorit6 de R~gulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes
(ARCEP) regulates both the telecommunications market and the postal services.2 62 It
was created in 2005 to replace the Autorit de R~gulation des T6l6communications
(ART), established in- 1996263 and was established to prepare for the opening of the
telecommunications sector to competition following the liberalization efforts of the
European Commission. This sector-except for mobile telephony-was previously a
legal monopoly of France T6lcom. The ART was entrusted with removing barriers
to entry, and it was also responsible for guaranteeing the provision and financing of
the "public service of telecommunications."
The agency is an independent administrative authority (aulorit6 administrative
ind~pendante) with an Executive Board of seven members who are appointed for
six-year terms "on the basis of their economic, legal and technical qualifications in
the areas of electronic communications, post and regional economy." Their terms are
irrevocable and nonrenewable. Three members are appointed by the President of the
Republic, two by the President of the Senate, and two by the President of the
National Assembly.
Although the board members must have some expertise, informal networks
between politicians and members of independent regulatory authorities appear to
play a role.2" The majority of the board members of the ARCEP have followed the
traditional path leading to the upper echelons of the French administration. Most
appointees incorporate into agency operations a prior knowledge of how the
administration works in addition to technical competence.
265
Political oversight can be informal and behind the scenes, but there are also
formal mechanisms. Like CSA, the ARCEP submits an annual public report to the
government and the Parliament, and agency representatives participate in
261 This section summarizes the material in Athanasios Efst Psygkas, From the "Democratic
Deficit" to a "Democratic Surplus ": Enhancing Participatory Regulatory Processes it France,
(unpublished draft paper, Yale Law School, 2011). We are grateful to Athanasios Psygkas for sharing
with us his draft, which contains additional details on the agency and its work.
262 Loi 2005-516 du 20 mai 2005 relative A la regulation des activitis postales [Law 2005-516 of
May 20, 2005 on the Regulation of Postal Activities], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LAW REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 21, 2005, p. 8825.
263 Loi 96-659 du 26 juillet 1996 de r~glementation des t6l6ecommunications [Law 96-659 of July
26, 1996 of Telecommunications Regulation], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LAW REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE, July 27. 1996, p. 11384. For a comparison of ART and the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission, see Dominique Custos, Agences indpendantes de rgulation amiricaines
(IRC) et autoritis administratives indpendantesfrantaises (AA1): L'exemple de la "Federal
Communications Commission " (FCC) et de l'autorit de rigulation des thlcomnunications (AR7), 20
POLITIQUES ET MANAGEMENT PUBLIC 67 (2002), available at
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/pomap_0758-1726_2002_num_20_I2706 (last
visited February 11. 2013).
264 See Mark Thatcher, Independent Regulator' Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe, in
REGULATION THROUGH AGENCIES IN THE EU: A NEW PARADIGM OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 47, 59.
(Damien Geradin et al., eds., 2005).
265 See Martin Hirsch, L 'expertise scientifique ind~pendante dans un etablissement public:
L 'exemple de I'Agencefranvaise de scurit sanitaire des aliments, in CONSEIL D'ETAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC
2001: LES AUTORITtS ADMINISTRATIVE INDtPENDANTES 428 (2001) (suggesting, in the context of
another authority, the French Food Agency, that it is entrusted with developing independent expertise).
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parliamentary hearings. In addition, the Commission supirieure du service public
des postes et des communications glectroniques (CSSPCE) has provided
parliamentary oversight since 1990 when France T6lcom was transformed from a
state service (service de t'tat) into a distinct public body.2 " The committee has
seventeen members: seven from the National Assembly, seven from the Senate and
three "qualified personalities." The aim was to give parliamentarians an oversight
mechanism that would "guarantee the public service of telecommunications."
However, CSSPCE's role is purely advisory. It can issue an opinion before the
ARCEP adopts a policy; ARCEP retains its independence vis-A-vis the legislature
but must explain its actions.
ARCEP faces some of the same challenges to its independence as CSA. In its
day-to-day operations the threats to ARCEP's independence are rather subtle. We
have already pointed to the fact that both boards and agency staffs include high civil
servants. In addition, the government tries to manage or influence policymaking in
both agencies.
If the government oversteps, ARCEP has a strong advocate in the European
Commission, which can go beyond rhetoric to take legal action. However, it has
done so only when the challenge to ARCEP's independence was particularly
evident: for example, in 2010-2011 when the government attempted to assign a
government commissioner (Commissaire du gouvernement) inside the ARCEP.267
During the first reading of this bill in the National Assembly, the Government
introduced an amendment providing that a government commissioner, nominated by
the Minister in charge of the electronic communications sector, would be placed
within the ARCEP. She would "communicate the analysis of the government," with
respect to policy in the domain of posts and electronic communications and would
retire during the deliberations of the agency. However, she could put on the agenda
any question related to sectoral policy and "the examination of this question could
not be refused." 2 8 The Minister highlighted the commissioner's limited power and
stated that her presence would "reinforce the dialogue" between the agency and the
government. 26This proposal is the reverse of the practice at CSA, which comments
on government regulations that will apply to its operation. The amendment prompted
strong reactions from ARCEP and members of the opposition who pointed out the
risk of undermining the independence of the agency. The European Commission
266 Loi 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 relative A I'organisation du service public des postes et
t6l6communications [Law 90-568 of July 2, 1990 on the Organization of the Public Postal Service and
Telecommunications], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZET-rE OF
FRANCE, Jul. 8, 1990, p. 8069.
267 Projet de loi portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation de Ia lgislation au droit de lUnion
europ6enne en matibre de sant6, de travail et de communications Nectroniques [Bill Containing Various
Provisions Adapting Legislation to the Law of the European Union on Health, Labor and Electronic
Communications], no. 2789, d6pos6 le 15 septembre 2010, available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/projets/pl2789.asp (last visited April 14, 2013).
2" Article 13 (nouveau); Aprs I'article L. 131 du m6me code, il est ins r6 un article L. 131-I.
269 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, XIITH LEGISLATURE, SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 2010-201 I, COMPTE
RENDU INTIGRAL TROIS19ME S-ANCE DU JEUDI 13 JANVIER 2011 [verbatim record of the debates at the
National Assembly, Third Session of January 13, 2011] (3d Sess., Jan. 13, 2011, Minister Eric Besson),
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2010-2011/20110097.asp (last visited April 14,
2013).
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threatened to initiate a procedure against France charging violation of the EU
directives because EU law requires ARCEP to be independent.270 Eventually, the
Senate deleted the amendment, and it was not passed by the legislature.27 One
wonders, however, if the Minister might achieve the same result by promulgating
rules to be applied by ARCEP. So far the EU has not objected to that practice.
The industry and other concerned actors provide input through organized
consultations or concertations. Many groups are affected by the actions of ARCEP,
including the regulated industry, civil society groups (particularly consumer groups),
other public authorities, and individuals. However, the telecommunications law of
1996 only envisaged stakeholder participation via two corporatist bodies, and
ARCEP emphasizes concertation only with the regulated entities. In the first Annual
Report of 1997, the Chairman identified dialogue with all market actors as a method
of attaining the aim of balanced, fair, and sustainable competition consistent with the
public service objectives of the agency. 272 These formal consultation requirements
contrast with the few public consultations that the ART launched during its early
period. They occurred on an ad hoc basis and were highly discretionary. They were
not published on its website, and there is very little information about who was
consulted or how ART responded.
The EU exercises external control over some aspects of ARCEP's choices.
273
For us, the most relevant EU control began in June 2004 with the transposition into
French law of the 2002 EU "electronic communications package". The new statute
modified the 1996 law to include the exact wording of the Framework Directive
regarding consultation procedures. 27 4 Article L 32-1-II of the Code des postes et des
communications 6lectroniques (CPCE) now reads:
Whenever, in the context of the provisions of this code, the minister in
charge of electronic communications and the Autorit6 de r6gulation des
communications 6lectroniques et des postes intend to take measures which
have a significant impact on the market, they shall publicize the intended
27o Arcep: UE menace la France de sanction [ARCEP: EU threatens France with sanctions], LE
FIGARO (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.lefigaro. fr/flash-eco/2011/02/08/97002-20110208FILWWW00503-
arcep-ue-menace-la-france-de-sanction.php; II n'y aura pas de commissaire du gouvernement d 'Arcep
[There Will Be No Government Commissioner to ARCEP], LE MONDE (Feb. 16,2011),
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/20ll/02/16/il-n-y-aura-pas-de-commissaire-du-
gouvemement-a-l-arcep_ 1481174_651865.html. Here the impact of EU law is stronger for ARCEP as
compared to CSA, which is not required to be independent under EU law.
27 See Digital Agenda for Europe, Broadband & Telecom Market Regulation,
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/scoreboard/broadband-telecom-market-regulation- 10 (the
independence and effectiveness of the NRA). See also the opinion of the Senate Commission on Economy
that argued that the amendment was contrary to EU law, of little use given all the other provisions of the
law regarding the relations between the agency and the government (http://www.senat.fr/rap/alO-252/alO-
2528.html#toc3 1)
272 ART, RAPPORT ANNUEL D'ACTIVITI 1997 [Annual Report 1997] (1997), p. 5.
273 ARCEP must submit its market analyses of the electronic communications sector to the
European Commission and to Member State agencies for their opinions. The European Commission has
veto power on the definition of these markets and on the designation of operators with significant market
power.
274 Loi no 2004-669 du 9 juillet 2004 relative aux communications 6lectroniques et aux services
de communication audiovisuelle [Law 2004-669 of 9 July 2004 on electronic communications and
audiovisual communications services], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.0.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], p. 12483, art. 3.
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measures within a reasonable period before their adoption and receive
comments on them. The result of these consultations is made public
except in the case of confidentiality protected by law. The authority puts
in place a service allowing access to those consultations.
275
Other provisions oblige the agency to launch a public consultation on specific
questions. 6 ARCEP immediately increased the number of consultations in 2004;
since then the numbers have remained stable or increased. The number of comments
received and, more importantly, published also rose, reflecting ARCEP's
commitment to transparency.277 According to Athanasios Psygkas's research, once
the agency officials became familiar with participatory processes and developed a
culture of consultation, they organized more frequent p7ublic consultations on
subjects where a prior consultation was not legally required.
Participants in ARCEP processes are mostly market players. According to
Psygkas, in the most recent year for which data are available, 77 percent of the
participants were from industry, 5 percent were from NGOs, 7 percent were
individuals, and I I percent were from local governments and other public
authorities.27 9 In spite of this tilt toward the regulated firms, the processes do permit
the engagement of actors that would otherwise be left outside the regulatory process:
namely, individuals, smaller NGOs, and local authorities. Further, as consumer
groups themselves acknowledge, some consultations may have a very narrow
technical scope that only concerns the industry.28 ° In addition, the industry category
encompasses both traditionally strong domestic firms, such as the incumbent
operator, and smaller companies in the telecommunications business, as well as
foreign companies. Participating firms may have divergent interests. For example, in
the case of net neutrality, operators and content providers (both small and large)
likely had opposing positions.28'
Of course, mandating open hearings and consultations does not eliminate the
possibility of informal, private meetings. Even if such meetings were to occur,
Psygkas argues that they would not negate the impact of public consultations. He
reports that lobbyists view participating in public consultations as a necessary prong
of their strategy, as it helps to identify them as reliable and expert market actors and
contributes to establishing a strong presence in the sector. ARCEP itself expects
market actors to make their positions clear in the hearings.28 2 According to Psygkas,
the formal consultative bodies have gradually lost influence with the rise of public
consultations. These bodies enter the picture late, at the end of the public
27 The article was translated by Psygkas, supra note 261.
276 They deal with the management of scarce frequencies and interconnection obligations. CODE
DES POSTES ET DES COMMUNICATIONS ILECTRONIQUES [C.P.C.E.] arts. LA2-2. 1-38-4, D99-1 I.
277 For detailed data, see Psygkas, supra note 261.
2 The consultation on "orientations" regarding net neutrality in the summer of 2010 is one
example. In April 2011, ARCEP launched a public consultation on access to optical fiber lines in "small
houses" in very dense zones. On June 15, 2011, the Authority published its decision on market analysis
and its recommendation on optical fiber lines. See Psygkas, supra note 261, for details.
27 Calculation by Psygkas, supra note 261, from ARCEP website
2" Psygkas, supra note 261, reported this from an interview.
2" See the case study in Psygkas, supra note 261.
212 Psygkas, supra note 261.
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consultation process; during their meetings actors repeat comments that they have
previously expressed.28 3
French law does not impose a general reason-giving obligation for regulatory
acts. 284 However, the act that governs ARCEP requires it to give reasons for some
decisions. 285 The Authority will often publish a synthesis or overview of the
comments it received, a practice that may lead ARCEP to articulate reasons why it
did or did not incorporate the comments into the final text. However, ARCEP has no
obligation to publish such syntheses, and it can select which comments to
summarize. Their content is entirely at the discretion of ARCEP. Between 2004 and
2010, the percentage of decisions with a published synthesis varied from 30 percent
to 62 percent, and the median number of pages varied from 12 to 31.286 There is no
way of knowing how the length of the summaries compares to the actual volume of
submissions.
Judicial review of ARCEP procedures is frequently limited to what Psygkas
calls a "checklist obligation." The court simply inquires whether the agency has
fulfilled its obligation to hold a consultation. If it did not, its decision will be
annulled; if it did, the Conseil d'ttat does not inquire further. However, if the law
requires broad concertation, consultation with a closed group will not suffice.28 7
Furthermore, the Conseil d'ttat held in 2009 that ARCEP could not modify the
obligations it imposed on a major market actor without a new round of consultations,
unless these modifications were anticipated in the original decision.288 In its opinion
the Conseil takes a broad view of the public accountability of consultations by
noting that they constitute guarantees for consumers as well as for operators.
However, the decision still fits in the checklist category in that the Conseil d'ttat
simply looks to see if a consultation took place.28 9 However, the adequacy of the
consultation process does matter when the Conseil d'Etat determines the scope of
review. This includes the number of comments received during those consultations
and, more importantly, the number of comments published. 290 The existence of a
comprehensive and well-advertised concertation prevents the firms from raising new
283 Psygkas, supra note 261, reporting on an interview.
2"The requirements on reason-giving are imposed by the Loi no. 79-587 du I I juillet 1979
relative A la motivation des actes administratifs et A I'am~lioration des relations entre radministration et le
public. The law applies to-unfavorable individual decisions. It does not extend to actes riglementaires -
although there are exceptions, e.g., one introduced by Loi no. 2002-276 du 27 f6vrier 2002 relative A la
d6mocratie de proximit6 [Law 2002-276 of Feb. 27. 2002 on the law on grassroots democracy], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 28 f6vrier 2002, p.
3808.
283 CODE DES POSTES ET DES COMMUNICATIONS ILECTRONIQUES [C.P.C.E.] arts. L34, L34-8,
L36-8.
286 Calculated by Psygkas, supra note 261, from ARCEP data.
287 For an example not involving ARCEP, see CE [Neither Ass. nor Sect.], June 6, 2007, Rec.
Lebon 242 [[N0 292386]], [[Association Le Reseau Sortir Du Nucleaire]]. In Nucliaire, petitioners asked
for the annulment ofan authorization to Electricit& de France ("EDF") to proceed to the definitive
termination and complete dismantlement of a nuclear facility. The Court held that it was insufficient to
consult only with a closed observer group; that practice violated the requirement that the concerned public
must be informed and permitted to express an opinion prior to the award of the authorization.
288 CE, June 19, 2009, [[310453]] Association des Renseignements pour Tous.
289 CE, July 24, 2009, [Rec. Lebon p. 872, N0 324642 Orange el SFR].
290 For detailed data, see Psygkas, supra note 261.
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issues before the court. If the firms had the opportunity to participate in the agency
process, they cannot obtain a rehearing of their complaints before the court.
291
The French statute speaks of "measures that have a significant impact on the
market." It thus appears to recognize that ARCEP can make decisions that have
policy implications whatever their formal character. The requirement for public
consultations seems based on a desire to assure democratic accountability not just to
protect property rights or avoid individualized harms. Thus, even if ARCEP's formal
ability to issue decrees is limited, its procedures acknowledge its role as an
independent policymaker that must consult broadly and justify its actions to the
general public.
D. Conclusions on Independent Agencies
In both France and the US statutes constrain and frame the actions of regulatory
agencies. In France, EU law also importantly limits national policymaking. These
agencies exist only because the political branches have created them; they are not
mentioned in the Constitution. In France some of them (like ARCEP) are mandated
by EU law, a fact that shields them against political interference at the domestic
level. However, if one of the functional justifications for independence it to limit
day-to-day political influence, that goal is partially undermined by French practice
and legal judgments that neglect the public welfare arguments for insulation. Of
course, U.S. agencies are also subject to political pressures, and some political
science research claims that they follow the shifting political complexion of
Congress and\or the President. However, recent research challenges those earlier
292results. In legal terms, the federal courts have permitted agencies to issue general
rules even without explicit statutory language.293 Court review of independent
agency rules is not substantially different from review of rules issued by cabinet
departments, although a justice does occasionally suggest that the Court should
provide more stringent review of independent agencies. The Supreme Court has
only limited the delegation of appointment and removal powers to agencies; it has
not limited their policy discretion.
In short, the contrast between the nature of independence in France and the U.S.
raises important questions about what independence is for. Is it mainly to assure
impartial individual decisions or is independent policymaking essential to the
agency's mission as well? Is the agency meant to be independent of the industry it
291 This doctrine is illustrated by the line of cases related to the assignment of a fourth license for
3G mobile phone services, which Free Mobile ended up receiving. See CE Sect., Apr. 27, 2009, [no.
312741, Bouygues], Recucil Lebon p. 872; CE, Oct. 12,2010, [no. 332393 Bouygues], Recueil Lebon p.
378.
292 Key articles on both sides of this debate are collected in ECONOMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2007).
293 Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
294 See FCC v. Fox Television, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in
his dissent, views the FCC, an independent agency, as "an agent of Congress," leading him to conclude
that the Court has a special mandate to review its actions to maintain stability.
2n See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (holding
unconstitutional the removal provisions of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board which gave
the Securities and Exchange Commissioners, not the President, the power to remove Board members "for
cause").
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regulates, of the rest of government, or of both? What if the government owns or
partly owns some of the most important regulated firms? How is impartial, effective
regulation in the public interest to be accomplished? 296 Our concern with democratic
accountability implies that independence from the executive and the legislature
ought to mean that agencies have a greater obligation to consult broadly beyond the
regulated industry and to use transparent procedures. Lacking strong oversight from
the political branches, they should, as a consequence, seek democratic legitimacy
through participatory processes. Although CSA does acknowledge these pressures as
a reason for accepting more public input, it faces no legal requirement to do so,
except in the case of tenders for new TV and radio frequencies. ARCEP is supposed
to contribute to the creation of a single market and does have a mandate for greater
openness that comes from the EU, but the nature of its choices, compared to CSA,
suggest that most of its decisions will have less public salience that those made by
CSA. If public participation were to expand in France, the independent regulatory
agencies would seem an obvious place to start on the grounds of democratic
legitimacy.
IV. IMPACT ASSESSMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND BILAN
The third, pressure on conventional administrative law comes from social
science, especially economics, and technical scientific disciplines, such as
engineering and biology. Technocratic experts are allied with the European
Commission under its "better" (or "smarter") regulation initiative and with the
OECD. These institutions are pushing Member States to evaluate policies using
Impact Assessment (IA). IA is a tool both to produce better laws and to reduce the
costs imposed on business and citizens, particularly with respect to regulatory
initiatives. The EU/OECD initiative claims to espouse a coherent way of evaluating
policies. The reality is more complex. Proponents of IA urge systematic analysis
using risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis, and they also support a
heterogeneous basket of other goals, not all of which are consistent with the
objective of balancing benefits and costs.
The move to incorporate IA into statutory and regulatory drafting processes is
linked to claims that legislators and government officials, left to themselves, will
produce statutes that do not accord with the public interest. IA requires lawmakers to
balance benefits and costs and to seek the best overall outcome. Public input can
help in the preparation of an IA, but such input might also generate laws that more
closely track the concerns of citizens, unmediated by representative or elite bodies.
The tension between French concepts of the public interest as articulated by elite
officials and popular democracy are particularly salient here.
France gives constitutional status to something approaching IA in the Charter
for the Environment. Article 5 of the Charter requires authorities to implement
procedures for risk assessment, and article 6 requires policymakers to reconcile
296 Looking at the whole range of French independent agencies, some are set up to protect the
citizen from the government. The first independent agency created in France in 1978, CNIL (data
protection agency), gave citizens protection in the use ofdata collected by the government.
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environmental values with economic development and social programs.297 In 2003
the French government set up its own internal IA process for proposed rules and
statutes, but these guidelines have no external legal force. The legal status of IA
changed in 2009 under legislation that implements the July 23, 2008 constitutional
amendments. The framework law requires the government to submit an IA along
with every draft bill that it submits to the legislature. 298 The Conseil d'Etat reviews
the IA, but the document is only made public when the bill is sent to the legislature
and made available on the National Assembly website. 299 The assembly has ten days
to determine if the IA is adequate and can submit it to the Conseil Constitutionnel
for review.
300
Although the French Organic Law is nominally procedural, the requirements
have substantive implications for the definition of the public interest. Under article 8
of the Act, the IA must explain the way the bill dovetails with European legislation
and its impact on the domestic legal system. It must show how the law will apply at
the national and local levels of government, to overseas territories, and over time.
The IA must include an evaluation of the economic, financial, employment, and
environmental impacts, and an assessment of the financial costs and benefits
expected for the public administration and for natural and legal persons. The
Government must specify the method of calculation used, evaluate the consequences
for public-sector employment, and list the consultations carried out. It should include
a provisional list of any implementing secondary legislation that may be necessary.
There is no similar legal requirement for secondary legislation, such as decrees
and ordinances. If draft bills should be subject to IA, why not draft decrees and
ordinances? At present, IA remains an internal government practice framed by the
guidelines prepared by the Conseil d'tat and the Secretary of the Government.3 °'
The Sarkozy government issued two executive orders requiring administrative
297 Outside ofthe environmental area, France must comply with the Sanitary Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS") agreement of the World Trade Organization, which requires a risk assessment ifa
country wishes to exceed the standards, guidelines, or recommendations of international bodies. WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY
MEASURES, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/sps_.e/spsagre.htm.
293 A 2008 amendment to the French Constitution, provides that an organic law must govern the
presentation ofbills tabled in the National Assembly or the Senate. See 1958 CONST. art. 39 (amended
Jul7 23, 2008). The provision was codified in an Organic Law of April 15, 2009, which took effect in the
fall of 2009.
Loi 2009-403 du 15 avril 2009 relative A I'application des articles 34-1, 39 et 44 de la
Constitution [Law 2009-403 of 15 April 2009 on the Application of Articles 34-1, 39 and 44 of the
Constitution], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE FRANIAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF FRANCE],
April 16, 2009, p. 6528.
2" Projets de loi: Les etudes d'impact sont en ligne, ASSEMBLtE NATIONALE (Sept. 15, 2009),
http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/alaune/projets-loi-etudes-impact-sont-ligne.html
300 At its own discretion, the legislature can decide if amendments from members of parliament
should also be subject to an IA before they are discussed. Organic Law, articles 9 and 15. Occasionally,
the Government has asked a member of parliament to introduce a bill to avoid the IA requirement. See J.-
P. Duprat, The Judicial Review of Ex Ante Impact Assessment in France: An Attempt to Fuse the
Principles of Legal Certainty and Institutional Balance 6 LEGIPRUDENCE 379 (2012).
301See Guide de ligistique: tudes d'impact, ASSEMBLE NATIONALE (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Guide-de-legistiquei.-Conception-des-textes/I. I.-Necessite-
des-nornes/I .1 .2.-Etudes-d-impact. This document is a set of guidelines for drafting legal texts produced
by the Secretary of Govemment and the Conseil d'ttat. In other words, it is not itselfa law.
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bodies to draft lAs for any regulations that affect local governments and business.30 2
In August 2012 the Hollande government issued an executive order requiring that
draft legislative and regulatory texts include an assessment of their impact on gender
equality.
30 3
The Conseil d'ttat reviews lAs a part of their established procedures, but if the
Government does not prepare an IA for a piece of secondary legislation, that would
not be legally enforceable. The requirement takes the form of a guideline or an
executive order, not a law. President Sarkozy did create a Commissioner for
Simplification that checks the quality of the IAs and gives its opinion.3 4 This
Commissioner, who continues to review lAs under the Socialist Government, is
similar to the Impact Assessment Board that performs that function at the European
Commission.0 3
A. Impact Assessment: Alternative Concepts
Fundamentally, Impact Assessment signals an interest in the functional efficacy
of the law. Under the IA model, the state evaluates statutes and regulations to
determine the effects they will have on human behavior and on the achievement of
public benefits. That much seems uncontroversial. IA counsels a focus not on the
formal properties of the law but on how it operates in the real world. Neatness, clear
drafting, and consistency are valuable only as means to an end, not as ends in
themselves. 3 s
IA arose in American debates over environmental policy and later affected
policymaking in Europe. In the U.S. these debates led to passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970 that requires an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) for all public projects that might affect the natural environment.
30 7
The reports must be public, but they are only advisory. The courts have delayed
projects when the ETAs were inadequate or non-existent, but if the government has
carried out a satisfactory assessment, the project can go forward in spite of its
302 See Circulaire du 17 fevrier 2011 relative i la simplification des normes concemant les
entreprises et les collectivit6s territoriales (Feb. 18, 2011 ), JORF n*41 du 18 fivrier 2011 page 3025, texte
no 3
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023596423&fastPos=l &fastReql
d=2124413186&ategorieLien=id&oldAction=rechTexte [hereinafter Circulaire du 17 f6vrier 2011 ]. The
circulaires here are analogous to executive orders in the U.S. in that they do not have the status of
enforceable law.
303 Circulaire du Premier ministre du 23 ao0t 2012 relative A la prise en compte dans la
pr6paration des textes 16gislatifs et r~glementaires de leur impact en termes d' galit6 entre les femmes et
les hommes (JORF n°0 196 du 24 aoit 2012 page 13760, texte n* 3).
3'€ For a description of his mandate, see Michel Hainque & Charles-Henri Montin, Better
Regulation in France (draft paper, 2011), available at http://montin.com/documents/brfrance.pdf. The
authors are officials in the French Ministry of Finance, but the paper is not an official Ministry document..
305 See J. B. Wiener & A. Alemanno, Comparing Regulatoy Oversight Bodies Across the
Atlantic: The Of/ice of/lhformation and Regulatmy Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in
the EU, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 47, at 309. The Impact Assessment Board,
created in 2006, was created to control quality under the authority of the Commission President.
3" For a critique of Polish legal culture along these lines, see MACIEJ KISILOWSKI, BRIBERS,
ZEALOTS, AND THE BLACK LETTER OF LAW: LAWMAKING IN.A POSITIVIST LEGAL CULTURE (unpublished
J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School, June 2012) (on file with Susan Rose-Ackerman).
042 U.S.C. § 4321 etseq.
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environmental effects. 308 The law does not create any rights to stop projects or to
obtain compensation. Nevertheless, the law has affected the way environmental
values are incorporated into policy. Although the Government has prevailed in all
the NEPA cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, the law, nevertheless, creates a
background set of procedural requirements for agencies whose actions may have
environmental impacts.3°
Some critiques of the EIA requirement point out that public projects have many
effects that go beyond the purely environmental. The general term IA, then, broadens
the analytic reach so that policymakers consider all the effects of a project or policy.
Environmental values have no priority. IA can limit the reach of environmental
policies by requiring regulators to consider the costs imposed on businesses and
labor. As such, it bears a close relationship to cost\benefit analysis (CBA) in
economics, but it is not quite the same thing. Reading the country reports that the
OECD has prepared for most EU Member States, one is struck by the diversity of
aims expressed. There is an interest in open, transparent, and wide ranging
participation by all those affected. Decision-makers should canvass a range of
options, including doing nothing, and explain why they have selected a particular
outcome. In doing so they are to balance costs and benefits in some, not clearly
articulated, way. The OECD documents do not confront the difficulties of choosing a
discount rate, or of valuing life, health, and nature.
An IA does not necessarily require a hard cost/benefit analysis where everything
is reduced to dollar values. However, in the absence of a systematic CBA, the
technique is not clear about how to make tradeoffs. Descriptions of IA sometimes
emphasize the simplification and the clarity of laws and legal changes that would
make it easier for private firms to do business. Some of the rhetoric surrounding IA
is distinctly deregulatory in that it puts a burden of proof on those who seek new
regulations. "Impact" in those discussions is impact on economic interests, not
impact on the environment, on the poor, etc. A major theme of the OECD report on
France is the claim that France has too many overlapping regulations and needs to
simplify and rationalize the rules in a business friendly way.310 This is impact
assessment as a reflection of a libertarian philosophy that seeks less state
intervention. It may be true that France has many legal rules that serve little purpose,
but it is decidedly one-sided to presume that this is true.
Three other themes also come up in the Organic Law and in discussions of
"Better Regulation" by the OECD that point in different directions. First, documents
discussing IA often refer to the value of public consultation, and the Law requires
that government consultations be documented, presumably both to encourage wide
consultation and to guard against capture of the process by narrow interests. 31 1
Greater openness and participation of this sort accord with democratic values, but
"0 Judicial review was first carried out in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic
Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
3o Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Protection Act in the U. S. Supreme Court: A
Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtain, 100 GEO. L. J. 1507 (2012) (reviewing the case law and
arguing for the Act's continued influence despite of environmental group losses in the Supreme Court).
310 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ("OECD"), BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE:
FRANCE 120-41 (2010) (dealing with the simplification of law).
311 Loi Organique, supra note 298, art. 8; OECD, supra note 3 10, at 68-85.
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they may be in tension with technocratic, data-driven techniques if the participants
are poorly informed, a biased sample of the population, or both. Second, IA is
sometimes confused with the New Public Management, a technique for carrying out
public programs that tries to import values from the private sector into state
bureaucracies by introducing such practices as managing for results and incentive
payments for civil servants as well as contracting out to private firms.312 Third,
purely formal legal values are sometimes imported into IA, especially when
traditional lawyers are charged with overseeing its implementation.
31 3
Nevertheless, however multifaceted and fuzzy the concept, it is part of the
debate in France and in the EU Member States toward systematizing and quantifying
the costs and benefits of new statutes and of secondary legislation produced by the
executive and the independent agencies. In France that debate has some special
aspects related to its public law tradition. Respect for science, engineering, and
technical knowledge is strong at least at the elite level. The use of expertise to aid
decision-making is not contested. Even the Charter for the Environment incorporates
the value of risk assessment in its text. Hence, to the extent that IA implies a careful
study of the impacts of a policy based on the best scientific and technical data, it has
had an easy reception in many areas of official French decision-making. Jt can
counter emotional or populist appeals through a sober assessment of a policy's
impacts.
But beyond that basic compatibility, two opposing views of IA link to different
aspects of French public law. The debate over the use of IA and over its more precise
forn-cost\benefit analysis-presents quite fundamental challenges even if its roots
can be traced to earlier French contributions by engineers and economists.
314
In the first place, IA could simply be a technique for discovering and
quantifying the public interest based on the best data available. It is a pragmatic
effort to think through all the effects of a policy before it is put on the agenda and to
compare each proposal with other options. IA involves balancing (bilan) consistent
with the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'ttat since the early 1970s. The precise
balance struck is a matter for judgment by government officials and is subject to
review in the administrative courts. It is linked to the proportionality principle with
its focus on rights and the requirement that if rights' violations occur, they should be
tailored in the least restrictive way possible. Under this view IA is essentially a
procedural requirement in no deep tension with French ideas of a general will that
produces laws in the public interest.
312 Loi Organique, supra note 298, art. 8; OECD, supra note 310, ch. 5 (describing the work of
the Director General for State Modernization ("DHME")).
313 OECD, supra note 310, at 120-41.
314 France has a history ofstate ownership of business, especially public utilities and
infrastructure. This tradition produced some of the earliest work dealing with the efficient operation of
business in the public interest. Pierre Mass6 and Marcel Boiteux made seminal contributions on optimal
pricing for state-owned enterprises with public welfare goals. See Pierre Mass6, The French Plan and
Economic Theory, 33 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1965); Marcel Boiteux, On the Management of Public
Monopolies Subject to Budgetary Constraints, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 219 (1971). This work influenced U. S.
public finance economists. Boiteux's article was translated from the original French article, published in
1956, by William Baumol and David Bradford. Baumol and Bradford drew on Boiteux's paper in Optimal
Departuresfrm Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970). We are grateful to Alvin
Klevorick for pointing out this connection.
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Second, IA could be a deeper challenge to the French concept of service public
that, if widely adopted, could spark a debate over the content of fundamental
republican values. If IA includes a commitment to cost\benefit analysis, it stands for
a particular method of furthering the public interest by balancing costs and benefits
to maximize social welfare. It evaluates options in an essentially utilitarian way,
using estimates of monetary benefits and costs as a proxy for utility. Its synoptic
vision seems consistent with French views of the state as a force for furthering
general public values.315 This general presumption might make French policymakers
particularly open to IA that seeks to bring together all the diverse strands of a policy
and unify them into a single recommendation that maximizes social welfare.
However, the notion of social welfare embedded in CBA may be in tension with
other traditional French notions.
We consider each of these IA concepts in the context of French public law. The
first would not require much change in the operation of government agencies and
administrative courts. The second could be a more direct challenge to traditional
concepts although in some ways it fits well with French notions of the state. We
conclude with a separate, overlapping issue-claims that France has "too many
statutes."
B. Impact Assessment as Balancing
Policymakers cannot avoid making tradeoffs, even if they are not always
explicit about the values and political pressures behind their choices. Given that a
public body has made a decision, what role should the courts play in reviewing such
choices? Should they consider the substantive value of policies by invoking public
interest criteria? Should they, instead, only seek to protect individual rights, leaving
governments and legislatures free to determine policy so long as they observe that
constraint?
In practice, courts find it difficult to establish constraints independent of
underlying substantive policy goals. Of course, some official actions are so clearly
illegal that the administrative courts simply quash them. But in many other
situations, French courts examine the motifs or the objective legal and factual
grounds of the decisions. 16 The principle of proportionality, much debated in the
European Union and the Member States, is one way of resolving difficult cases.
317
Nevertheless, in France the notion that judges should make explicit tradeoffs in
reviewing governmental choices is a challenge to notions of law as a clear,
normative body of precepts under which courts can unambiguously judge actions to
315 It is certainly consistent with the analyses of Mass6 and Boiteux. supra note 314, both
technically trained analysts who contributed to the academic debate and were actively engaged in setting
policy for state enterprises. When Boiteux's 1956 article was translated into English, he was the Director
General of Electricit6 de France, of which he later became President. Mass6, trained as an engineer, was
Director General of Electricit6 of France after World War II and became a top planner under De Gaulle.
316 We base our discussion of motifs and balancing (contrdle du bilan) on Pierre Laurent Frier,
Contrdle des Motifs, RIP. CONT. ADM. DALLOZ, I (September 2005). Motifs (reasons) are distinguished
from mobiles (motives), which reflect intentions and are subjective and psychological.
317 See PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAw chs. 17, 18 (2006), chs. 17 and 18.
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be lawful or unlawful.31 8 Jurists in that tradition criticize as "non-normative" modern
laws that incorporate administrative principles and political concerns.
319
In spite of their discomfort with tradeoffs, French public lawyers have engaged
in balancing since the iconic Conseil d'ttat case of Ville NouvelleEst.32 ° That case,
decided long before the current push for IA, concerned official approval of an urban
development project and dealt with the law of eminent domain (the taking of private
property for public use). 321 The opinion mentioned the need for the court to make
tradeoffs or to balance (bilan) competing values, but it provided no guidance about
how to do this. The Conseil d'ttat held that:
A project may not lawfully be declared in the public interest unless "the
infringement of private property rights, the financial costs, and the possible social
costs are not excessive compared with the public benefits of the project" [authors'
translation].322
Guy Braibant, the Commissaire du gouvernenient in this case, justified this
evolution in the jurisprudence by saying that the Conseil d'tat now has to
acknowledge that the public interest is plural. He wrote that:
There is no longer, on one side, the public power and the general interest, and, on the
other, private property. More and more frequently multiple public interests are present
behind the expropriating authorities and the expropriated, and it may well sometimes
happen that the private interests that benefit from the operations will weigh more in the
decision making process than the public interests the operation may harm. Thus, it is not
possible to keep to the old reasoning that amounted to asking if the takings, in
themselves, were in the public interest. The various advantages and disadvantages, the
cost and the return on investment or, as economists would say, the utility against the
disutility have to be balanced [authors' translation].
3 23
Therefore, the Conseil held that it was appropriate for judges to balance the
public interest versus harm to private property, financial cost, social disturbance,
environmental damage, etc. Hence, because the Conseil d'tat will make tradeoffs,
the primary decision-maker ought to do so as well or risk having its decisions
annulled. The language of that case has been repeated in subsequent cases dealing
with housing, urban development, railway lines, airports, electric power lines,
318 See the discussion of balancing as a "resistance norm" in LINDSETH, POWER AND
LEGITIMACY, supra note 2, at 21-22, 30, 47-48, 166, 196, 256, 266, 272 (applying to Europe a concept
developed in Ernest A.Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. R. 1549 (2000)).
319 For a particularly strong statement of this view, see Yves Gaudemet, "La loi administrative",
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 65 (2006) (arguing
that the creation of the law is no longer a sacred work, quasi-religious; it is an earthly task, carried out in
light of earthly concerns).320 Guy Braibant, 27 L'ACTUALITt JURIDIQUE, DROIT ADM IN ISTRATIF 404 (1971)
(reproducing his conclusions on the case).
321 In France with its dual court system, takings cases are rather complex. The administrative
courts, as in Ville Nouvelle-Est, decide on the legality of the project. If the project is legally acceptable,
disputes over the level of compensation are heard in the civil courts.
322 CE Ass., May 28, 197 1, Ministre de l'cquipement et du logement c/ Fd6ration de defense des
personnes concern6es par le projet actuellement d~nomm6 "Ville nouvelle Est", Rec. Lebon 409.
323 Prior opinion of the coninissaire de gouverneinent in the case. Braibant, supra note 320.
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shopping centers, and supermarkets. 324 They all involve interference with private
property (takings) and tradeoffs between private property rights and such factors as
public sector costs, development, and rights to lodging. The Conseil d'ltat has
articulated the need for tradeoffs but gives officials space (marge d'appriciation) to
make such judgments so long as they stay within limits. These limits seem to rest on
case-by-case judgments that resist generalization. However, the national government
seldom loses when the Conseil engages in balancing. Only two large national
highway projects did not pass the balancing test. 325 The other projects that were
quashed were all local initiatives.
Nevertheless, the 1971 case represents an important acknowledgment by the
Conseil that public law includes such tradeoffs. The case was apparently the first
time that the administrative court accepted a role in the balancing process. To most
commentators, balancing implies a more active stance than simple review for
unreasonableness or "manifest error of judgment." However, it leaves the criterion
open. Should the courts strike down a decision if it can locate one with higher net
benefits, or should they approve any policy where, on balance, benefits outweigh the
costs? At least one commentator argues that the latter position is the appropriate
one.326 Given that most cases involve some benefits and costs that cannot easily be
evaluated using a single measuring rod, it would be hard for the courts to make the
more precise judgment.327 As we discuss below, there is a strong normative
commitment embedded in the second view of IA. Whether or not the courts enforce
this second concept, it could still play a role in the unfolding debate on the proper
way to evaluate policies.
C. Impact Assessment and Service Public
In the French republican tradition, the "general will" should produce law that
reflects the public interest. As the 1789 Declaration states, "La Loi est l'expression
de la volont6 gn6rale" ("The Law is the expression of the general will"). 328 The
state should act in ways that benefit the citizenry as a whole, not narrow groups with
concentrated power or wealth. This public interest ideal permeates French
discussions of public policy and public law, but it has no precise definition and can
be invoked by politicians and policymakers with very different agendas. The general
will, as a source of public interest norms, is problematically associated with the
choices of representative legislatures that operate by majority rule and with the
decisions of professional bureaucrats. In some policy debates everyone claims to
speak for the general will and to articulate the public interest. Thus, to the extent that
French critics of IA react with dismay to efforts to maximize net benefits through
3 Frier, supra note 316, provides citations to the relevant cases in paragraphs 92-95.
325 Frier, supra note 316,1195, writing in 2005, mentions CE Ass., Mar. 28, 1997, Rec. 121. The
second project was St6 civile Sainte Marie de I'Assomption, a highway project that would have harmed a
hospital. See CE Ass., Oct. 20, 1972, Rec. 657.
32' Frier, supra note 316, 97-101.
327 See Bertrand Seiller, Pour un contrdle de la Igalit extrinsique des ddclarations d 'utiliti
publique, 59 L'ACTUALITI JURIDIQUE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 1472, 1472 (2003).32
8 See J.-J. ROUSSEAU, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT ch. 7, at 1840.
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CBA, it may push them to articulate explicit alternatives in an effort to counter
policy recommendations that arise from CBA.
So far, the incorporation of IA into policymaking is in its infancy.329 Even
though the first guidelines date from 1998, the economic analysis of costs and
benefits clashes with other ways of making tradeoffs. 330 Notice that this is not
necessarily a question of business interests clashing with other interests. A
competent CBA will take account of environmental harms and effects on health and
safety. Quantification may be a problem, but no policy analyst argues that that is a
reason to ignore such issues. 331 The fundamental issue is whether IA will evolve
toward a formal CBA requirement consistent with applied utilitarianism. In contrast,
some might want to tilt choices in the direction of preserving certain rights, others
seek to further distributive justice through policies that aid the poor, and still others
believe that economic growth measured in terms of GDP should trump other
concerns. Such conflicts over fundamental values are central to the debate over
CBA. CBA locates the best policy through a particular technique of aggregation that
depends on a normative commitment to overall welfare maximization in spite of
losses suffered by some members of the polity. Its ambitions are to produce
comprehensive recommendations for government action. 32 This perspective is
congruent with the position of post-war French scholar-officials who sought to
rationalize planning in the public interest,333 but it clashes with other notices of the
public interest less closely tied to utilitarian values.
D. Impact Assessment and the Quantity and Quality of Statutes
The Conseil d'tat drafted the original 2003 guidelines on Impact Assessment
and supports Impact Assessment for draft bills. The motivation was not just to
produce better bills, but also to limit the number of new laws. 334 It may seem strange
to an American reader that the quantity of statutes should, in and of itself, be a
source of concern as opposed to the burdens of regulatory and tax laws. 35 However,
329 The only legislative IA that led to a debate among economists concerned a draft statute on
energy that implements the EU directive on energy. Some economists criticized the IA openly (See F.
L6vque).
M. Saguan, Analyse critique de I'tude d'impact de la Loi NOME, (CERNA, Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 2010-09, 2010), available at
http://www.cema.ensmp.fr/images/DocumentsWP/cwp_201009.pdf
330 The first circulaire from January 26, 1998 required an IA for every draft statute or decree. In
2003 the requirement was softened to permit the need for an IA to be determined case by case.
331 See Jonathan Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, in 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 447
(2006), reprinted in JANE HOLDER & DONALD MCGILLIVRAY, EDS., TAKING STOCK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2007). (arguing for "warm" cost-benefit analysis that
includes a wide range of costs and benefits, including those not easily quantified.
332 For a discussion of the limits ofcost-benefit analysis as a normative framework for policy, see
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 335 (2011). See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Etude d'impact et analyse cots-avantages:
Qu'impliquent-elles pour IAWaboration des politiques publiques et les riformes ligislatives?, 140 REVUE
FRANCAISE DIADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 787 (2011).
333 See the work of Boiteux and Massd, supra note 314.
334 Interview with Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Head of the Social Section, Paris, France
(December 1, 2011).
335 Ile debate in the United States has focused not on the mixture of statutes and executive
branch rules but rather on the burden on the private sector. For a critique of rulemaking in the United
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in France the concern is closely tied to debates over the proper role of the legislature
vis-h-vis the elite civil service in furthering the public interest.33 6 In the view of the
Conseil d'ttat statutes should be general expressions of the public interest, and this
view permeates debates in France about the number and quality of legislative
enactments. 337 The Civil Code epitomizes what is meant by a "general" requirement.
For more than two centuries, since the enactment of the Napoleonic civil code, tort
law could be summarized in a single sentence: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it". This
sentence sums up the three requirements of the law of tort: the existence of fault, of
damages, and of a causal link between the two. It expresses the ideal of French legal
drafting. The Conseil d'tat has long lamented the "proliferation of laws," the
"overproduction" of norms, and the inflation of rules by parliament and the
executive. 3 8 The Conseil d'Etat argues that the growth in the number of legal texts
means a loss of legal value. Law becomes trivialized; "quand le droit bavarde, le
citoyen ne lui prate qu'une oreille distraite" ("when the law babbles on and on,
citizens lend it only a distracted ear"). This multiplication of legal texts may result in
a breach of equality before the law, a democratic deficit, and legal insecurity.3 39 An
interest in halting this "tide" was behind the Conseil d'ltat's support of lAs for draft
laws. The Conseil understood the IA requirement as consistent -with its own
commitment to upholding the public interest.
Recent legal scholarship emphasizes that a comprehensive IA system for
statutes can uphold an idealized hierarchy of norms.340 The IA should explain how
the bill will fit into the legal environment and which regulations will have to be
issued or revoked in order to enforce the new law. Following Hans Kelsen, the
hierarchy of norms in French administrative law scholarship expresses the
requirement that inferior norms must be consistent with superior norms (adjudication
must conform to rules, rules must be consistent with statutes, and statutes must not
States, see THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 273-74 (199 1).
336 On the historical roots see Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy:
Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341,
1404-07 (2004).
337 Concern with the quality of law is not only French. Research on legal drafting and the quality
of law began in Germany and Switzerland in the 19th and 20th century and in the common law world in
the 70s. See Laurent Eck, Les itudes d'impact et la lhgistique, in LES ITUDES D'IMPACT ACCOMPAGNANT
LES PROJETS DE LOI (M. Philip-Gay ed., 2012); KARINE GILBERG, LA LIGISTIQUE AU CONCRET : LES
PROCESSUS DE RATIONALISATION DU DROIT (These, Universitd Paris 2 Panth6on-Asses, 2007).
1
31 See RAPPORT PUBLIC DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 1991, at 15. The principal author of the report was
Franqoise Chandernagor, a historian and member of the Conseil d'ttat. In 2005, the Conseil d'Etat
reported that there were 10, 500 laws and 120, 000 decrees in force. In 1991 the Conseil d'Etat counted
7500 laws. In addition each year ministries issue more than 10, 000 executive orders. See RAPPORT
PUBLIC DU CONSEIL D'tTAT 2006: S9CURITt JURIDIQUE ET COMPLEXITt DU DROIT, FRANCE. Conseil
d'Etat, La Documentation francaise at 239.
33' For an analysis of the French definition of legal quality, see CHARLES-HENRI MONTIN,
LEGISTICS AND THE QUALITY OF LEGISLATION IN FRANCE,
http://www.montin.com/documents/legistics.pdf (last visited March 10, 2013).
340 See M. Philip-Gay, "L 'obligation dejoindre des itudes d 'impact aux projets de loi Une
illustration des ivolutions ricentes du droit issu de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958", in LES tTUDES
D'IMPACT ACCOMPAGNANT LES PROJETS DE LOI, (MATHILDE PHILIP-GAY ED., 2012,) at p. 156.
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be contrary to treaties and the Constitution). 341 This is a quite different set of
principles from those that arise from cost\benefit analysis and risk assessment, the
other intellectual traditions behind IA.
If IA expresses just what the Conseil and legal scholars have always asked the
government to do, then its codification gives the Conseil added leverage. However,
if it requires a technical CBA or risk assessment, it may be difficult for the Conseil
to fulfill its responsibilities without a change in the training of its personnel. It would
be instructive to know something about how the Conseil d'Etat reviews draft bills
under the statute that requires lAs. We have no information on this and can only
infer the Conseil's position from the unrepresentative sample of cases published in
the GRANDS AvIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT and in its annual reports.342 It seems likely
that, even before the IA requirement, the Conseil engaged in some type of balancing
ex ante both because it does so ex post and because of its involvement in drafting
earlier IA guidelines.
In spite of its ongoing interest in IA and the new legal status of IA reports on
draft statutes, it does not appear that the Conseil d'ltat has increased its capacity in
public policy analysis. Thus, it is not clear that the Conseil d'Etat can provide
adequate review of technically sophisticated studies. However, it is at least possible
that the IA requirement will slow down the volume of lawmaking simply because of
the need for public justification. Perhaps some draft laws will never be submitted to
the legislature because neither the government nor their Conseil d'ttat reviewers can
find adequate justifications for them.
Nevertheless, there is a further reason to doubt the impact of the IA requirement
on the quantity and quality of statutes.343 The legislature, which is the object of the
IA reports, lacks a staff able to review and critique the lAs. It also operates under
pressure from the executive to pass bills in a short time frame. The statute itself only
gives the legislature ten days to consider the bill and its accompanying IA. Neither
individual members, nor committees, nor thepolitical parties have adequate staff
resources to balance and constrain the flow of draft legislative texts coming from the
executive.3 " Under the Fifth Republic, Parliament generally enacts what the
government proposes. There is little extended discussion because the majority is
under the authority of the Government. The only exception would be especially
contentious issues and'periods of co-habitation when President and Prime Minister
are of different parties, but this seems increasingly unlikely under the current
electoral timing.
341 See Georges Vedel, Qu 'est-ce que la Constitution?, in CAHIERS DU CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL, 1998. See also KELSEN, supra note 74, at 257-65.
341 See GRANDS AVIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT http://www.conseil-ttat.fr/fr/les-grands-avis/ and the
ANNUAL REPORTS (2010) (2011), supra note 49; and (2012) supra note 69.
343 See also Conseil constitutionnel [CC] decision No. 2009-579DC, Apr. 9, 2009, Recucil, 84,
available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/roottbank/pdf/conseil.
constitutionnel-42539.pdf (holding that the government is not bound to undertake impact assessment from
the beginning of the elaboration of the bill).
344 The lack of staff in the Assembly was confirmed by our interview with Bertrand Plancher,
UMP member, Paris, France (January 10, 2012). See also Kaare Strom, Parlianientaty Committees in
European Democracies, 4 J. LEGIS. STUDIES, 21 (1998). Gibel Claude, L 'voltion des moyens de travail
des parlementaires, 31 REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 211 (1981).
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Thus, even if the Conseil d'tat provides stringent oversight, the legislature may
not be responsive to this material. Perhaps, however, groups with an interest in the
legislative outcome can be a partial substitute for rigorous legislative review. The
government must now be transparent about its calculations; thus, others can critique
its methods. No longer is the Conseil d'ltat the primary arbiter of legislative quality.
It has a first mover advantage because it reviews drafts before presentation to the
legislature.345 However, the draft that ii sent to the legislature can now Vie subject to
more intelligent criticism both inside and outside the legislature on the basis of the
IA. Interest groups and concerned citizens have no legal right to challenge the
quality of the analysis. Only the legislative leaders can submit an IA to the Conseil
Constitutionnel.346 Nevertheless, the increased openness could, in principle, help
those outside the formal structures of government participate more effectively.
Given the limitations and potential strengths of the IA process, scholars should
track the implementation of the Organic Law. It would be interesting to determine if
IA has limited the number of drafts submitted and improved the quality of those that
do reach the floor. Is the requirement merely a formal one that has little impact on
the number and content of legislative proposals or has it had an effect? One study of
the number of laws introduced by the Sarkozy government compared with previous
governments showed no slowdown in the number and an increase in the length of
individual statutes. However, that data covered the entire period since his election,
not the more recent period when IA became a legal mandate, not just a guideline.
347
It made no attempt to consider the quality of these statutes as effective responses to
social problems.
Although there has not yet been an in-depth study, the lAs that accompany draft
bills appear to vary in quality. For one thing, the statutory mandate requires an IA for
every bill, but not every bill's purposes fit into the IA framework. For example, in
2010 a statute came into effect that outlawed full-face coverings in most public
places. The bill was directed against Muslim women who wear a face veil, but the
statute did not mention them in the text. Clearly the justifications for the law cannot
be captured in the framework of an ordinary cost\benefit analysis. In fact, the IA of
the law does not make that effort. It is a fine piece of French republican rhetoric, but
it hardly conforms to the principles underlying IA as stated by the OECD.345 In
contrast, the IAs that accompanied the proposed reform of pensions and of the
electricity market in 2010 did deal with a number of important policy issues,
although some were covered in a rather cursory fashion. Both include some
quantitative data, but the pension IA emphasizes the impact on the public budget and
does not attempt a comprehensive evaluation of the law's effect on the labor market,
345 See the discussion in CONSEIL D'TAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC 2010 supra note 49 at 97-99.
346 Interview with Plancher, supra note 344.
347 See Olivier Rozenberg Sarkozy i.gislateur. La loi du plus fort ?, S6minaire g 6nral du CEE, at
http://cee.sciences-po.fr/images/stories/seminairedocapplique/20 I-
2012/I 111/111108_SGCEE/compte-rendu sminairegnlralOlivierRozenberg.pdf.
- Bill 2520 du Mai 2010 Interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans -espace public, Itude
d'impact [Bill Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public Space, Impact Study] May 2010; Loi
2010-1192 du I I octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans respace public [Law 2010-
1192 of October 11, 2010 on Prohibiting Concealment of the Face in Public Space] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LAW REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE, October 12, 2010, p. 18344.
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outside a few specific areas, such as gender. 349 As a general matter, even for policies
that fit into the IA framework, the analyses may suffer in the rush to legislate.
Reforms may be announced before having been discussed with stakeholders. How
are civil servants to engage in the serious work of producing an IA if they feel that
the decision is already taken? Lack of participation and the rushed IA process are
linked to the same problem: politicians may prefer to announce policy initiatives
rather than to engage in in-depth discussions and evaluation in order to find the legal
tool best suited to the issue.
A final problem may simply be the lack of capacity in the bureaucracy to carry
out competent evaluations. In spite of the elite nature of the French civil service, few
have the requisite training in policy analysis needed to perform an IA that balances
costs and benefits in a sophisticated way. Both engineering and a mixture of public
administration and law are useful inputs provided by graduates of the Grandes
Ecoles, but neither provides a framework for the full-blown impact assessment
envisaged by the OECD and the European Commission. An exception appears to be
the Cour de Comptes (the Court of Accounts), which attracts analytically oriented
members. It has a broad mandate to review government programs and the regularity
of public accounts. It does not help make policy although obviously a critical
analysis of an existing program could spur reform. 350 A full-scale commitment to IA
by the French state would imply a dramatic reorientation of the training provided to
those who aspire to the top of the French state officialdom. Training in public
administration, law and engineering would not suffice.
E. Conclusions on Impact Assessment
The Impact Assessment requirement is a striking development, and it will be
important to track its effect on the French lawmaking process and to observe how the
Conseil d'ttat and the Constitutional Conseil interpret the concept. Although
included in internal government guidelines since 2003, the codification of IA and the
publication requirement could affect the statutory drafting process. Because IA can
be interpreted in various ways that represent more or less radical challenges to
French public law traditions, its use may be an important bellwether of the response
of French institutions to developments in European law and to global trends in
policy analysis and democratic accountability.
Any systematic evaluation of IA's effect is complicated by substantial confusion
about what it means to carry out such an assessment. If these uncertainties are not
confronted in a straightforward way, they could sink the entire enterprise as each
new group of analysts defines the term in a different way. The OECD, which has
been a strong advocate of IA, is not of much help here. Their publications simply list
all the different goals of an IA without confronting the ways in which they might
349 Projet de Ioi portant reforme des retraites et Projet de loi organique relative d la limite des
magistrats de l'ordrejudiciaire, Etude d'Impact, No. 2760 (July 2010), available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/projets/p12760-ci.asp#P84 5473; Projet de loiportant nouvelle
organisation du marchi de !ilectricit (NOME), ttude d"impact-,no. 2831 (April 2010), available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rojets/p12451 -ci.asp.
350 1958 CoNsT. art. 47-2. The Court publishes annually all the anomalies it sees in the
management of public money.
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conflict in particular applications. Their spring 2010 report on progress in France is
an extremely useful document that reviews and critiques the actions of the French.
state, but it neglects tensions at the heart of IA.35
Although some French supporters of IA point to the U.S. as an example, the IA
requirement for draft statutes contrasts sharply with the American practice. Although
any U.S. administration would be wise to back up its proposals with data and
arguments and although Congress has greater staff resources than the French
legislature, the process of submitting, discussing, and approving statutes in the US is
not governed by enforceable legal standards beyond the need for a bill to pass both
houses by majority vote and to be signed by the president (or to be passed over his
veto by a two-thirds ;vote in each house)." 2 It is true that the practice of cost\benefit
analysis is well-developed in the United States compared to France, but it is carried
out by the policy staff of departments, agencies and congressional committees. The
White House reviews rules for consistency with cost\benefit tests, but does so under
an executive order, not a statute. Only a few statutes require CBA, and it is never a
condition for passage of a statute. Thus, in comparing France and the U.S., it will be
important to determine how closely IA tracks a cost\benefit test, how strictly the
Conseil d'ttat applies the test in its ex ante and ex post reviews of secondary
legislation, and whether the Conseil Constitutionnel is willing or able to assess the
quality of government IAs.
V. CHALLENGES TO FRENCH PUBLIC LAW, THE UNITED STATES
MODEL, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
To conclude we bring together the three challenges to traditional French
methods of producing secondary legislation: public participation, independent
regulators, and impact assessment. We summarize those challenges in light of U.S.
administrative law and consider possible future directions for French public law that
could move it in the direction of rulemaking accountability--that is, procedures that
enhance the democratic legitimacy of government or agency policymaking outside
the legislature.
A. The United States and France, Compared
In comparing the American and French law of policymaking there are a few
basic similarities and a number of important differences. The most fundamental
differences are the underlying view of statutory law and the bureaucracy. The French
have greater faith in the competence of their elite civil servants to articulate the
public interest.
In the U.S. the ideal is a statute that directly reflects Congressional preferences
and does not require policymaking inside the executive. Delegation of policymaking
authority is a pragmatic response to the reality of modem policy problems that
351 ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ("OECD"), BETTER REGULATION IN
EUROPE: FRANCE (2010).
352 Peter Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and hiformation: What Anerica Can
Learn from Europe and Vice Versa. 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645 (2005-2006); SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMANSTEFANIE EGIDY & JAMES FOWKES., AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM? "DUE PROCESS OF
LAWMAKING" IN COMPARATIVE LAW (forthcoming 2014) (section on the United States).
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require time and expertise to resolve. The Supreme Court accepts delegation under
the Constitution, and the non-delegation doctrine is thought to have few teeth.353
However, delegation is a functional necessity, not an essential feature of American
democracy. Even if rulemaking is under the authority of the President, the
background worry is a lack of accountability to the electorate. As a result,
procedures insure that outsiders can participate, and they require transparency and
reason-giving. Independent agencies are justified in functional terms, but they
generally include political checks through such devices as political party balance on
multi-member commissions. Political accountability to voters through their elected
representatives is the ideal, and inside the bureaucracy political appointees fill most
policymaking roles.
In France, in contrast, the guiding principle is that laws ought to state broad
principles that express public welfare goals. Statutes should be neither too numerous
nor too detailed. In the ideal they should embody principles that elected
representatives across the political spectrum can accept.354 Of course, that does not
often happen, and majority rule prevails, but once a statute is passed, it is
implemented by a government largely staffed by elite civil servants under a thin
layer of political appointees. This elite group is charged with carrying out the law in
accord with the public interest and absent pressures from partisan political forces or
narrow individual interests. To the extent that one takes that view of the bureaucracy,
not only would public participation be unnecessary; it might also be outright
pernicious. Due process may be a way to protect the rights of individuals, but it is
not bound up with the need to justify government policymaking in democratic terms.
Independent agencies are an awkward fit with this view of officialdom. If the civil
service is really imbued with a public welfare ethic, why bother to create an
independent institutional structure? Such agencies look like an acknowledgment that
the ideal does not always fit the reality. If officials claim a mandate to further the
public welfare, rulemaking accountability is unnecessary.
There. is a way to reconcile public participation, impact assessment, and even
independent agencies. The reconciliation acknowledges that government officials
may not have the background and breadth of experience to further the public welfare
without input from outsiders-not only technical experts, but also ordinary citizens,
businesses, and civil society groups. The ultimate decision is in the hands of the
government officials, but by consulting broadly, they can carry out their
responsibilities more effectively. An independent agency may be able to assure that
policy choices are doubly insulated from partisan politics, not just in the legislature
but in the Cabinet and the Presidency as well. These arguments can make
353 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States.295 U.S. 495 (1935). A recent case upholding a broad delegation is Whitman v. American Trucking
Asso. Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (200 1). However, given that the courts accept delegation, they then review
agencies' interpretation of statutory terms. See Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
315 (2000). See also the discussion of the Chevron case, supra
354 This is exemplified by two important contemporary trends: simplification of the laws and
especially a drastic move towards codification. A Commission supdricure de la codification'(Superior
Commission for Simplification) has been appointed whose role is to take existing laws and put them into
intelligible and clear codes. Codification is supported by the Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional
Court] decision No. 2004-509DC, Jan. 13, 2005; see also Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional
Court] decision No. 2005-512DC, Apr. 21, 2005.
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rulemaking accountability consistent with French traditions, but one needs to
recognize the sometimes subtle differences between the U.S. and French models. In
the U.S. case participation is not only designed to produce better executive decisions
but also to give citizens assurance of the democratic legitimacy of executive
policymaking. In France participation is justified as a way to help the officials make
better decisions in the public interest.
These contrasting models of the relationship between statutes, democratic
accountability, and public officials have several implications. These involve judicial
review of process, substantive policy principles, ex ante review of draft regulations,
and the status of independent agencies.
1. Process
The role of the courts in reviewing process reflects the differences between
France and the US. In both cases the legislative process is not subject to review
because that would represent too great an interference with partisan politics.3"' In the
US, however, the courts review the administrative rulemaking process to assure
public notice, open-ended hearings, and reason-giving. The first two factors assure
that citizens, economic interests, and civil society groups have notice and can make
their views known. The last factor, reason-giving, is an essential complement to
participation in situations where a government body makes the ultimate policy
decision. The government body must not only be open to outside input but must also
explain its decision to the public in a reasoned way.
The APA emphasizes process, and limited judicial review keeps the courts from
going too far in substituting their own policy preferences for those of the executive
and the legislature. The Supreme Court has held back efforts by lower courts to
expand the scope of procedural review. 356 The U. S. system is often criticized for
being "ossified" because it takes too long and is too cumbersome. 357 Although the U.
S. process could surely use reform, one should be careful what one wishes for. In the
U.S., with its weak bureaucratic tradition, less public accountability could simply
invite more special interest influence.
In contrast, judicial review of the legislative process is extremely deferential in
the US. There is no Legislative Procedures Act. Absent claimed violations of rights
or interference with the structure of government, the federal courts seldom get
involved. Courts rarely look to the underlying factual justifications of a statute or
require the legislature to supply the background information. There is no general
requirement for impact assessment or for any other substantive criterion.
335 On the U.S. case, see ROSE-ACKERMAN ET. AL., supra note 352.
351 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also
Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1833 (1978); Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,
91 HARV. L. REV. 91 1805 (1978).
357 Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. REV.
1385 (1992); Thomas McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525
(1997).
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In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel has quashed statutes because the
Government or the legislature used procedures that it judged to be in violation of the
Constitution. For example, provisions not germane to the main purpose of a statute
may be struck. It has also refused to approve statutes if the Conseil d'ttat did not
review the Government bill. Conseil review is confidential and ex ante, not public
and ex post. In line with its different concept of executive rulemaking, France has no
legally required general procedures for public input into the production of decrees
and ordinances. Preliminary public consultations are a legal mandate for large local
projects of national interest, but not for national decrees and ordinances. Sometimes
the law requires consultation with particular named bodies of experts or
stakeholders, but those bodies have a closed membership, often selected by
politicians or professional associations. The Conseil d'tat will hold the Government
to these consultation requirements. It will not, however, examine the quality of the
advice or its representative character.
Recent developments, however, suggest that both the Conseil d'Itat and the
Conseil Constitutionnel are more willing to evaluate the procedures that produce
decrees and ordinances. The Conseil d'tat struck down a decree on procedural
grounds in December 2011. Similarly, the Conseil Constitutionnel has taken the
rather dramatic step of constitutionalizing administrative procedures in several cases
dealing with environmental policymaking. These new developments might signal a
major change in approach, one that might be spearheaded by organized
environmental groups and by independent agencies seeking greater popular
legitimacy. More cases that challenge procedures are likely to arise and may already
be making their way through the courts. French environmental lawyers are certainly
aware of the possibility as indicated by the QPCs decided by the Conseil
Constitutionnel in 2011 and 2012.358 If more cases arise, they should be admissible
because of the open-ended character of French standing law in contrast to the much
more restrictive nature of U.S. standing doctrines. Hence, if environmental groups
see weaknesses in existing procedures or wish to test the limits of the new 2012
statute that mandates public participation, they may decide to challenge them subject
to their own funding and personnel constraints.3
One potential deterrent, not present in the U.S. case, is two-sided fee shifting: a
losing civil society plaintiff may be required to pay the winning public body.3 °
However, in France the legal charges do not appear to be high, at least relative to
legal fees in the United States where one-sided fee shifting is common in statutes
with citizen suit provisions. 361 If these French lawsuits proliferate and are successful,
that development will give public officials an incentive to open their processes to
public participation. However, as we pointed out above, the Government has
responded to the constitutional challenges to environmental policy processes by
358 Denier-Pasquier Interview, supra note 153.
359 Denier-Pasquier Interview, supra note 153.
36 E-mail from Denier-Pasquier, , Representative of FNE to CESE, to authors (Jan. 23, 2012,
6:12).
361 JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION
CONTROL LAWS (1987) (a winning plaintiff in a citizen's suit has its legal fees paid by the losing
defendant, but the losing plaintiff does not have to pay the legal fees of the government agency or private
finn on the other side of the law suit.)
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amending the law to provide for more public input. However, the amendments' are a
rather tepid response, which are unlikely to facilitate a vigorous civil society
response.
2. Substance
The United States and France are similar along a second, substantive,
dimension. In both cases secondary legislation need not legally comply with any
general policy norms--such as coast\benefit analysis-that go beyond the provisions
of individual substantive statutes. In the United States the courts review general rules
to assure consistency with the statutory text, to avoid decisions that either are
arbitrary and capricious or are not based on substantial evidence. They do not
impose a cost\benefit test on rules absent a specific requirement in the substantive
statute. The remedy is usually a remand to the agency, not a judicial determination of
policy. The focus is on requiring the agency to justify its choices.
Policymakers in France are meant to further the public welfare, but that concept
is defined in various ways, and the courts have not articulated clear principles to
guide the executive. Conseil d'ttat review of substance stresses legality, not policy
efficacy. At the same time, the protection of individual rights is playing a growing
role in judicial review of state action, drawing on U.S. and European
developments. 362 This new direction may lead French public law doctrine toward a
stronger and clearer articulation of the public welfare to provide a counterweight to
the growth in rights jurisprudence. However, although the courts and the government
invoke the proportionality principle to tradeoff rights and the general welfare, its
precise contours are unclear.
Although our focus is on secondary legislation, changes in the justifications for
draft statutes in France may signal an overall move toward stronger substantive
conditions. As we have noted, the framework law that implements the 2008
constitutional amendments requires the government to prepare Impact Assessments
to accompany draft statutes submitted to the legislature. The Conseil d'ttat reviews
these documents before they are issued, and if requested by politicians, the Conseil
Constitutionnel can also evaluate the quality of lAs. Furthermore, these lAs are
publicly available on the website of the National Assembly along with the text of
draft and enacted statutes. It is too early to tell, first, if these IAs are competently
done and, second, if the IA requirement will be expanded to cover decrees and
ordinances.
3. Review of Draft Regulations
There is a further contrast between France and the United States in the review of
draft regulations. In both systems such review is routine, but the body engaged in
review and the nature of the review differ. In the United States if a cabinet
department issues a rule with the force of law, it is subject to White House review on
cost\benefit grounds. 363 This review is governed by an executive order that the
362 For an extensive discussion, see LASSER, supra note 22.
3 Exec. Order No. 13563, Jan. 18, 2011; 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (updating Exec. Order No.
12,866).
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President could unilaterally rescind or modify at any time. Rules issued by
independent agencies are exempt, but an executive order encourages them to carry
out their own reviews and to review past rules to be sure they can be justified. 3 "
In France, the Conseil d'Etat must review the content of much secondary
legislation before it goes into effect. This review is routine, and the advice can be
kept secret at the option of the government. There is no systematic legal basis for the
Conseil to disapprove Government decisions that fail to balance benefits and costs.
The Conseil cannot prevent issuance of a regulation, but if it disapproves and the
Government goes forward, the decree risks future challenges in the administrative
courts. Unlike White House review of regulations, the body doing the review has
some independence from the executive structure of government. The Conseil d'tat
claims to be neutral with respect to substantive policy, but the line between review
for legality and review of policy efficacy may be blurred in practice. Thus, in France
when the government issues a decree, it must defend its action before the Conseil
d'ttat, but it is not legally required to consult broadly, to issue public statements of
reasons, or to conform to a particular substantive norm. The ideal is a policy that
furthers the public welfare and complies with the law, but these principles give the
government broad scope.
4. Independent Agencies
Given the public welfare ideal and in line with U.S. defenders of the agency
model, independent agencies would seem an ideal location for policymaking in the
public interest, subject to Conseil d'Itat review. However, in French law their
policymaking authority is strictly limited because of their isolation from partisan
politics in the Cabinet and the Presidency. Here one sees the tension between the
bureaucracy as a repository of republican values and the elected President and Prime
Minister as representatives of the voters. One response has been for the independent
agencies to try to enhance their public legitimacy vis-h-vis the ministries through
heightened consultation and transparent policy analyses of major decisions.
Nevertheless, there remains a fundamental mismatch between the policymaking
justifications for agency independence and the French constitutional language that
appears not to have anticipated the rise and functional value of these bodies.
365
B. Reform Initiatives
French reform possibilities can draw on American experience while recognizing
the differences outlined above. We pose four questions. First, should France move to
a more open and transparent process of producing secondary legislation (decrees and
ordinances) that would seek to enhance democratic legitimacy? Second, should the
move toward IA in legislation be extended to secondary legislation? Third, should
independent regulatory agencies obtain a policymaking role that includes delegated
364 Exec. Order No. 13579, Jan. 11, 2011, states that independent agencies "should" comply with
Exec. Order No. 13563 "to the extent permitted by law." They also "should consider" retrospective
analysis of old rules and should issue a plan.
365 Of course, it is nothing new for constitutional texts to fail to anticipate modern developments.
The U.S. Constitution did not anticipate independent agencies, much less political parties and a large civil
service bureaucracy.
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decree powers? Fourth, what role should the high courts, both the Conseil d'tat and
the Conseil Constitutionnel, play in reviewing these possible developments?
Some reform initiatives originated from France's memberships in the European
Union and in the Council of Europe. Decisions by the European Court of Justice and
the European Court of Human Rights influence French public law. The Aarhus
Convention has pushed environmental law in a procedural direction. Nevertheless,
the domestic response is not simply reactive but also represents a real engagement
with these issues. Under a 2011 statute, the previous government made a few modest
moves in the direction of openness and public input for decrees and ordinances, and
these may form the basis of a more extensive reform.
Our particular emphasis on rulemaking accountability with its concern for
democratic legitimacy is not identical to the pressures from European legal
institutions that, outside of Aarhus, have concentrated on the protection of rights.
Legally enforceable participation rights have not been at the forefront of legal
developments in the EU, and even the Commission's espousal of IA is not tied to
judicial review. The creation of independent agencies to oversee privatized industries
is an EU-supported initiative, and the EU has pushed for more accountable
policymaking in the Member States.366 However, it has not gone so far as to require
Member State courts to enforce public participation or IA norms.
1. Participation and IA
Even in France, with its tradition of an expert, elite civil service, both political
influence and inadequate training support reforms that lead to more open and
participatory processes that involve the general public and draw on modern social
science.
One route to reform may be through the Conseil d'tat. Long the defender of
the French public law tradition, it is responding to contemporary reform pressures.
After a period of resistance to efforts by the ECtHR to reform the Conseil,367 it has
both modified its own practices and demonstrated an interest in issues of public
participation, agency independence and IA. Its 2011 public report, CONSULTER
AUTREMENT, PARTICIPER EFFECTIVEMENT, argued for an administration
dilibirative, similar to what we call rulemaking accountability. It recommends
reforms in policymaking processes at all levels of government and in independent
agencies. Processes should be based on open public participation and on the
systematic evaluation of policies compared-to alternatives. 68 The principal drafter of
the report sees IA as complementary to enhanced public participation. Government
policymakers first ought to frame the problem without selecting the preferred
alternative. They would then organize a public concertation that is informal, open,
and transparent. Then the policymakers, both technical experts and politically
responsible officials, would select the best option using IA and decide if any new
legislation is needed.369 The recommendations are consistent with our perspective
36 See PSYGKAS, supra note 261.
N7 See LASSER, supra note 22.
368 RAPPORT PUBLIC 2011, supra note at 49. Richard Interview, supra note 81.
" Richard Interview, supra note 81.
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but leave unresolved the possible tensions between openness and competence that
may arise in practice.
At the same time it recommends this new process, the report is critical of
consultation through various commissions, councils, and committees. By the end of
the 1990s there were about 4000 commissions. A 2000 law reduced their number
through mergers and abolitions. In 2006 a government decree eliminated many more,
and a new law limited the ability of the Government and the President to create such
commissions. However, the report argues that there are still too many. It documents
the creation of forty-five new bodies by the legislature since the 2006 reform.370 Of
course, some of these bodies may serve valuable functions; a pure count of the
numbers is not dispositive, but apparently they sometimes are a way of appearing to
deal with a problem without actually committing the government to taking action.
There is a fundamental contrast between the consultation recommended by the
Conseil d'tat and the use of established, on-going bodies. Those bodies have
members who represent the interests of concerned groups from, for example,
business, labor, consumers, and the scientific community. Even if the members of
such bodies are selected by the groups they represent, the bodies may exclude other
interests, not acknowledged ex ante. Similarly, the process of selecting
"representatives" may itself be biased against new or dissident members of the
recognized interest groups. In seeking to limit the influence of established bodies,
the Conseil d'tat report aims to open up the consultation process. The process, of
course, would need to be managed to produce useful information and debate. Here
the report looks to the model of the CNDP and argues that consultation should occur
early in the process of promulgating secondary legislation in the ministries and
independent agencies. The state ministries and agencies would have the final say,
and the Conseil d'ltat would retain its own power to review draft decrees and
ordinances.
In addition to recommending a more systematic and open-ended consultation
processes, the report would constrain the government to use the substantive criteria
of IA. The report is not clear on just what model of IA they support, but the key
features are a recognition of tradeoffs, consideration of a range of options, including
doing nothing, and the use of data to back up policy recommendations. Legally
mandated Impact Assessment of secondary legislation is an innovation that would go
far beyond U.S. experience. IA is too new a development to have produced a judicial
response. The support of IA by the EU and OECD largely neglects judicial review.
A comprehensive OECD document assessing the state of IA in France does not
mention the courts. 372 Our own view is that hard-edged cost-benefit analysis ought
not to be codified as a general matter given the diversity of regulatory texts. In the
statutory context consider the difference between the public policy justifications for
statutes outlawing the face veil and reorganizing the electricity industry. A similar
diversity of issues is dealt with in secondary legislation. It is hard to see how either
the courts or the legislature could craft a generic law to cover the range of cases. A
370 RAPPORT PUBLIC 2011, supra note 49, at 139-42 (Annexe I).
371 Interview with Richard, supra note 81; see also Vanneste, supra note 242.
372 See Organization for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ("OECD"), Better Regulation in Europe:
France (2010), available at http://www.oecd.orgtdataoecd/30/5/45706677.pdf.
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more limited response would be to set up a rebuttable presumption in favor of an
economic cost\benefit test, but only for regulations that are primarily designed to
correct a market failure and only if the statute does not include an alternative
standard.373
The 2011 report is just that-a report-and does not necessarily have the full
support of all the active members of the Conseil d'tat. Nevertheless, it does
acknowledge the importance of making the policymaking process inside the
government more systematic. Coming from the Conseil d'tat itself, this is a
significant recognition on which to build in the future.
However, to have teeth, reforms of the administrative process would need to be
codified into law and enforced by the administrative courts. One important factor is
likely to limit the impact of these courts in supporting reform, even if a new statute
were passed. The Conseil d'Etat has very limited remedies to deal with
irregularities.374 It can only quash decisions, not order measures tailored to the
problem at hand. For that reason the administrative courts may delay the
implementation of their decision to permit time for the administration to remedy the
problem. 375 In other cases delay may mean that the contested project is very far
advanced by the time it reaches the Conseil. Quashing a decision may require
dismantling a large public project. Hence, administrators may simply gamble on the
outcome of a court case, reasoning that even if they lose, the court will give them
time to correct their errors.376 This problem suggests either the need for a wider
range of remedies or the ability to obtain a ruling from Conseil on an expedited basis
using its recently obtained power to issue injunctions.
This problem is quite acute in the United States with its greater emphasis on
process and the widespread use of injunctions. A rule cannot go into effect if the
process was faulty; the agency must remedy the defect in a new proceeding. Pre-
enforcement review of rules is justified to assure regulated bodies that a rule is both
substantively and procedurally valid before they invest in compliance. 377 For major
infrastructure projects injunctions halt work before costs become sunk. This makes
enforcement of procedural requirements feasible but also delays project
373 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 33-42 (1992).
374 See Daniel Labetoulle, Le vice de procidure, parent pauvre de V ivoilution du pouvoir
d'appriciation dujuge de I'annulation, il MILANGES EN L'HONNEUR D'YVES IGOUZO 483 (2009)
(arguing that the treatment of procedural problems by French administrative judges is deficient).
37s The possibility of a court-ordered delay to avoid a legal vacuum is a recent innovation. See CE
Ass., May 11 , 2004, Rec. Lebon 197. Before 2004, if an administrative judge quashed a decision, it
immediately disappeared.371 See Interview with Yann Agila, Att'y, Bredin Prat, Conseiller d'Etat, in Paris, France (Dec. 13,
2011). Agila suggested that Conseil review of procedures could learn from review of procurement
irregularities. In procurement law, a court can stay a challenged process in a very quick intervention that
permits a new, legally acceptable process to be carried out promptly. When a public body awards a
contract, it must follow very strict procedures ensuring fair competition. If an irregularity occurs,
competing bidders can apply for pre-contractual interim measures, and the judge can stay the procedure
and can even order the whole tender to be started again.
In See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967). The practice, however, has its critics. See,
e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
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completion.318 Injunctions may eventually lead to project cancelation, not on the
merits, but simply because of the cost of delay.
2. Independent Regulatory Agencies
The final reform possibility concerns independent agencies and could draw
lessons from the long U.S. experience with their strengths and weaknesses.
However, reformers would also need to take account of the strong additional
argument for independence in France that arises from continued state ownership
stakes in major firms. The tension between functional reasons for independence and
the constitutional text has not yet produced much of a legal response although these
agencies, often mandated by EU directives, are central to many ongoing debates
between France and the EU.
Some of these regulatory agencies are carrying out procedural innovations.
Regulators risk capture by large, powerful regulated firms, and the concerned public
is not always as well organized as in the environmental field. Nevertheless,
regulators acknowledge that if the interests of the general public are ignored, the
agency may lose its legitimacy. Standing outside the cabinet structure of
government, they need to defend themselves against attack for being anti-
democratic. At present, the concern for democratic legitimacy is answered by
limiting the power of agencies to make binding rules and by requiring them to
enforce rules promulgated by a cabinet ministry. However, an alternative route
would give them the authority to issue regulations subject to a legal requirement to
consult broadly and to justify their policies publicly. This ought to be in the self-
interest of agencies wishing to avoid the accusation of capture, but a legal
requirement could also push reluctant regulators in that direction. To the extent that
the state still retains an ownership share in some of the regulated firms, for example,
in broadcasting and in electricity, requiring public participation and debate can be a
more effective way to enhance the agencies' democratic legitimacy than their current
dependence on ministerial rules. True, one needs to be sensitive to the worry that
only a biased sample of the affected public and the business community will take
part. However, with the ultimate decision in the hands of the agency and with
requirements for transparency and reason-giving, those concerns can be managed.
The alternative, after all, is an opaque process where the regulated industry with its
well-financed lobbying resources plays an important behind-the-scenes role. The
basic point is that opaque policymaking by a government ministry is not obviously
more democratically responsible than more open concertations organized by
independent agencies that produce rules accompanied by a public statement of
reasons that responds to public comments. Our proposal seems consistent with
French republican values, but, of course, it will be for the Conseil Constitutionnel to
decide if a mixture of rulemaking authority and greater public accountability will
pass constitutional muster.
378 See Robert A. Kagan, Should Europe Worry about Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). See the case study of efforts to upgrade the Port of Oakland, California, in
Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369
(1991). A more recent article revisits the Oakland case and paints a much more optimistic picture. See
Christopher B. Busch et al., Taming Adversarial Legalism: The Port of Oakland's Dredging Saga
Revisited, 2 LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 179 (1999).
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C. Conclusions
The heightened interest in public participation, independent agencies, and
impact assessment in France highlights the tensions between traditional views of
administrative law and modem trends. The expertise of the bureaucracy and its
insulation from day-to-day politics were traditionally designed to preserve French
republican views of the public interest from the short-term partisan pressures of
political actors. As this faith in the civil service has eroded, the state faces demands
for more openness and public participation, on the one hand, and more systematic,
publicly justified reason giving, on the other. These demands are not always
complementary. Sometime expert social science conflicts with popular beliefs and
interests. Institutional innovations, such as independent regulatory agencies, are a
response to fears of over-politicization. They provide an institutional solution, not
one only based on an elite, meritocratic civil service. All are a challenge to
conventional French public law. The system has begun to respond to these pressures,
but they are still frequently resisted, and reforms have not coalesced around a
consensus view. However, the recent decisions of the French high courts suggest a
possible move toward more oversight of administrative processes. Furthermore, the
efforts of those inside and outside the government suggest a move toward more open
policymaking and the more systematic study of government programs. Future
developments are by no means clear, especially with a new president and
government, but the elements are in place to build upon recent reforms. It remains to
be seen whether the glimmers of change that we have isolated are passing fancies or
a real reformulation of policymaking that takes account of modem political and
technocratic realities.
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